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It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American criminal law that an offender must have 
performed the relevant criminal offence voluntarily. An instance of an offence occurring as a 
result of involuntary movements of the body, such as spasms or reflexes, generally gives rise to a 
claim of automatism, which is overwhelmingly characterised by courts and scholars alike as a 
‘defence’. However, such language has implications on the way in which we understand 
voluntariness in criminal law. Rather than categorising the situation as an instance in which a 
constituent element of the offence has not been fulfilled, courts seek to identify whether the 
defendant should be excused. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it gives rise to 
conceptual uncertainty, due to the inadequate labelling of the instance at hand. Second, it has the 
potential of casting the net of criminalisation too wide, as courts are sceptic and overwhelmingly 
cautious in acquitting defendants who allege to have moved involuntarily.  
This study adopts the view that automatism is not a defence, but rather a denial that the offence 
ever happened, due to the requirement of voluntariness having not been fulfilled. In turn, the 
question then becomes: ‘How should the voluntariness requirement be defined in the context of 
criminal responsibility?’ The present thesis seeks to answer this central question by adopting a 
multi-disciplinary perspective, engaging in philosophical and neuroscientific analyses on the 
nature of voluntary movement. Drawing from these areas of research, it is argued that the criminal 
law should adopt a definition of voluntariness based on one’s retention of sufficient bodily control 
to move otherwise. Such a conceptualisation would align the requirement with a philosophical 
understanding of free action based on the availability of alternative possibilities. Moreover, it 
would place the voluntariness requirement on a sounder empirical footing, given the existence of 
neuroscientific evidence that traces back the regulation and inhibition of movement to specific, 
identifiable cognitive processes. The proposed definition of voluntariness would apply to all 
assessments of criminal responsibility, as an element of the offence, thus relinquishing the 
application of an automatism ‘defence’. Beyond practical implications, the thesis is also 
methodologically significant, due to the incorporation of cognitive neuroscience and hypnosis 
iv 
 
research into the legal analysis of voluntariness. In this context, the present study contributes to 
the growing field of ‘neurolaw’, which combines law and neuroscience to influence legal 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
AUTOMATISM AND VOLUNTARINESS: ................................................................. i 
DECLARATION .............................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ ii 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
1. Context and Rationale .................................................................................................... 1 
a. The Voluntariness Requirement .................................................................................... 2 
b. The Relationship Between Automatism and Voluntariness ........................................ 5 
2. Significance of the Thesis ............................................................................................. 15 
3. Methodology and Theoretical Framework ................................................................. 18 
4. Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 25 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................. 27 
UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN LEGAL DISCOURSE ..................... 27 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 27 
2. Statutory Rules and Guidance ..................................................................................... 28 
3. Situational Liability ...................................................................................................... 33 
4. Trigger Slip Cases ......................................................................................................... 36 
5. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder .................................................................................. 40 
6. Sleepwalking .................................................................................................................. 44 
7. Hypnosis ......................................................................................................................... 47 
8. Dangerous Intoxicants .................................................................................................. 50 
9. Non-Dangerous Intoxicants .......................................................................................... 55 
10. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 60 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................. 64 
UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN A PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT . 64 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 64 
2. What is the Target of Voluntariness? ......................................................................... 66 
a. Bodily Movements ..................................................................................................... 66 
vi 
 
b. Act Descriptions ........................................................................................................ 75 
3. Voluntariness and the Structure of Offence Elements .............................................. 77 
4. What is Voluntariness? ................................................................................................. 81 
a. Volition ....................................................................................................................... 81 
b. Intention ..................................................................................................................... 87 
c. Control ....................................................................................................................... 96 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 108 
CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................ 111 
UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN A NEUROSCIENTIFIC CONTEXT
 ....................................................................................................................................... 111 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 111 
2. Processes Underlying the Control of Bodily Movements ........................................ 119 
a. Areas of the Brain Involved in Movement ............................................................ 119 
b. Go/No-Go/Stop ........................................................................................................ 123 
c. Further Evidence of Impairments to the Control Mechanism ........................... 131 
3. Habitual Movements and Inhibition of Movement .................................................. 134 
4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 140 
CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................ 143 
CASE STUDY: HYPNOSIS AND THE VOLUNTARINESS REQUIREMENT 143 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 143 
2. Hypnosis and Control Functions ............................................................................... 147 
a. Can Hypnotised Subjects Move Otherwise? ......................................................... 147 
b. Can Hypnotised Subjects Resist Suggestions? ..................................................... 154 
3. The Relevance of Hypnotisability .............................................................................. 162 
4. General Implications for the Current Legal Framework ....................................... 162 
5. Implications for the Proposed Model of Voluntariness ........................................... 165 
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 167 
CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................ 169 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 169 
1. Significance of Study ................................................................................................... 169 
2. Practical Implications of the Proposed Model .......................................................... 172 
a. The Impact of a Definition of Voluntariness on the Existing Case Law ............ 172 
b. The Impact of a Definition of Voluntariness on the Burden of Proof ................ 174 
c. The Use of Disposal Powers in Cases of Involuntary Movement ........................ 178 
d. The Role of Prior Fault ........................................................................................... 180 
vii 
 
3. Summary of Findings ................................................................................................. 183 
4. Limitations ................................................................................................................... 187 
5. Recommendations to Law-Making Bodies ............................................................... 190 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 194 
Cases ..................................................................................................................................... 194 
England and Wales ......................................................................................................... 194 
Scotland ............................................................................................................................ 195 
Canada ............................................................................................................................. 195 
Australia........................................................................................................................... 195 
New Zealand .................................................................................................................... 195 
United States .................................................................................................................... 195 
European Court of Human Rights ................................................................................ 196 
Legislation ............................................................................................................................ 196 
Other Primary Sources ....................................................................................................... 196 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABH Actual Bodily Harm 
ADHD Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
AmPhilQ American Philosophical Quarterly 
Annu Rev Law Soc Sci  The Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
BCLRev Boston College Law Review 
BehavSci&L Behavioral Sciences and the Law 
BuffCrimLR Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
Cardozo LRev Cardozo Law Review 
CLJ Cambridge Law Journal 
CLP Current Legal Problems 
CrimLR Criminal Law Review 
CUP Cambridge University Press 
ColumLRev Columbia Law Review 
DLS Dorsolateral Striatum 
ECHR Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
EEG Encephalography  
fMRI Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
FordhamLR Fordham Law Review 
Hous J Int'L Houston Journal of International Law 
Int'l JL & Psychiatry International Journal of law and Psychiatry 
Iran J Neurol  Iranian Journal of Neurology 
J Abnorm Child Psychol          Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 
J Am Acad Psychiatry Law     Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 
JL&Soc Journal of Law and Society  
ix 
 
JLB Journal of Law and the Biosciences 
JPsychiatry&L Journal of Psychiatry and law 
Law & IneqJ Law and Inequality 
LQR Law Quarterly Review 
M1 Primary Motor Cortex 
MCC Model Criminal Code 
MLR Modern Law Review 
MPC Model Penal Code  
MRI Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
NILQ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
OJLS Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
OUP Oxford University Press 
PAP Principle of Alternate Possibilities  
PFC Prefrontal Cortex 
preSMA Pre-supplementary Motor Area 
PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
SOA 
SocPhil&Pol’y  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 
Social Philosophy and Policy  
SMA Supplementary Motor Area 
Stan L Rev The Stanford Law Review 
UPaLRev University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
UPittLRev University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
VMPFC Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex  
VUWLR   Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 
WLR The Weekly Law Reports 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                                       Page 
  1    Human Motor Cortex ......................................................................................................... 119 
  2    Illustration of Brain Regions .............................................................................................. 120 
  3   Spatial Organisation of Areas Controlling Movement in Different Parts of the Body......  121 
  4    Motor Areas in the Frontal Lobe ......................................................................................... 122 







1. Context and Rationale  
The legal requirement that an offender must have committed the relevant criminal offence 
voluntarily is universally accepted within case law, statutes and textbooks.1 Such an 
acknowledgement rests on the fact that, as a minimum condition for criminal responsibility, the 
conduct in question should be attributed to the defendant where they act as an autonomous agent. 
However, despite references to such a requirement within legal documents and scholarship, no 
precise definition of voluntariness can be identified within case law or statutes. This is 
problematic, as the lack of clarity and consistency risks negatively impacting legal certainty and 
fairness. On a fundamental level, such an approach is at odds with common law rules, both in 
terms of not treating like cases alike and in respect of not giving adequate notice to members of 
society as to the legal consequences of their conduct.2  
This thesis seeks to address the challenging issues prompted by the voluntariness requirement’s 
lack of legal definition. In other words, the main question that the thesis pursues is the following: 
‘How should voluntariness be defined in the context of criminal responsibility?’. Adopting the 
methodological approach of exploring conceptualisations of voluntariness across multiple 
disciplines, the study seeks to identify and recommend a definition that is grounded on a sounder 
theorical footing. Here, it is argued that a multi and interdisciplinary approach, which goes beyond 
the legal sphere and includes philosophical and neuroscientific enquiries, is needed to understand 
the concept and enable the reconstruction of its essential role within the law. In this context, the 
 
1 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 409 (Lord Denning): ‘The requirement 
that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal case.’; see 
also Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 72; and Jonathan Herring, 
Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2014) 104.  
2 See for example Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234, 1234 (Lord Gardiner LC): 
‘Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is 
the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which 




thesis draws together theoretical and empirical lessons from discrete disciplines to propose a 
working definition of voluntariness. To illustrate how this could apply in practice, the thesis 
explores the proposed definition in the unique context of hypnotic movement, which has often 
been categorised as involuntary by courts, but with little explanation as to the rationale behind 
such a classification.3 
The remainder of this chapter explores the way in which courts and statutes have positioned the 
principle of voluntariness in criminal law and further explains why the lack of detail and definition 
is problematic. Moreover, the relationship between the voluntariness requirement and automatism 
is discussed, as it is argued that much of the current conceptual confusion rests on the interplay 
between these. Understanding this relationship will also enable a discussion as to the significance 
of this study and its potential impact for criminal responsibility assessments. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the structure of the thesis and outlines in greater detail the theoretical framework upon 
which it is based.  
 
a. The Voluntariness Requirement  
Within multiple common law jurisdictions, some consistency can be identified in terms of the 
acknowledgement of a requirement that an offence must have been committed voluntarily in order 
to be characterised as criminal. This appears to be the case both in codified and uncodified legal 
systems. For example, according to Lord Denning in Bratty v Attorney General of Northern 
Ireland:  
The requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder 
case, but also in every criminal case. No act is punishable if it is done 
involuntarily.4 
Similarly, it was argued in the Canadian case of Parks that:  
 
3 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [22] (Hughes LJ). For further detail, see Chapter 5. 
4 [1963] AC 386, 409 (Lord Denning). 
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Our system of justice is predicated on the notion that only those who act voluntarily 
should be punished under the criminal law.5 
In the United States, the requirement is enshrined in the Model Penal Code (MPC), which 
excludes liability in the absence of a voluntary act or the omission to act within physical 
capabilities.6 Whilst the Code is not in itself legally binding, it has shaped the laws of various 
states such as New York or Montana, which have positioned the requirement as a fundamental or 
a minimal element of criminal responsibility in their respective penal codes.7  
From a normative standpoint, the voluntariness requirement is often referred to as the irreducible 
minimum condition for criminal responsibility.8 Going beyond one’s ability to physically move 
their bodies, it is said that it is the voluntariness of the person that contributes to their responsible 
agency and autonomy.9 To criminalise people when they are involuntary would thus amount to 
an injustice. As society generally considers only voluntarily committed actions (or omissions) as 
suitable grounds for assessing the level of blameworthiness of the agent, neither deterrence nor 
punishment would be heightened by criminalising involuntary conduct.10 Therefore, whether we 
conceptualise criminal responsibility in terms of the infliction of harms, or the expression of 
(moral or character based) wrongs, ascription of such harms or wrongs to the defendant would 
require first a demonstration of agency. The most basic level of agency required for all criminal 
 
5 R v Parks [1992] 2 SCR 871, 874 (La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier JJ). See also the Australian case 
of Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [18] (Windeyer J): ‘That an act is only punishable as a crime when it is 
the voluntary act of the accused is a statement satisfying in its simplicity.’ 
6 US Model Penal Code, s.2.01(1): ‘A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on 
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.’  
7 See for example s.15.10 of the New York Penal Law: ‘The minimal requirement for criminal liability is 
the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act 
which he is physically capable of performing […]’; and s.45-2-202 of the Montana Code Annotated 2019: 
‘A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty that 
the law imposes on the offender and that the offender is physically capable of performing […]’ 
8 Ian P Farrell and Justin F Marceau, ‘Taking Voluntariness Seriously’ (2013) 54 BCLRev 1545, 1598. See 
also A P Simester, ‘On the So-called Requirement for Voluntary Action’ (1998) 1 BuffCrimLR 403, 406: 
‘The foundation of moral responsibility is not action but voluntariness’. 
9 Antony Duff, ‘Action, the Act Requirement and Criminal Liability’ (2004) 55 Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 69, 70. See also Horder (n 1) 72. This thesis adopts a gender-neutral language, 
using ‘they/their’ as a singular pronoun.  
10 Unless there is a prior fault on the part of the defendant. See also Robert Schopp, Automatism, Insanity, 
and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility: A Philosophical Inquiry (CUP 1991) 5.  
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offences (including strict liability offences) is that the defendant acted or omitted to act 
voluntarily.11   
At the same time, despite the acknowledgement of the principle and its significance across 
multiple common law jurisdictions, there is a lack of detail as to what being ‘voluntary’ actually 
means for legal purposes. For instance, in England and Wales, beyond issuing statements 
recognising the existence of the requirement, no overarching definition or guidance can be 
identified as to how to distinguish a voluntary from an involuntary act. In most cases, case law 
and legislation are focused on those instances in which a movement should be categorised as 
involuntary, as opposed to assessing a movement against a standard of voluntariness. This is 
unsuitable, as it contributes to shifting the focus of the criminal assessment from that of 
establishing that the elements of an offence have been fulfilled, to that of applying a ‘defence’.12  
Equally, the lack of definition, as well as the fact that courts adopt multiple interpretations of 
‘(in)voluntariness’ within case law, runs the risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty, 
particularly in common law jurisdictions, where courts are bound by precedent. This principle 
underpins the rule of law as recognised across the world.13 Modern and historic texts frequently 
reference the idea that citizens should be able to know in advance the legal consequences that 
stem from committing themselves to a particular course of action.14 Moreover, such a principle is 
also acknowledged as instrumental in the development of domestic laws that respect human 
rights.15 In the context of the criminal law, legal certainty is mostly concerned with the idea that 
 
11 J J Child and Alan Reed, ‘Automatism Is Never a Defence’ (2014) 65 NILQ 167, 176. 
12 This argument is developed in Subsection b.  
13 James R Maxeiner, ‘Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law’ (2008) 
31 Hous J Int’L 27, 28. 
14 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591, 638 (Lord 
Diplock); see also Francis Bacon quoted in R v Misra and Srivastava [2005] 1 Cr App R 328, [32] (Judge 
LJ): ‘For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? So if the law give 
an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn before it strikes…’ 
15 See for example Maestri v Italy (39748/98) [2004] ECHR 76 (17 February 2004) para 30: ‘The law 
should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if 
need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.’ 
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individuals must be given notice of the applicable rules so that they can regulate their conduct 
and avoid punishment. According to the House of Lords in R v Rimmington and Goldstein:  
There are two guiding principles: no one should be punished under a law unless 
it is sufficiently clear and certain to enable him to know what conduct is 
forbidden before he does it; and no one should be punished for any act which was 
not clearly and ascertainably punishable when the act was done.16 
The absence of a clearly defined requirement of voluntariness in law, despite its status as an 
essential and minimum condition of criminal responsibility, sits directly at odds with the above 
statement. Given that voluntariness is a constituent element of all criminal offences, an 
insufficiently outlined definition puts assessments of liability at risk. As Judge LJ highlights, 
vague laws may effectively impede the identification of a relevant prohibited conduct, forcing 
judges ‘to guess at the ingredients of a purported crime’ and thus making a conviction ‘unsafe’.17 
Continuous references to a need for voluntariness, but without clarifying how it is to be identified, 
leaves the requirement in ambiguity as to its status and application. Furthermore, in a common 
law jurisdiction based on precedent, the absence of a legal definition facilitates an inconsistent 
approach in which like cases may not actually be treated alike.18 
 
b. The Relationship Between Automatism and Voluntariness 
In part, the lack of a definition of voluntariness can be attributed to the relatively few instances in 
which courts are faced with the issue, thus reducing opportunity for ‘law-making’ in this area. 
Generally, courts operate on the assumption that all offences are committed voluntarily, except in 
a select few cases where the defendant raises the issue that their movements had been 
 
16 [2006] 1 AC 459, 482 (Lord Bingham) (emphasis added). 
17 R v Misra and Strivastava [2005] 1 Cr App R 328, [34] (Judge LJ). 
18 See for example Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234, 1234 (Lord Gardiner LC): 
‘Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is 
the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which 
individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules’. 
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involuntary.19 However, central to much of the conceptual confusion regarding the voluntariness 
requirement, and its meaning and position within the structure of offence elements, has been that 
assessments of voluntariness (or lack thereof) have mainly taken place through the use of 
automatism. This is a claim raised by defendants when they allege that they had been involuntary 
at the time of the offence. In contrast with the requirement itself, which can be characterised as 
an element of an offence, automatism has been overwhelmingly described as a defence by courts, 
law-makers and scholars alike.20 However, the co-existence of both the requirement and the 
automatism ‘defence’ has contributed to a lack of clarity as to what voluntariness means in law, 
as well as to the role that is left for the requirement in light of the overwhelming reliance on 
automatism to make assessments of involuntariness. More significantly, such reliance, and 
particularly the development of case law focusing on ascertaining whether a movement is 
involuntary, rather than voluntary, has masked the need for adequately rationalising voluntariness 
for legal purposes.  
Generally, a claim of automatism is introduced where the defendant claims that, at the time of the 
offence, they had been involuntary or in some way ‘automatic’. A frequently cited definition of 
such instance is that of Lord Denning in Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland:  
An act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a 
spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion, or an act done by a person who is not 
conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from 
concussion or whilst sleep-walking.21  
If a movement is found to have been involuntary, automatism operates to prevent liability for the 
alleged offence. However, depending on the trigger that leads to the involuntariness, the law 
distinguishes between automatism of the ‘sane’ and ‘insane’ kind. Specifically, where the 
 
19 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 413 (Lord Denning): ‘a man’s act is 
presumed to be voluntary unless there is evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that it was 
involuntary’.  
20 See for example Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [24] (LJ Hughes); and Law Commission, Criminal 
Liability: Insanity and Automatism Discussion Paper (July 2013) para 1.27; and Paul H Robinson, 
‘Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis’ (1982) 82 ColumLRev 199, 204. 
21 [1963] AC 386, 409 (Lord Denning).  
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automatism is caused by an external factor, then the defendant is acquitted. Examples include 
being ‘attacked by a swarm of bees’ whilst driving or being ‘stunned by a blow on the head from 
a stone’ from passing traffic,22 as well as reacting to prescribed drugs such as insulin.23  
In contrast, if the automatism is caused by an internal factor such as a mental or physical 
condition,24 the defendant is found ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ and is subjected to 
restrictions proportionate to the level of danger they may pose to society.25 Such a distinction 
between external and internal triggers has been consistently criticised within the literature for the 
unfair results it may lead to,26 with the most poignant example being that of diabetes. Whereas 
hyperglycaemia can be triggered by someone forgetting to take insulin, hypoglycaemia can result 
from having a reaction to insulin.27 However, involuntariness that arises from these two 
circumstances is treated differently, with the former instance being categorised as a case of 
‘insanity’, and the latter leading to an acquittal. For present purposes, it is worth noting that these 
seemingly arbitrary separations have contributed to the conceptual confusion regarding the 
relationship between the voluntariness requirement and the doctrine of automatism. This can be 
attributed primarily to the development of multiple legal principles that assess the same aspect, 
namely voluntariness, and the lack of clarification as to how voluntariness should be defined. 
 
22 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 286 (Pearson J).  
23 See for example Broome v Perkins [1991] 2 QB 92; and R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760; and R v Quick 
[1973] QB 910.  
24 These include epilepsy, sleepwalking or even hyperglycaemia. See R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156; R v 
Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92; and R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287. 
25 Such restrictions range from an absolute discharge, i.e. release, to being detained in a hospital, in 
accordance with the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s.5. See also R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156, 172 
(Lord Diplock): ‘The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 
1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous conduct.’; and Arlie Loughnan, 
Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (OUP 2012) 166: ‘It is clear that the special verdict 
is both premised on and signals that the insane defendant is dangerous, a construction that has proved 
remarkably durable [...].’ 
26 The distinction has been described as ‘incoherent and arbitrary’, ‘illogical’, and even ‘little short of a 
disgrace’. See Law Commission (n 20) para 5.39; William Wilson, Irshaad  Ebrahim, Peter Fenwick and R 
Marks, ‘Violence, Sleepwalking, and the Criminal Law, Part 2: The Legal Aspects’ [2005] CrimLR 614, 
617; and Lord Justice Davis in Law Commission (n 20) para 1.46. 
27 Hyperglycaemia refers to a state of exceedingly high blood sugar levels, which are generally brought 
down by taking insulin. In contrast, hypoglycaemia is a state of exceedingly low blood sugar levels, which 
may arise, among others, as a result of taking insulin. 
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To some extent, one could understand why automatism has been widely categorised as a defence, 
most often as an excuse.28  From a criminal responsibility viewpoint, it is often argued that a 
factor in the constitution of excuses is that the agent does not have the capacity and fair 
opportunity to avoid the wrongdoing.29 For example, according to Wilson, not following the law 
must primarily reflect an attitude towards the rule in question.30 However, when a person lacks 
the ability to make the choice of breaking the rule because they ‘could not help doing what [they] 
did’, then the law intervenes to excuse them.31 As such, automatism as an excusatory defence is 
generally described in the way that some characteristic of the actor, be it a medical condition or a 
reaction to an external trigger, vitiated society’s interest in punishing them.32 When that behaviour 
is not the creation of the agent’s voluntary effort or determination, or when the actor does not 
adequately perceive the nature or consequences of the behaviour, society is usually willing to 
excuse that agent.33 A distinction is created between behavioural weaknesses indicating a 
dangerous or antisocial character and those weaknesses that are part of being a normal human 
being, the latter scenario excusing those ‘one-off’ reactions which are able to block the attribution 
of blame.34 
At the same time, adopting the view that automatism is a defence contributes to further 
uncertainty. First, the mere fact that central to automatism assessments is the involuntariness of 
one’s movement is hard to reconcile with the existence of a requirement of voluntariness as an 
element of the offence. Second, viewing automatism as a defence implies that both the actus reus 
 
28 Most of the literature categorising automatism as a defence has regarded it as an excuse. See for example 
Robinson (n 20) 221: ‘a disability causing an excusing condition’ (emphasis added); and Wilson William 
Wilson, ‘How Criminal Defences Work’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) with Nicola Wake and 
Emma Smith, General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 
2014)18: ‘a kind of exculpatory wild card’. Others have referred to it as an exemption. See footnote 47. 
29 The emphasis on capacity and opportunity comes from Hart and has broadly been endorsed within the 
literature. See KJM Smith and William Wilson, ‘Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: 
Reworking Hart's Theory of Excuses--The English Judicial Response’, (1993) 13 OJLS 69. Other 
academics would support a combination of different theories of responsibility, including capacity, character 
and choice theories. See Jeremy Horder, ‘Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (1993) 
12 Law and Philosophy 193. 
30 William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2002) 333. 
31 ibid 334. 
32 Robinson (n 20) 229. 
33 ibid. 
34 Wilson (n 28) 16. See also Loughnan (n 25) 131; and Arlie Loughnan, ‘“Manifest Madness”: Towards a 
New Understanding of the Insanity Defence’ (2007) 70 MLR 379, 399. 
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and mens rea of the offence have been fulfilled but that there is a strong reason that excuses the 
defendant from punishment. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between certain conditions that 
impair one’s ability to reflect on the circumstances and consequences of their actions and those 
cases in which movement is involuntary. Excusing an offence implies that there is a movement 
that can be attributed to the agent acting as an autonomous agent, which occurred in the proscribed 
circumstances or achieved a prohibited result, coupled with an intention or other mental state that 
is tied to the relevant action. According to Duff, it requires the defendant to admit that they ‘got 
it wrong’ and that they failed to exercise ‘capacities for rational deliberation and action’.35 That 
is, excuses still operate ‘within the realm of practical reason’, even if that happens ‘deficiently’.36 
However, involuntary movements such as spams or reflexes do not involve practical reason and 
are not reflective of something of which agents can assume ownership. According to Murphy: 
talk of an excuse here seems to make no more sense than would talk of excusing a 
rock for falling on one’s head.37 
Another factor that contributes to confusion in this area of law relates to the evidential requirement 
needed to satisfy claims of automatism or insanity. In cases of sane automatism, the law operates 
under a presumption of ‘mental capacity’, according to which a person’s action is assumed to be 
voluntary ‘unless there is evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that it was 
involuntary.’38 That is, it is only once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to warrant 
claims of automatism (satisfies an evidential burden) that the prosecution must prove that the 
defendant had been voluntary.39 In the case of insanity, the presumption to be rebutted is that of 
‘sanity’, which dates back to the M’Naghten Case:   
 
35 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
287. 
36 ibid.  
37 Jeffrie F Murphy, ‘Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability’ (1971) 81 Ethics 332, 332. 
38 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 413 (Lord Denning).  
39 ibid. See also Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 407 (Viscount Kilmuir LC): 
‘normally the presumption of mental capacity is sufficient to prove that he acted consciously and 
voluntarily’. For more information on the distinction between evidential and legal burdens of proof, see 





[…] the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be 
sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, 
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction.40 
 
In contrast with sane automatism, where the defendant is faced with an evidential burden to raise 
the issue, but it is ultimately the prosecution’s task to disprove the automatism,41 in insanity, the 
defendant has a legal burden to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the ‘defence’ should 
apply.42 This is the only ‘common law exception’43 to the principle that the legal burden of proof 
rests on the prosecution, for even in cases of duress or self-defence, the defendant only has an 
evidential burden to raise the issue, rather than prove it.44 In fact, the Law Commission has 
acknowledged that the reverse burden violates the presumption of innocence enshrined in Art. 
6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).45 Usually, this approach is justified 
on the basis that it would be too onerous on the prosecution to prove ‘a matter so personal to the 
defendant’ as their ‘sanity’.46 Normatively, it is also said that society should be protected where 
‘questionable cases’ are at ‘risk of success’.47 However, this argument is more persuasive in 
respect of cases in which the defendant was voluntary, but could not understand what they were 
doing, as opposed to those in which the defendant was not voluntary.48 In other words, while it 
may be acceptable to require sufficient proof that someone should be excused, this is not the case 
 
40 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Clark and Finnelly 200, 8 ER 718722. 
41 That is, the defence must provide ‘only such evidence as would, if believed and uncontradicted, induce 
a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable jury’ as to whether the defendant had been involuntary. See 
Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (12th ed 2010) 152; and Law Commission (n ) para 8.2. 
42 The rules are also unique in that the prosecution can also raise the issue of insanity, but in this case, this 
needs to be proved to the criminal standard, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt. For further detail see Loughnan 
(n ) 380. 
43 Burdens of proof can also be reversed by statute, e.g. s.75 of Sexual Offences Act 2003 on absence of 
consent, s.6 of the Public Order Act 1986, on involuntary intoxication etc. For further information see Doak, 
McGourlay and Thomas (n 41) 52-54; and Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd 
edn, OUP 2010) 266. 
44 See for example David Hamer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ 
(2007) 66 The Cambridge Law Journal 142, 148. Compared to other defences such as duress and self-
defence, the burden is a legal, rather than an evidential one.  
45 Law Commission (n 20) para 8.43. 
46 Foye [2013] EWCA Crim 475, [33]. 
47 Stephen J Morse, ‘Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered’ (1985) 58 Southern 
California Law Review 799, 824. 
48 This would relate to cases where a person performs the elements of the offence, including voluntariness 
and mens rea, but should nevertheless be excused (e.g. due to having performed the offence while 
hallucinating etc.)  
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when voluntariness is lacking, for it would place the onus of proving a definitional element of an 
offence on the defendant. The risk of leaving society unprotected could be mitigated with the use 
of disposal powers, which are already in place where defendants are found ‘not guilty by reason 
of insanity’.49 
At the same time, even if the burden of proof of insanity (as it relates to a lack of voluntariness) 
were to change to that of sane automatism, there are a number of problematic aspects that should 
be highlighted. On one hand, requiring the defendant to produce sufficient evidence as to their 
involuntariness is not necessarily contentious, as long as it is acknowledged that the ultimate 
burden of proving voluntariness rests on the prosecution. This would make it more feasible and 
efficient for prosecutions to take place. On the other hand, existing conceptual uncertainties 
surrounding the legal meaning of voluntariness and the relationship between the requirement of 
voluntariness and the ‘defence’ of automatism would remain, which could have a negative impact 
on evidential rules.50 First, the co-existence of a requirement of voluntariness and a ‘defence’ of 
automatism leads to unnecessary complexity, given that the prosecution may have to prove 
different levels of voluntariness according to the claim in question. Second, more conceptually, it 
is not clear why automatism and insanity (in relation to a lack of voluntariness) claims should 
rebut a presumption of mental capacity or sanity, rather than one of voluntariness. Such a 
categorisation can be traced back to a lack of clarification in the law as to the relationship between 
the requirement of voluntariness and the ‘defences’ of automatism and insanity. While a 
presumption of voluntariness as a definitional element could be imposed to make prosecutions 
more feasible, it is not apparent why presumptions of mental capacity or sanity should apply in 
relation to voluntariness. Such an approach contributes to legal confusion and lack of clarity and 
further demonstrates why research into the meaning and significance of voluntariness should be 
carried out, to understand whether it is appropriate to link the notion with mental abilities. 
 
49 For further detail on the disposal powers and their role once a legal definition of voluntariness is 
introduced, see Chapter 6.2.c.  
50 These are addressed below.  
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Certainly, from a practical viewpoint, one could argue that, given both the scarcity with which 
courts are faced with the issue of voluntariness and the existence of rules stemming from 
automatism and insanity case law, there is no need to define voluntariness and to explore its 
position within the structure of offence elements. That is, the absence of a definition of 
voluntariness in law is not problematic enough, considering that there are already rules and 
presumptions in place to help identify involuntariness. Moreover, it could be argued that 
categorising automatism and insanity as exemptions or denials of responsibility, rather than 
excuses,51 would resolve the ambiguities stemming from voluntariness assessments under the 
remit of a defence. In other words, rather than developing a standard of voluntariness as a 
definitional element of an offence, it may be sufficient to acknowledge that a person’s movements 
cannot be subjected to moral evaluation, as there are no reasons or motives for performing them.52 
In this way, the current rules would continue to apply, but under the label of a doctrine, rather 
than defence. For instance, as Loughnan argues, automatism and insanity could be categorised as 
‘exculpatory mental incapacity doctrines’, to indicate that the defendants making these claims 
‘are not individuals to whom the criminal law – as a normative system – speaks’.53  
Notwithstanding the above, the present thesis adopts the view that developing a definition of 
voluntariness as an element of an offence is to be preferred, as it would alleviate conceptual and 
practical issues associated with the current application of the rules. First, as mentioned above, the 
co-existence of the voluntariness requirement and the automatism and/or insanity rules adds 
conceptual confusion to the criminal law and affects certainty in respect of what types of cases 
 
51 Gardner argues that excuses focus on the reasons people act in a certain way but where it is impossible 
to make sense of people’s rationales due to profound illness or other factors, there is no need for excuses 
altogether. According to the author, self-respect is something anyone should deserve, i.e. the ability to 
provide a logical, rational account of themselves and to show that their actions are those of someone who 
seeks to ‘live up to the proper standards for success’ and ‘fitness to lead it’. See John Gardner, ‘The Gist of 
Excuses’ in John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law 
(OUP 2007) 132, 133. A similar argument is provided by Horder, who focuses on the difference between 
accidents that can be attributed to an individual and those which are wholly involuntary, the latter leading 
to a complete denial of responsibility. See Jeremy Horder, ‘Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity’ (1993) 
52 The Cambridge Law Journal 298, 299.  
52 Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime (OUP 2004) 9. 
53 Loughnan (n 25) 18. See also Arlie Loughnan, ‘Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law’ (2012) 15 
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal 1.  
13 
 
should be judged under which category. For example, certain categories of cases such as ‘trigger 
slip’ cases or situational liability may be judged under the requirement, while involuntariness due 
to sleepwalking or diabetes may be judged under insanity or automatism.54 This issue is further 
exacerbated by the rationalisation of (in)voluntariness by reference to multiple concepts such as 
consciousness or control, without a uniform standard applicable to all cases.55 Such an approach 
is again, deeply problematic for legal certainty and the consistent application of the law.  
Second, beyond the conceptual importance of accurately classifying automatism as a denial of an 
offence element, there are negative, practical implications stemming from the lack of definition 
and the assessment of voluntariness under the heading of automatism/insanity. In the attempt to 
pursue policy considerations and prevent defendants from making ‘bogus claims’,56 there is the 
risk of over-criminalising individuals. This is illustrated through the development of automatism 
case law within the past few decades and the progressive narrowing of instances in which 
defendants would be categorised as involuntary.57 For example, whilst originally, cases such as 
erratic driving triggered by an insulin reaction had been considered as an involuntary 
occurrence,58 subsequent cases have narrowed the rule to the point that nothing short of a ‘total 
destruction of control’ is accepted in order to categorise a defendant as involuntary.59 Such an 
approach could be traced back to the categorisation of automatism as a defence, with courts 
seeking to prevent claims from those deemed morally culpable and undeserving of acquittal. 
Rather than focusing on establishing whether an element of the offence had been completed, 
courts take much broader considerations into account, which should only be addressed once 
voluntariness is ascertained.60 This means that in order to prevent claims, a wide view of 
 
54 See Chapter 2. 
55 See Chapter 2 for an illustration of the multiple concepts that have been used to define voluntariness in 
law. 
56 Loughnan (n 25) 163. 
57 The narrowing of the automatism rules is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
58 R v Quick [1973] QB 910. 
59 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91, 105 (Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ). The trend 
started with case involving driving offences, as seen in Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321, and 
later in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91, where it was stated that driving under 
impaired control, without awareness, was not sufficient to be categorised as involuntary. More recently, the 
rule was affirmed in the leading case of R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 223, [18] (LJ Hughes). 
60 Such considerations relate primarily to prior fault.  
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voluntariness is taken, which makes the application of the ‘defence’ virtually impossible. If the 
rules of automatism – and those of insanity as they relate to the issue of voluntariness – were 
abolished and the law focused on voluntariness as an offence element instead, it is natural to 
assume that courts would be more cautious in developing a test as stringent as the present one.61 
Shifting the perspective in this manner would most likely lead to a narrower view of voluntariness 
that would not go as far as only classifying as involuntary a complete destruction of control.62 
From a criminal justice viewpoint, one would assume that the danger of criminalising individuals 
who have not actually committed an element of the offence overshadows the risk of defendants 
abusing the law. Indeed, a presumption of voluntariness could be imposed to increase efficiency 
and make prosecutions feasible. However, the defendant would have to satisfy an evidential 
burden, as opposed to a legal one (i.e. to prove their involuntariness on the balance of 
probabilities). Moreover, in contrast with existing automatism rules, the prosecution would be 
required to apply a uniform standard and prove voluntariness as a definitional element of the 
offence, rather than preventing the application of an ‘excuse’ or ‘exemption’, or mitigate against 
the risk of ‘fanciful defences’.63 Such an approach would be fairer and avoid the over-
criminalisation of defendants who do not complete the elements of an offence.    
Once we accept that automatism and insanity (as it relates to voluntariness) are not defences, but 
merely illustrations of the fact that the voluntariness requirement has not been fulfilled, then it 
becomes clear that a legal standard of voluntariness must be developed in order to ensure 
conceptual clarity, as well as consistency, within the criminal law framework. This standard 
should be imposed as a statutory definition, to be applied whenever the defendant’s level of 
voluntariness comes into question, irrespective of the circumstances in which the impairment to 
 
61 ibid. One could also consider the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Art. 6(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in light of the fact that it is not for the defendant to establish their 
innocence. According to Art. 6(2), ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law’. For further detail, see Chapter 6.2.a. 
62 ibid 175. As will be discussed throughout the thesis, one does not need to completely lose control to 
become involuntary.  
63 Glanville Williams, ‘Offences and Defences’ (1982) 2 Legal Studies 233, 235. 
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voluntariness may have taken place.64 Therefore, the ‘defences’ of automatism and insanity 
should be abolished and any issue of voluntariness should be applied by reference to a legal 
definition. What is yet to be clarified however, is the impact that such a definition would have on 
existing case law exploring the nature of voluntariness in the context of automatism and insanity. 
While these ‘defences’ have been inappropriately been categorised as such, they have 
nevertheless been concerned with the issues of voluntariness and may have served to produce 
some guidance on how to separate voluntary from involuntary conduct.65  
In this context, the analysis must focus on developing a legal definition of voluntariness, exploring 
the way in which it has been defined in case law and statutes, but also looking beyond the legal 
sphere to understand its meaning and significance across disciplines such as the philosophy of 
action and cognitive neuroscience. As such, the remainder of the present analysis will focus on 
identifying the parameters of the requirement, i.e. identifying the separating point between 
voluntary and involuntary movements, seeking to answer the central question of ‘How should 
voluntariness be defined in the context of criminal responsibility?’ 
 
2. Significance of the Thesis  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on criminal law theory in multiple ways. Most 
importantly, it is distinctive in proposing a legal definition of voluntariness. Efforts to reform the 
law in this area have been limited and have invariably focused on overhauling the application of 
the automatism rules, as opposed to the voluntariness requirement. For instance, in the past 
decade, the Law Commission for England and Wales has produced a Discussion Paper on 
 
64 For example, whether the defendant was at fault for becoming involuntary is a matter for subsequent 
consideration for the law.  
65 This issue is addressed in Chapter 2, where it is argued that courts have been associating voluntariness 
with notions of consciousness and control, but without adequately explaining why that association should 
be made. As such, it is argued that any statutory definition of voluntariness should be interpreted 
independently from existing case law, with the effect of overruling the existing law on automatism and 
insanity (as it relates to voluntariness). Inevitably, as statutory instruments as often incomplete, the same 
may occur here. However, the interpretation of the definition should be forward-looking, in line with the 
meaning and significance of the requirement as explored in the present analysis.  
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automatism and insanity, highlighting the need for reform in this area of law.66 Here, the 
Commission discussed important issues regarding the application of the rules, for instance in 
relation to the inappropriate terminology used to describe defendants suffering from both mental 
and physical medical conditions as ‘insane’.67 Moreover, the Commission tackled the widely 
criticised distinction between external and internal factors leading to distinct verdicts of 
automatism and insanity.68 However, the Paper continued to categorise automatism as a defence. 
In fact, it explicitly stated that the use of the word ‘voluntary’ should be avoided, due to potential 
misinterpretations arising from multiple conceptualisations.69 Rather than avoiding the concept 
of voluntariness, this thesis seeks to directly engage with alternative rationalisations of the 
requirement, drawing from disciplines outside the criminal law, to produce a comprehensive 
definition that is theoretically and empirically sound.  
The thesis also differentiates itself from previous attempts to reform the automatism defence by 
way of producing a definition of involuntariness. For instance, Claydon has recommended a test 
of involuntariness that should assist courts in the application of automatism and insanity rules, 
based around an actor’s lack of control and/or consciousness.70 Whilst such concepts are indeed 
relevant and are explored throughout the thesis, it is argued that a focus on what is it about 
movement that is involuntary, as opposed to voluntary, is unsuitable. Together with relevant case 
law and statutory instruments, such definitions can direct us towards more appropriate concepts 
for defining voluntariness.71 However, as the Introduction has highlighted so far, a focus on 
 
66 Law Commission (n 20). 
67 ibid 1.56. 
68 ibid 1.41. The Commission proposed a new defence of ‘recognised medical condition’, which would 
cover the majority of cases consisting of involuntary movements with the exception of a limited number of 
cases which would continue to be dealt with under the heading of sane automatism. The latter cases would 
include involuntariness triggered by non-medical reasons such as the oft-cited case of being attacked by a 
swarm of bees. See Law Commission (n 20) para 5.106.  
69 ibid A47. For further detail, see Chapter 2.2.  
70 Lisa Claydon, ‘Involuntary Action and Criminal Responsibility’ (PhD thesis, De Montfort University 
2001) 240: ‘Involuntariness would exist when an actor lacked any ability to control her movements, or 
when an actor lacked a sufficient degree of consciousness to have the capacity to monitor movement’. Here, 
Claydon has built the definition around Lord Denning’s statement in Bratty v Attorney General of Northern 
Ireland [1963] AC 386, 409: ‘`... an act which is done without any control by the mind, such as a spasm a 
reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing’. For a 
further discussion on the case law on automatism and insanity, see Chapter 2.  
71 For further detail see Chapter 2.1. 
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involuntariness, rather than voluntariness, is not only conceptually inappropriate, but can also 
have practical implications, resulting in overcriminalisation. This is attributable primarily to 
judicial scepticism and amplified concerns regarding the potential for defendants to abuse the 
‘defences’ of automatism and insanity. Since voluntariness is an offence element, what is 
important is to identify the threshold at which point an agent can be deemed to be voluntary. In 
this way, the thesis is unique in its objective of defining voluntariness as an essential ingredient 
of criminal responsibility. In turn, such a definition supports legal certainty, consistency and 
fairness in the application of criminal offences.  
In addition to its legal impact, the thesis is methodologically significant in its exploration of the 
concept of voluntariness across disciplines. Drawing from the philosophy of action and cognitive 
neuroscience to extricate themes, patterns and linkages across literature, the thesis relies on an 
multi and interdisciplinary methodology to propose a legal definition that is both theoretically and 
empirically based. In particular, incorporating neuroscientific evidence into this investigation, the 
thesis contributes to the rapidly growing field of ‘neurolaw’, which seeks to utilise neuroscientific 
knowledge to inform legal debates.72 ‘Neurolaw’ literature mentions the potential for 
neuroscience to shed light on the nature of voluntariness.73 However, no extensive attempts have 
been made to fully engage with empirical evidence and determine its explanatory power for the 
purposes of developing a legal definition of the requirement. In addition, the thesis uses hypnotic 
movements as a case study in which the proposed definition is applied, exploring existing research 
surrounding hypnotic movements and assessing whether such movements would be categorised 
as voluntary or not under the proposed definition. The thesis is also original is this respect, 
particularly given the frequent categorisation of hypnotic movements as involuntary within case 
 
72 Naturally, limitations exist in respect to such a methodology. For further information see Section 3 of the 
present chapter, as well as Chapter 4.1. 
73 See for example Deborah W Denno, ‘Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts’ [2002] 
87 Minnesota Law Review 269); and Michael S Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Minds, Brains, and Law: The 
Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2013) Chapter 5. 
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law, statutory instruments, and wider scholarship, but with little explanation as to why that 
classification should be made.74 
 
3. Methodology and Theoretical Framework  
In order to identify what the most suitable conceptualisation of the voluntariness requirement is, 
the present thesis extends beyond legal doctrine and interacts with disciplines that have engaged 
extensively with the question of ‘what it is to act voluntarily?’. Specifically, the thesis draws upon 
literature based in the philosophy of action and cognitive neuroscience. These areas have been 
selected because both have sought to unpack the meaning and role of voluntariness in human 
behaviour. Concepts and processes from both disciplines have also found explicit reference within 
a legal context, used to underpin judgments on automatism and (particularly criminal code-based) 
definitions of action and omission.75 For this reason, incorporating external areas of research helps 
us establish and justify a definition of voluntariness. Moreover, adopting a multi and 
interdisciplinary perspective enables us to test whether the assumptions upon which the law relies, 
for instance in the case of hypnotic movements, are supported or contradicted by empirical 
evidence. In this way, the importance of the project goes beyond practical implications to include 
methodological ones, connecting traditional methods of legal research with theoretical insights, 
as well as methods and techniques from these two disciplines.  
Rather than simply exploring the concept of voluntariness across disciplines, the thesis seeks to 
actively incorporate such knowledge and evidence into our legal investigation. Integrating 
perspectives from other disciplines within the legal sphere is largely supported within the 
literature. Proponents of such approaches argue that interdisciplinarity broadens legal discourse 
 
74 For further detail, see Chapters 2.7. and 5.  
75 When it comes to criminal codes, committees in both Australia and New Zealand have referenced 
philosophical intricacies as reasons for not clarifying concepts such as ‘conduct’ or ‘action’. See J J Child, 
‘Defence of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law from Philosophies of Action’ (2021) 24 
New Criminal Law Review; and New Zealand Report on 1989 Crimes Bill (1991) 9-12; and Australian 
Model Criminal Code, Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee (Commentary) s.202. In relation to case law, 
see for example cases related to sleepwalking or post-traumatic stress disorder, which placed the emphasis 
on consciousness as the dividing line between voluntary and involuntary behaviour; R v T [1990] Crim LR 
256; and R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92.  
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and allows for issues to be analysed within a wider conceptual framework, providing solutions 
through combinations of disciplinary perspectives.76 Moreover, as Nissani argues, this type of 
research can be placed on a spectrum ranging from lesser to greater degrees of synthesis between 
disciplines.77 The integration of distinct elements of different areas of research varies from partial, 
where these elements are not merged but simply juxtaposed, to complete, where aspects of 
different disciplines merge ‘into a single entity’.78 This thesis seeks to partially integrate elements 
from the philosophy of action, as well as cognitive neuroscience within legal research, with a 
view to produce a definition of voluntariness that should be applied within the criminal law.  
At the same time, the importance of doctrinal legal research as a foundation for interdisciplinary 
analyses should not be underestimated. That is, before we attempt to incorporate alternative 
perspectives into the present assessment, it is important to first explore the way in which the 
concept of voluntariness has been approached by courts and law-making bodies. Specifically, we 
must first identify whether alternative notions have been used to rationalise voluntariness, and 
whether a definition of the requirement may nevertheless be extricated from legal discourse. In 
recent decades, doctrinal research has come under scrutiny for failing to engage with issues 
beyond the letter of the law, to the point that certain academics have described it as ‘dead’ and in 
need of replacement.79 However, it is still the case that doctrinal methodology can provide the 
foundation for most legal projects before any interdisciplinary perspectives are included and 
relevant empirical evidence is identified. No theoretical critique of a legal framework can be 
provided without a solid foundation related to the status and authority of the doctrine being 
examined.80 As such, the first limb of the investigation, i.e. the legal one, analyses statutory codes, 
as well as courts’ language in categories of cases involving voluntary and involuntary movements. 
In Chapter 2, the primary objective is that of identifying what exactly are judges relying on in the 
 
76 See Douglas W Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 JL&Soc 163, 181. 
77 Moti Nissani, 'Fruits, Salads, and Smoothies: A Working Definition of Interdisciplinarity' (1995) 29 
Journal of Educational Thought 121, 124. 
78 ibid 125.  
79 Rob van Gestel and Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About 
Methodology?’ (2011) European University Institute, 1. 
80 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Taylor and Francis 2013) 7. 
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absence of a comprehensive definition of voluntariness, whether alternative language is being 
used, as well as the reasons for doing so. Such investigation of primary sources opens the 
possibility to subsequently engage with outer perspectives that help us understand the nature and 
role of the voluntariness requirement in law.  
Once the legal analysis is carried out, in Chapter 3, the philosophy of action, and particularly 
rationalisations of the nature of human action, provides depth to the legal understanding of 
voluntariness. Specifically, the philosophy of action helps shape an alternative legal framework 
based on a sounder theoretical foundation, and thus avoid the substantive law being negatively 
impacted by uncertainty. This is particularly the case as the voluntariness requirement in law can 
be traced back to the philosophy of conduct of the eighteenth century and it is said to have been 
translated into modern legal thinking by reference to the concept of ‘willed bodily movements’.81 
If we understand that criminal responsibility is supposed to require only voluntary movements, 
then any investigation into what it actually means to be voluntary should expect a philosophical 
account of the nature or the defining characteristics of voluntariness. With its complex 
engagement with the essence of human action, its source, and constituent elements, the 
philosophy of action is essential for exploring the meaning and significance of acting voluntarily. 
In turn, this allows for an initial development of a legal definition of voluntariness, focusing on 
what the target of the requirement should be and what concept should be used to define it, be it 
volition, intention, control, and so on.  
At the same time, it is important to emphasise that the philosophy of action does not present a 
unitary definition of voluntary action and, somewhat unsurprisingly, there have been multiple 
attempts at defining and rationalising the notion of voluntariness. Within this limb of the 
investigation, the analysis explores these alternative conceptualisations, relating them back to the 
descriptive and normative ideals of the legal requirement in order to produce a provisional 
 
81 See for example John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, Volume 1 
(Verlag Detlev Auvernmann KG 1972), Lectures XVIII-XIX; and HLA Hart, ‘Acts of Will and 
Responsibility’ in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 
90. The reference to willed bodily movements is also present in criminal law textbooks. See, for example, 
David Ormerod and others, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 60.  
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definition of voluntariness.82 In other words, the primary objective is to extricate those features 
of the requirement which can offer an understanding of voluntariness and its role within the legal 
framework, rather than developing a distinct theory of knowledge within the philosophy of action. 
In this sense, the thesis navigates across competing theories of action, being mindful of not 
conflating the needs of the voluntariness requirement with said theories. Here, it is argued that 
basic bodily movements should be considered the object of the voluntariness requirement. That 
is, the law should initially focus on those physical movements that are performed first in the chain 
of causation, rather than concentrate on the circumstances or effects of those movements. Second, 
the chapter turns to alternative conceptualisations of voluntariness, including control and 
conscious intention, which are cited by courts in reference to voluntary movements, but also terms 
such as ‘volitions’, which have traditionally been included within action theory as the source of 
voluntariness. Analysing these competing categorisations, the chapter concludes that a control-
based model is most suitable from a descriptive and normative viewpoint. A provisional definition 
of voluntariness is provided, consisting of ‘sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can 
move otherwise’. 
Equally, developing a legal framework by solely relying on the philosophy of action comes with 
its limitations, particularly given the breadth of multiple conceptualisations of voluntariness 
within this discipline. As such, in Chapter 4, exploring the nature of voluntary movement through 
neuroscience contributes to scientifically closing some of the gaps associated with philosophical 
rationalisations of voluntariness. That is, in addition to legal and philosophical perspectives on 
voluntariness, studies in cognitive neuroscience also help explain the nature of voluntary 
movement and test assumptions presented in earlier strands of the investigation. Analysing 
existing research on the nature of voluntariness and the way in which we restrain or inhibit our 
actions adds an important empirical layer to the legal investigation, primarily in terms of our 
underlying physiology. This is done by providing new insights into those faculties or capacities 
 
82 For example, references to notions such as consciousness or control are common within case law, but it 
is not entirely clear why these terms are used to describe voluntary conduct. See for example R v Coley 
[2013] EWCA Crim 233. This limb of the investigation could help understand whether the use of such 
terms is appropriate or not, i.e. whether the legal approach is supported by the philosophical one.  
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which are not visible to the naked eye but nevertheless essential in initiating and regulating 
movements. Assessing the impact of such empirical studies on criminal responsibility also 
contributes to the growing field of ‘neurolaw’ research, which explores the effects of discoveries 
in neuroscience on legal rules.83 These discoveries include the use of brain imaging in the 
courtroom,84 lie detection,85 and even challenges to the idea that free will lies at the heart of 
criminal responsibility.86  
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that limitations exist in relation to incorporating neuroscientific 
evidence within the legal assessment. Despite the potential of such investigations, neurolaw 
scholars have been keen to emphasise the drawbacks of applying such distinct areas of research 
congruently. For example, Morse refers to the ‘overconfidence’ of researchers that suffer from 
the ‘brain overclaim syndrome’ and exaggerate how much we know and how firm the science 
is.87 At the same time, Morse acknowledges that there is a place for neurolaw research, 
specifically in the case of those neural structures and functions that have an effect on capacities 
such as control or rationality.88 In fact, Morse cites automatism as one of the few legal doctrines 
that can be informed by the use of scientific evidence, mainly in terms of the way in which 
physical compulsions such as spasms or reflexes arise.89 Similarly, Pardo and Patterson argue that 
inductive evidence surrounding attributes or psychological faculties, i.e. evidence that can be 
empirically correlated with an attribute or faculty,90 can be probative in the legal context, 
especially in the case of voluntariness.91 On the one hand, Pardo and Patterson emphasise that 
voluntariness, like other attributes or faculties such as perception, intention, and so on, cannot be 
 
83 Arian Petoft, ‘Neurolaw: A Brief Introduction’ (2015) 14 Iran J Neurol 53, 53. 
84 Adina L Roskies and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Brain Images as Evidence in the Criminal Law’ in 
Michael Freeman (ed), Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2011) 97. 
85 Frederick Schauer, ‘Lie-detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence’ in Dennis Patterson and 
Michael S Pardo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016). 
86 Nita A Farahany, ‘A Neurological Foundation for Freedom’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S Pardo 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016) 55. 
87 Stephen J Morse, ‘Brain Overclaim Redux’ (2013) 31 Law & IneqJ 509, 514. 
88 ibid 533. 
89 Stephen J Morse, ‘Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience’, in Michael Freeman (ed), 
Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2011) 534.  
90 Pardo and Patterson (n 74) 8. 
91 ibid 123. 
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attributed to the brain, but to a person as a whole.92 That is, a psychological property should not 
be confused with a neural property.93 On the other hand, much like Morse, they agree that 
empirical evidence regarding brain function may be probative in instilling adequate legal 
standards that are closer in line with those employed by scientists. In the case of voluntariness, 
this evidence relates primarily to those brain areas and processes necessary to engage in certain 
activities such as inhibition of movement, conscious decision-making etc. While such areas are 
not identical to mental activities,94 they are intrinsically tied to those concepts that have 
traditionally been used to define voluntariness and are thus essential for developing a theoretically 
sound definition of the legal requirement.     
In this context, it is argued that exploring neuroscientific research contributes towards 
strengthening our understanding of voluntariness, by undergoing an exploration of empirical 
studies looking at processes relevant for the concepts used to conceptually define voluntariness. 
Building on from the previous limb of the investigation, this strand of the analysis enables us to 
test the suitability of the legal test proposed in Chapter 3, undertaking a review of the literature 
and extricating relevant themes and patterns from empirical evidence. In particular, Chapter 4 sets 
out to explore empirical evidence surrounding the mechanisms involved in processing competing 
alternatives of action and ultimately selecting one over another. In addition, it seeks to evaluate 
neuroscientific research relating to our ability to inhibit movement, i.e. refrain from moving. 
Together, this investigation contributes to test the assumption that a control-based model is most 
appropriate for rationalising voluntariness. Equally, the chapter explores empirical evidence 
relevant to alternative conceptualisations of voluntariness based on intention or consciousness. 
Such evidence relates primarily to neural mechanisms at play in habitual movement, which have 
so far enjoyed an uncertain status regarding their voluntariness and relevance for the criminal law. 
On a more conceptual level, this investigation also allows us to reflect on the ability for 
 
92 ibid 21. This is something that the authors have described as the ‘mereological fallacy’: ‘attributing an 
ability or function to a part that is only properly attributable to the whole of which it is a part’, i.e. ascribing 
psychological predicates to the brain, rather than to the person as a whole. 
93 See also Neil Levy, ‘Is Neurolaw Conceptually Confused?’ (2014) 18 The Journal of Ethics 171. 
94 Pardo and Patterson (n 74) 146. 
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neuroscience to influence legal decisions and contribute to developing standards of ascribing 
criminal responsibility. Given the timeframe, as well as the limitations of the researcher as 
primarily a social scientist, this neuroscientific limb of the investigation consists of a review of 
existing empirical evidence rather than involve original scientific research. 
In Chapter 5, in order to explore the practical implications of the proposed definition of 
voluntariness, hypnosis provides an appropriate case study, considering that hypnotic movements 
have been generally referred to as an example of involuntariness within legal scholarship and case 
law.95 However, it is one of the categories of alleged involuntary movement that has least been 
engaged with theoretically or empirically within the case law.96 When comparing courts’ 
approaches to other types of movements with that of hypnotic ones, it becomes difficult to justify 
such a categorisation, particularly in the absence of clarification from courts and legal scholars as 
to what makes hypnotic movement involuntary. Considering the extensive availability of 
empirical evidence surrounding hypnosis, applying the proposed model in this context enables us 
to bridge the gap in evidence and explore the approach taken by courts from a scientific 
perspective. Applying the proposed model of voluntariness, the chapter concludes that hypnosis 
should not be considered as an example of involuntariness. Whilst potentially altering one’s 
awareness of moving, empirical evidence suggests that bodily control is retained whilst 
hypnotised, which would suffice under the proposed definition. Most importantly, the case 
provides the opportunity to showcase the importance and benefits of defining voluntariness for 
legal purposes. In addition, building on from the neuroscientific strand of the investigation, 
conducting a case study on hypnosis allows for the further incorporation of scientific evidence 
 
95 Law Commission (n 20) 121; see also R v Quick [1973] QB 910 and R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233. 
It has also been accepted in other jurisdictions such as Canada, as shown in R v Book [1999] ABPC 149. 
Moreover, it is listed in the United States MPC as a valid justification for an involuntary act, s. 2.01(2)(d). 
The acceptance is also widespread within academic literature. See for example Jeremy Horder, ‘Pleading 
Involuntary Lack of Capacity’ (1993) 52 CLJ 298, 300; and Simester (n 8) 430; and George P Fletcher ‘On 
the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements’ (1994) 142 UPaLRev 1443, 1444; Michael Corrado, ‘Is There 
an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?’ (1994) 142 UPaLRev 1529, 1547. 
96 See Chapter 2.7. 
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into our legal assessment. In turn, this contributes to the development of additional neurolaw 
research. 
Finally, the Conclusion to the thesis brings the analysis together, highlighting the proposed 
definition and the significance of the study, whilst also acknowledging its limitations. This is 
followed by clarifications regarding the practical implications of incorporating the proposed 
model in legal assessments. These relate to the relevant burden of proof in establishing 
voluntariness, the importance of expert evidence, and the issue of prior fault. The chapter 
reiterates the position of the requirement within the structure of offence elements, as well as 
highlights areas where additional research is needed.    
 
4. Research Questions 
This thesis focuses primarily on developing a suitable definition of the legal requirement of 
voluntariness. 
Alongside this central examination, the present investigation aims to answer the following sub-
questions: 
• Are there any discernible principles regarding the nature of the voluntariness requirement 
that can be extricated from case law? 
• Is there any clarity or consistency in the approach taken by courts to the concept of 
voluntariness?  
• What is the object of the voluntariness requirement? 
• How does the philosophy of action conceptualise voluntariness? Which rationalisation 
best fits the descriptive and normative goals of the legal requirement?  




• How does the neuroscience behind inhibiting movement influence our legal 
understanding of voluntariness? 
• Should hypnotic movements be classified as voluntary? 






UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in the Introduction, within criminal law frameworks across multiple jurisdictions, 
there is a basic acceptance that a constituent element of all criminal offences is the fact they 
occurred ‘voluntarily’. In essence, the requirement of voluntariness purports that only persons 
who voluntarily commit a proscribed act (or omit to act in accordance with their legal duty) are 
to be held criminally responsible.1 At the same time, when issues of involuntariness arise, they 
are often dealt with under the heading of automatism, a doctrine which can be said to embody the 
same functions as the voluntariness requirement,2 but which has often been described as a 
‘defence’.3 The potential for confusion and inconsistency arising from the division of legal rules 
between a requirement of voluntariness and a so-called ‘defence’ of automatism is problematic in 
a number of ways. Most importantly, it leads to legal uncertainty.4 However, for present purposes, 
we can look to either to inform debates surrounding the nature of voluntariness and identify 
whether a legal definition of voluntariness can be extracted from legal discourse.  
The following chapter explores voluntariness across statutes and categories of cases dealing with 
this concept. Particularly, it consists of an analysis of legal sources within different common law 
jurisdictions, with a view to understanding how voluntariness is defined by courts and whether 
there are any discernible legal rules been being applied in such cases. This is not to say that legal 
sources from civil law jurisdictions cannot provide depth to the analysis. However, it is beyond 
 
1 See for example Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 409 (Lord Denning): ‘The 
requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder case, but also in every criminal 
case. No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily.’; and Jeremy Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of 
Criminal Law (8th edn, OUP 2016) 72. See also J J Child and David Ormerod, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s 
Essentials of Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 92. For further information, see Chapter 1.1.a. 
2 See for example Stanley Yeo, ‘Putting Voluntariness Back Into Automatism’ (2001) 32 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 387, 396: ‘automatism is a subset of involuntariness’; and R v Parks 
[1992] 2 SCR 871, 872 (La Forest J): ‘a sub-set of the voluntariness requirement’. 
3 See Chapter 1.1.b.  
4 ibid.  
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the scope of the current thesis to engage in an exploration of voluntariness across the criminal 
legal frameworks of all legal systems. In other words, despite the potential application to any 
criminal legal framework, the definition developed in the present thesis is primarily aimed at 
being implemented in common law jurisdictions, particularly in England and Wales. In this 
context, the following chapter discusses multiple types of cases in which the issue of 
(in)voluntariness arises, either as part of the voluntariness requirement or the automatism and/or 
insanity ‘defences’. These categories have been selected as they are either commonly dealt with 
by courts – hence, the higher likelihood for identifying existing rules – or are conceptually 
controversial, as will be seen in the case of hypnosis. The goal here is to identify potential ways 
of conceptualising the requirement and understand whether there is any clarity and consistency in 
the way judges address separate categories of cases. Finally, the chapter seeks to identify whether 
judges rely on certain philosophical or neuroscientific assumptions related to the nature of 
voluntary action, or whether no such assumptions are being made.  
 
2. Statutory Rules and Guidance  
The voluntariness requirement is not codified in statute within England and Wales. It is useful, 
therefore, to turn to guidance presented by the Law Commission on two separate occasions as a 
way of understanding the meaning of the requirement in law. For instance, the 1989 Draft 
Criminal Code Bill constituted an attempt at codifying criminal law, in which reference was made 
to the automatism doctrine. Specifically, the Code would have statutorily declared that 
automatism occurred as a result of reflexes, spasms, convulsions, as well as conditions that 
deprived a person of ‘effective control of the act’.5 However, no reference to the voluntariness 
requirement is made in the Bill, either in relation to automatism, or as a standalone requirement 
for criminal responsibility. In fact, according to the Commentary to the Draft, conceptualisations 
of the automatism doctrine using the word ‘involuntary’ were not needed, ‘happily, in view of the 
 
5 Law Commission, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Volume 1: Report and Draft 
Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) s.33(1)(a).  
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variable use to which it tends to be put.’6 In particular, to emphasise the complexities of using the 
terminology, the Commission referenced cases such as Broome v Perkins,7 in which the defendant 
appeared to be goal-directed and could not have behaved otherwise.8 In contrast with judicial 
opinion, the Commission argued that erratic driving during an episode of hypoglycaemia should 
have been deemed as involuntary, given the defendant’s inability to choose to behave otherwise.9 
However, rather than clarifying why the emphasis on the choice to behave otherwise was relevant 
to voluntariness, the Commission simply argued that ‘involuntariness’ was redundant in cases of 
automatism.10 
A similar approach was adopted by the Law Commission more recently, when it presented a 
Discussion Paper consisting of a thorough analysis of the law on automatism and insanity.11 
There, a number of factors that made the doctrine theoretically problematic were identified, 
particularly in terms of the relationship with the rules relating to the defence of insanity and the 
distinction between internal and external triggers of involuntary movement.12 Moreover, the 
Commission showed a willingness to engage with the notion of voluntariness and acknowledged 
its role in the ascription of criminal responsibility.13 However, it did not go further in proposing 
a test for identifying involuntary movement. A point of concern was that the use of the word 
‘voluntary’ would lead to misinterpretation.14 Specifically, the word could be employed to define 
particular desires, attitudes, intentions, or simple awareness, but would not always be sufficient 
 
6 Law Commission, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Volume 2: Commentary on 
Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) para 11.1.   
7 Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321 
8 In Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321, the defendant drove erratically, under a state of impaired 
consciousness and lack of awareness of his surroundings but was not deemed to be automatic. This issue is 
further discussed in the section related to non-dangerous intoxicants. 
9 Law Commission (n 6) para 11.4. 
10 The reference to the capacity to do otherwise has been linked by various academics to the voluntariness 
requirement and will be explored in Chapter 3.4.c.  
11 Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion Paper (2013). 
12 ibid paras 5.39-5.54. 
13 ibid paras A.52-A.54. 
14 ibid paras A47. Here, the Commission referred to offences such driving without insurance, where ‘there 
is no requirement for the act of driving without insurance to have been voluntary or even for the driver to 
be aware that he or she was uninsured.’ However, it could be argued that the offence would still require the 
presence of a voluntary act, such as driving. See also Ian P Farrell and Justin F Marceau, ‘Taking 
Voluntariness Seriously’ (2013) 54 BCLRev 1545, where the authors discuss whether the voluntariness 
requirement requires a single voluntary movement or whether every element of the actus reus must have 
been completed voluntarily.  
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to show whether the agent should be criminally responsible.15 Such an approach reveals a 
consistent stance to the one previously revealed in the Draft Criminal Code. This relates to 
avoiding rationalising voluntariness for legal purposes and focusing instead of the types of cases 
in which automatism or a reformed ‘defence’ would apply. Similar to the Code, the Commission 
placed an emphasis on the capacity to do otherwise as the foundation of criminal responsibility, 
but without linking it to the concept of voluntariness.16 In this way, it seems to have escaped the 
need to engage with the voluntariness requirement or to produce a description for it. Instead, the 
Commission proposed a new ‘defence’ of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of recognised 
medical condition’, which would abolish the defences of insanity and automatism.17 In as much 
as the reformed defence would deal with issues of voluntariness that are currently dealt with under 
the heading of insanity, the proposal represents an improvement, at least from an evidential 
perspective. This is because, under the reformed ‘defence’, the defendant would no longer be 
expected to bear a legal burden of proving the condition.18 That is, they would not be expected to 
prove their involuntariness on the balance of probabilities. However, it is still inappropriate in 
that it allows for definitional elements of an offence to be addressed under the heading of a 
defence. This could lead to potential over-criminalisation, as, it is argued, is the case with the 
current approach, and would still preserve the current ambiguity surrounding the co-existence of 
the requirement of voluntariness with that of a defence.19  
In contrast with England and Wales, the voluntariness requirement is present in US legislation 
through the Model Penal Code (MPC), which was designed to assist different jurisdictions in 
achieving a uniform legal framework. This means that states are not required to follow the rules 
enshrined in the statute, but most of them have incorporated at least partial or modified versions 
 
15 Law Commission (n 11) A.47. 
16 ibid A.7. This issue will be further explored in Chapter 3.4.c.  
17 Law Commission (n 11) paras 10.6, 10.17. For further detail on the relationship between the reformed 
defence and the requirement of voluntariness see Chapter 3.4.c. 
18 ibid para 10.26. However, this would be an ‘elevated’ burden: ‘where the accused pleads the defence of 
recognised medical condition, he or she should bear an elevated evidential burden – meaning that the 
accused must adduce evidence from two experts – but that the prosecution should bear the burden of 
disproving the defence once it has been raised.’ 
19 For further detail see Chapter 1.1.b. 
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of the Code.20 In relation to the requirement, the MPC excludes liability in the absence of a 
voluntary act or the omission to act within physical capabilities.21 However, what exactly is meant 
by ‘voluntary’ is not particularly clear, since the statute provides a list of involuntary cases such 
as reflexes or convulsions, somnambulism, hypnotic trances, and so on.22 Indeed, s. 2.01 (2)(d) 
of the MPC describes as voluntary whatever is ‘a product of the effort or determination of the 
actor, either conscious or habitual’. However, there is no further guidance as to what ‘effort’ or 
‘determination’ actually means for legal purposes. Moreover, there seems to be no justification 
as to why exactly the aforementioned examples were listed in the statute.23 This emphasis on 
particular states of involuntariness rather than rationalising voluntariness in law is similar to that 
present in the Draft Criminal Code in England in Wales.  
A similar objective to that of the drafters of the MPC in the US was also present in Australia in 
the early 1990s, when the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General started developing the 
Model Criminal Code (MCC).24 The Code was designed to create consistency and uniformity 
between states that relied on common law and those with criminal codes but it ultimately became 
more of a reference tool rather than the standard for legal reform in Australia.25 In terms of its 
approach to the voluntariness requirement, the Code lists a number of examples of involuntary 
movements, similar to the MPC and the Draft Bill in England and Wales. It refers to spasms, 
convulsions, and acts performed during unconsciousness, impaired consciousness, and sleep.26  
 
20 See for example s.15.10 of the New York Penal Law: ‘The minimal requirement for criminal liability is 
the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act 
which he is physically capable of performing […]’; and s.45-2-202 of the Montana Code Annotated 2019: 
‘A material element of every offense is a voluntary act, which includes an omission to perform a duty that 
the law imposes on the offender and that the offender is physically capable of performing […]’ 
21 Model Penal Code (MPC) s.2.01(1).  
22 MPC s.2.01(2).  
23 See for example: The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 
(Philadelphia 1985), where no justification is given for including either of the exceptions to the voluntary 
conduct requirement in s.2.01 of the MPC.   
24 Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, Model Criminal Code (28 May 2009). 
25 Arlie Loughnan, ‘“The Very Foundation of any System of Criminal Justice”: Criminal Responsibility in 
the Australian Model Criminal Code’ (2004) 6 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 8, 19. 
26 Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee, Model Criminal Code (28 May 2009), s.2.2.4(3).  
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Similar to the MPC, the MCC also includes a short definition of voluntary movements. 
Specifically, it states that conduct can only be voluntary if it is a person’s ‘product of the will’.27 
But as with s.2.01(2)(d) of the MPC, it does not provide a clear description as to what ‘a product 
of the will’ entails. In a guide for practitioners, some clarification was given, in that ‘a product of 
physical forces over which the person has no control’ should be categorised as involuntary.28 
Moreover, it would be possible to categorise conduct which is ‘intentional’, i.e. in which the 
defendant acts ‘in a purposeful and directed way’, as ‘unwilled’.29 However, as with previous 
statutory guidance, it seems that the guidance focused more on what is not a product of the will 
rather than what is. This apparent avoidance is likely to be attributed to the complexities of the 
concept and its convoluted philosophical roots. In fact, committees in both New Zealand and 
Australia have referenced philosophical intricacies as specific reasons for not clarifying concepts 
such as ‘conduct’, ‘action’, or ‘omission’.30  
Overall, it seems that statutory codes such as the MPC and MCC do identify some main areas 
where involuntariness is at issue. However, neither of them goes further to provide an in-depth 
rationalisation of the voluntariness requirement, beyond references to issues of free will or usage 
of terminology such as ‘effort’, ‘control’, or ‘determination’. These codes have avoided 
definitions in favour of examples. Though helpful in identifying specific cases where 
involuntariness may negate liability, there remains a clear need for greater legal certainty and 
clarity on the conceptualisation of the requirement of voluntariness in law. In the absence of an 
adequate definition of the requirement, there is a danger that the criminal law will become too 
rigid in its application. In this context, the remainder of the chapter will explore these examples, 
alongside others where (in)voluntariness is addressed, in order to see what rules are being applied 
 
27 ibid s.2.2.4(2).  
28 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, ‘The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for 
Practitioners (2002) The Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, Part 2.2. The 
Elements of an Offence, Division 4 – Physical Elements, 35. 
29 ibid. As will be seen throughout the chapter, this is not the approach taken in England and Wales.  
30 J J Child, ‘Defence of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law from Philosophies of Action 
(2020) 23 New Criminal Law Review 437, footnote 12. For further information on the relevance of 
philosophy for the legal requirement of voluntariness, see Chapter 3.   
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in court. The objective is to understand what voluntariness amounts to in law, and thus to look 
behind these examples to see why they were chosen and what the underpinning criteria are.  
 
3. Situational Liability  
Some of the most well-known voluntariness debates have happened in cases involving situational 
liability. Situational liability refers to instances where a criminal offence does not require the 
defendant to engage or omit to engage in a particular movement. Instead, it is sufficient that the 
defendant is in a particular condition or enjoys a certain status.31 Examples include public 
intoxication, drunk driving, or overstaying visas. What could be argued is controversial about 
such cases is the relationship they have with the requirement of voluntariness in law, or lack 
thereof. Regardless of the way in which one may describe voluntariness, be it through notions 
such as control, consciousness, and so on, some cases of situational liability are evidently at odds 
with the requirement, particularly when considering its role of promoting one’s autonomy and 
agency. An example is the case of Larsonneur,32 in which the defendant was found in breach of 
her requirement not to enter the United Kingdom, despite being forcibly brought into the country 
by the Police. Here, the Lord Chief Justice emphasised that the circumstances under which she 
returned to the country were ‘immaterial’ but no further reasons were given as to why.33 Similarly, 
in Winzar,34 a conviction for being drunk on a motorway was upheld, even though the defendant 
had been forcibly moved to the motorway by the Police.  
The fact that the cases ‘hardly shine as a beacon of common law reasoning’ is clear.35 In 
Larsonneur, the judges did not even allude to the voluntariness requirement. They simply based 
 
31 A P Simester, J R Spencer, Findlay Stark, G R Sullivan, and G J Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal 
Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart 2016) 85. 
32 Larsonneur (1934) 24 Cr App R 74.  
33 ibid 78 (Lord Chief Justice). 
34 Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent, The Times, March 28 1983 (QB). Here, the defendant arrived drunk 
at a hospital and refused to leave after being asked to by staff. Police interfered and moved him to the 
highway outside the hospital. 
35 Horder (n 1) 112.  
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the decision on the apparent breach of the Aliens Order 1920.36 Such verdicts can be contrasted 
with the case of Finau37 in New Zealand, where the defendant’s conviction for overstaying her 
visa was overturned on the basis of her pregnancy and the rejection of any airline to transport her. 
Here, judges were aware of the requirement of voluntariness. Specifically, despite not mentioning 
the requirement itself, they emphasised the need for a person to be able to avoid causing a 
prohibited event. This is because the court focused on the presence of ‘due diligence’ on the part 
of the defendant, establishing a distinction between cases where the lack of voluntariness arises 
due to fault and those in which the defendant is incapable of controlling the course of events.38 
Thus, despite avoiding the direct reference to the requirement, the approach is in contrast with the 
English cases of Larsonneur and Winzar where the courts appeared completely unaware of the 
issue. 
Similar cases related to situational liability have also been recorded in the US. For instance, in 
Robinson v California,39  it was held that a chronic alcoholic with an uncontrollable desire to 
consume alcohol should not be criminalised for drinking or being intoxicated. In particular, the 
court emphasised that because addiction is an illness which may develop ‘involuntarily’, and 
because addicts most often lose their power of self-control, it is unconstitutional to criminalise 
such individuals.40 Thus, simply being a drug addict was not enough to justify liability. In 
contrast, the court in Powell v Texas41  distinguished the former decision where the defendant, an 
alcoholic, had been found intoxicated in a public place. Even though the ingestion of alcohol 
should have been described as involuntary, following Robinson, for the court here, it was enough 
that the person had chosen to do it publicly.  
 
36 Larsonneur (1934) 24 Cr App R 74,78 (Lord Chief Justice). The Aliens Order had required foreign 
nationals seeking residence or employment to register with the police, failure of which resulting in 
deportation.  
37 Finau v Department of Labour [1984] 2 NZLR 396 (CA). 
38 ibid 398. 
39 Robinson v California (1962) 370 US 660.  
40 ibid 667 (Mr. Justice Stewart). 
41 Powell v Texas 392 US 514.  
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Despite mentioning the importance of assigning criminal responsibility based on one’s 
voluntariness, the judges in Powell were keen on diminishing the relevance of voluntariness in 
law. According to Justice Black, whether a defendant was involuntary was:  
an inherently elusive question, and one which the State may, for good reasons, 
wish to regard as irrelevant.42  
This suggests that the decision might have been reached based on public safety rather than legal 
principle, for no clear understanding of the voluntariness requirement was actually offered. In 
fact, isolation, deterrence, and treatment were cited as justifications for punishing a chronic 
alcoholic for getting drunk in public.43 Moreover, the stance suggests that judges are unwilling to 
engage with the voluntariness requirement on the basis of its conceptual difficulties, despite being 
aware of its existence.  
The decision in Powell may be explained on the basis that, in contrast with Robinson, the 
defendant in Powell could have chosen to become intoxicated at home. Cases such as Martin v 
State44 support this explanation, in which a conviction was overturned since the defendant had 
been forcibly brought on public premises by police whilst under a state of intoxication. In fact, 
the case was even affirmed in Powell, where the judges argued that being carried into the street 
by another person is no act at all.45 Unfortunately, the court did not explore the argument further, 
but this is not surprising given its remarks on the irrelevance of the voluntariness requirement. 
Decisions like Finau or Martin suggest that the capacity for control might be what courts are 
looking for in cases of situational liability. However, control is not explicitly linked to 
voluntariness as a way to describe the concept, but simply used as a rationale for not assigning 
blame more generally. Moreover, questions surrounding the verdicts in Larsonneur and Winzar 
remain, especially since no mention or acknowledgment of the voluntariness requirement was 
made, a fact that could be attributed more to policy than need for legal clarity.  
 
42 ibid 544 (Mr. Justice Black).  
43 ibid 541 (Mr. Justice Black). 
44 Martin v State (1944) 17 So.2d 427. 
45 Powell v Texas 392 US 514, 548 (Mr. Justice Black).  
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Situational liability cases are a clear example where the voluntariness requirement should be 
brought into play. Despite the unwillingness of English courts to acknowledge the relevance of 
the voluntariness requirement in these decisions, one implication can be identified by looking at 
decisions in New Zealand and the US. Specifically, physical manipulation by another amounts to 
a definite example of involuntariness, with judges in Martin or Powell stating that no criminal act 
comes into play in these instances. However, there are some inconsistencies, for example in cases 
of addiction. Here, judges refer to the requirement but do not seem committed enough to further 
explain it in their analyses, preferring the use of alternative language such as control, as seen in 
Robinson. In fact, statements referring to the irrelevance of voluntariness, such as those made by 
Justice Black in Powell suggest that courts are effectively forced to engage with the requirement 
given the nature of the events but are unwilling to go further in describing what the test should be 
or at least what is it about voluntariness that makes it essential in these cases. The lack of any 
definitions in these cases raises concerns in terms of the effective and consistent application of 
the criminal law. 
 
4. Trigger Slip Cases   
‘Trigger slip’ cases involve defendants who are charged with shooting and killing victims, but 
who allege that the pulling of the trigger was a reflex movement rather than a voluntary one. 
When defendants claim that the discharge of the weapon resulted from a spasm, reflex, or as a 
result of being startled, they essentially allege that the movement of their finger was involuntary, 
and that the voluntariness requirement has not been fulfilled. Such cases could be included within 
those examples listed in statutory codes, as outlined above.46 However, rather than acquitting, 
 
46 An example could be s.2.01(2)(a) of the MPC, referring to reflexes or convulsions, or even s.2.01(2)(d) 
of the same Code, which refers to conduct that ‘otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of 
the actor, either conscious or habitual’. 
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courts seem to have avoided this requirement by identifying other voluntary movements as the 
death-causing ones, potentially due to public policy considerations.47  
In terms of the predominant approach, judges have not limited the discussion around the muscular 
contraction of the defendants’ fingers but instead widened their analyses to address preceding 
voluntary movements. For instance, in Gray v Barr,48 the court found that in the accidental 
discharge of a gun during a fight, the focus would turn to the preceding action of approaching the 
victim with a gun.49 However, the court did not refer explicitly to voluntariness in the case, 
preferring to focus on the intentional and deliberate nature of the behaviour more widely. 
Specifically, wielding a loaded shotgun amounted to ‘a wilful and culpable act’ which could have 
reasonably been expected to carry the risk of discharge.50 Here, the court focused on a previous 
time where there was voluntary movement rather than declaring that the discharge occurred 
involuntarily. A similar approach was taken in Australia, where trigger slip cases have been more 
frequent. For instance, in states such as New South Wales, reckless indifference as to life is 
sufficient to establish the mens rea for murder.51 This means that presenting a loaded shotgun in 
an attempt to commit a robbery could lead to a murder verdict if the weapon accidentally 
discharges, as opposed to a manslaughter, as was the case in Gray v Barr.52   
Looking at the way in which courts refer to voluntariness in trigger slip situations, most cases 
focus on the discharge of the gun as the death-causing act, which can involve a multitude of 
separate movements. The problem with this approach is that it is not entirely clear what needs to 
 
47 The issue is further exacerbated by the focus on the voluntariness of the actus reus, as opposed to the 
specific movement. This issue is considered in Chapter 3.  
48 Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 544. 
49 This was a civil case dealing with the issues of whether Barr could rely on his insurance to recover 
indemnity for the consequences of his own dangerous act. However, the court did acknowledge that the act 
amounted to manslaughter and not murder, given that the requisite mens rea for murder was not present.   
50 Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 544, 586 (Phillimore LJ). 
51 S.18(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. 
52 Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [28] (Barwick CJ). Here, the defendant devised a plan to rob a service 
station. He entered carrying a rifle and demanded that the shop assistant turn around in order to be tied up. 
Whilst reaching into his pocket for the rope, the assistant suddenly turned around, startling Ryan. This led 
to the accidental discharge of the gun and the fatal shooting of the assistant. The defendant was charged 
with murder.  
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be voluntary in order to meet the requirement. In Vallance for instance, it was recognised that the 
discharge is:  
a complex act, involving loading the piece, cocking it, presenting it, pressing the 
trigger. The act, that if done voluntarily and intentionally would constitute the 
crime, is the whole deed whereby the bullet was caused to strike and wound.53 
However, the statement does not clarify what specifically is sufficient to complete the 
voluntariness requirement. Courts have confirmed that in theory, a person who pulls the trigger 
‘in a reflex or convulsive, unwilled movement of his hand or his muscles’ would not be regarded 
as voluntary.54 However, there have been various cases in which defendants were convicted 
despite the pressing of the trigger occurring accidentally.55 Even though such cases can be solved 
by reference to preceding movements that meet the causation rules and the contemporaneity 
between actus reus and mens rea, they do not provide a clear rationalisation of the way in which 
the requirement should be applied in each case. In particular, courts have been quick to state that 
it is the set of connected, willed movements of loading the gun, presenting it to the victim, and 
pulling back the hammer, that should be deemed as death-causing.56 This is the case, despite the 
lack of evidence as to whether the pressing of the trigger was involuntary or not. In this way, it 
seems that the focus of the requirement is on the voluntariness of the actus reus itself, with its 
accompanying circumstances and/or results, rather a specific bodily movement.57 For instance, in 
Murray,58 it was said that to regard the muscular contraction of the finger as what caused the 
death would lead to the conclusion that there was no thought and will on the part of the actor and 
thus result in too strict of an application of the criminal law.  
 
53 Vallance v The Queen [1962] HCA 42, [11] (Windeyer J) (emphasis added). The present thesis disagrees 
with this view, as it is argued that only physical movements must be voluntary, rather than a complex act 
that involved wider circumstances and results. For further information, see Chapter 3.  
54 Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [22] (Barwick CJ). 
55 See for example Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2; Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26; Koani v The 
Queen [2017] HCA 42. 
56 Koani v The Queen [2017] HCA 42, [39] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ).  
57 For a discussion as to why the focus on bodily movements is preferrable, see Chapter 3.2.  
58 Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26, [50] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).   
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What is equally problematic is that courts have remained reluctant to engage with the scope and 
boundaries of the voluntariness requirement. On one hand, they acknowledge that while a 
presumption of voluntariness may apply,59 it is ultimately the prosecution’s burden to prove 
voluntariness as a definitional element of an offence, beyond a reasonable doubt.60 On the other 
hand, there is little clarification within case law as to the meaning and scope of the requirement. 
In fact, there has been a tendency to simply assert that ‘the answer is far from simple’ due to the 
ambiguities associated with the notion of voluntariness.61 Some have connected action with the 
idea of ‘will’ but without explaining what is meant by a ‘willed act’.62 In other cases, courts appear 
to conflate the issue of voluntariness with that of identifying a conscious, intentional movement 
that causes death. For example, in Murray, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that:  
the more precise the identification of a particular physical movement as the ‘death-
causing act’, the more likely it is that it will be harder to discern a conscious 
decision by the actor to make that precise and particular physical movement.63 
Such an argument may be used to claim that the voluntariness requirement is based on conscious 
decisions. However, this is not clear, mainly given the fact that courts have not clarified the 
relationship between the actus reus requirement and the voluntariness one.64 Moreover, it 
suggests that courts are more interested in securing convictions for defendants whose choices are 
blameworthy, at the expense of the voluntariness requirement. Even if the defendant could be 
held properly liable for the inchoate offence of attempted murder, carrying the same sentence, to 
hold the defendant liable for the full offence, without their movements being voluntary, is not 
only morally problematic, but it also raises questions of fair labelling.  
 
59 The Queen v Falconer [1990] HCA 49, [9] (Mason CJ, Brennan AND McHugh JJ). 
60 ibid. See also Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2; and Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26; and Gillett v 
R [2006] NSWCCA 370. 
61 Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [18] (Windeyer J). 
62 ibid. This approach is potentially more straightforward in this category of cases, as there is an obvious 
and easy alternative target in the preparatory acts.  
63 Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26, [49] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) (emphasis added). The emphasis 
on conscious decisions will be explored further in the following chapters.  
64 This issue is discussed at length in Chapter 3.3.  
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Trigger slip cases are an appropriate example of decisions in which courts deal with the 
requirement of voluntariness tentatively but take pains to avoid fully engaging with the reasoning 
underpinning the doctrine. On one hand, judges recognise that pressing the trigger is not a 
voluntary movement. Yet on the other, rather than engaging with and further explaining the issues 
surrounding one’s involuntariness, they focus instead on preceding movements and regarding the 
set of connected movements as enough to satisfy the requirement. Moreover, when courts do 
engage with the requirement, they seem to muddy the waters, by conflating voluntariness with 
conscious choice, but without explaining why that is the case. 
This narrow approach to applying the voluntariness requirement could be rationalised by the 
apparent priority of securing a conviction based on the defendant’s moral blameworthiness. For 
example, the ‘pursuance of the design to commit the robbery’ was a justification raised in the case 
of Ryan for the focus on voluntary movement preceding the pulling of the trigger.65 Similarly, the 
court in Murray warned against adopting a strict interpretation of linking the death-causing act to 
the involuntary pressing of the trigger.66 However, the fact that defendants in such cases were 
potentially less sympathetic than, for instance, defendants in situational liability cases should not 
justify the increased emphasis on prior movements. If we are to maintain a principled basis for 
criminal responsibility that results in the consistent application of criminal rules, focus must be 
given to the requirement that defendants be voluntary. At the same time, this category of cases is 
similar to that of situational liability in that it assumes certain movements as involuntary but does 
not provide much guidance in identifying the underpinning criteria of the requirement.  
 
5. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
Another relevant category of sane automatism is that of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and other offences occurring as a result of dissociative states. According to the American 
 
65 Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [19] (Taylor and Owen JJ)  
66 Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26, [49] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). In fact, similar concerns can be 
raised in relation to case of Gray v Barr and whether involuntary manslaughter as an offence is compatible 
with the voluntariness requirement.  
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Psychiatric Association, such states amount to ‘a disruption in the usually integrated functions of 
consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment.’67 Because of the impairment 
of these functions, it seems that some dissociative states might affect a person’s voluntariness. 
Thus, crimes committed in these circumstances might lack voluntariness and as such, should be 
discussed in relation to the requirement. 
Looking at the approach of the courts, it appears that dissociative states amount to a valid example 
of involuntariness. For instance, in T,68 the defendant was charged with robbery and assault 
causing ABH but claimed that she had been raped three days prior to her arrest, a circumstance 
that led to her experiencing PTSD. According to a psychiatrist who diagnosed her, at the time of 
the offence she had entered a dissociative state and the crimes had occurred throughout ‘a 
psychogenic fugue’ during which ‘she was not acting with a conscious mind or will’.69 The court 
held that a condition of PTSD amounted to an external factor that could lead to sane automatism.70 
In contrast with everyday stress or sadness, rape ‘could have an appalling effect on any young 
woman, however well-balanced normally …’.71 The acceptance of PTSD as a trigger for 
involuntary movement was later endorsed by the Law Commission as well, who stated that PTSD 
can amount to a valid external factor for a claim of sane automatism.72  
What is interesting to note is by accepting PTSD as a factor in automatism, the court in T 
effectively recognised it as a potential trigger for involuntariness, despite not acknowledging the 
significance of the voluntariness requirement in law. However, there are particular statements 
within the judgment that suggest the focus was on consciousness rather than voluntariness, in a 
similar way to that in Murray, one of the Australian trigger slip cases. In particular, the court held 
that: 
 
67 In Melissa Hamilton, ‘Reinvigorating Actus Reus: The Case for Involuntary Actions by Veterans with 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (2011) 16 Berkley Journal of Criminal Law 340, 359 (emphasis added). 
The focus on consciousness will become apparent throughout the remainder of the section.  
68 R v T [1990] Crim LR 256. 
69 ibid 257. 
70 ibid.  
71 ibid 258. 
72 Law Commission (n 11) para 5.47(2).  
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If T, for whatever reason, was not acting with a conscious mind or will, she would 
have to be acquitted and the only question would then be whether she should be 
found simply not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity.73   
Thus, the categorisation of T as an automaton seemed to have rested primarily on her lack of 
consciousness, as opposed to her involuntariness. This is problematic, for it implies that the two 
concepts can be equated, when as we will see in the following chapters, it is not entirely clear 
whether they are the same. While it can be argued that most people who move unconsciously are 
involuntary, not everyone who is involuntary is necessarily unconscious, as is the case with 
reflexes, spams etc.74 Alternatively, it may be that courts view automatism as a wider doctrine 
that covers both cases of unconscious conduct and involuntariness.75 This would also explain why 
the presumption to be rebutted in cases of automatism is one of mental capacity, rather than 
voluntariness, even though there is no evidence that voluntariness should be linked to mental 
capacity.  
The reliance on consciousness in addition to voluntariness can also be seen in different 
jurisdictions. For example, in the Canadian case of Rabey,76  the defendant violently assaulted the 
victim due to a psychological blow caused by the victim not reciprocating in his romantic 
advances. The court adopted a similar approach to the one in T in terms of the voluntariness of 
the defendant. Both the majority and the dissenting judges acknowledged that no act should be 
punished if committed involuntarily. However, going beyond engaging in a discussion on the type 
of automatism at play, the dissenting opinion also focused on the defendant’s consciousness at 
 
73 R v T [1990] Crim LR 256, 257 (emphasis added).  
74 This point will be further discussed in the following chapters.  
75 The uncertainty in respect of the relationship between consciousness and involuntariness has also been 
noted within legal scholarship. For instance, according to Loughnan, it is unclear whether claims of 
automatism centre around the involuntariness or the unconsciousness of the defendant. See Arlie Loughnan, 
Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (OUP 2012) 126. The case law is also contradictory 
in this respect. See for instance R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999, (Gresson P): ‘With respect, I would myself 
prefer to explain automatism simply as action without any knowledge of acting, or action with no 
consciousness of doing what was being done; and Viscount Kilmuir in Bratty v Attorney General of 
Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 401, citing the earlier decision in the Court of Appeal: ‘automatism “[...] 
means unconscious, involuntary action”’. Here, it is not clear whether unconsciousness and involuntariness 
are interchangeable concepts or not. In the case of Coley, Hughes LJ stated that a person conscious in the 
belief that they are character, while irrational or unaware of what they are doing, will still be categorised as 
voluntary. See Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [23] (Hughes LJ). 
76 Rabey v R [1980] 2 SCR 513.   
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the time. In particular, it emphasised that ‘consciousness is a sine qua non to criminal liability’.77 
Moreover, due to the transient nature of the dissociation, there were no policy objectives served 
in a finding of insanity.78 For the dissenting judges, the fact that there was no fault or negligence 
attributable to the defendant, coupled with the loss of consciousness, sufficed to acquit him.79 
However, similar to the case of T, the court did not refer to the relationship between voluntariness 
and consciousness, limiting itself to a somewhat vague guidance on the issue. 
Loss of consciousness also seems to be essential in US cases dealing with PTSD or emotional 
trauma, where courts have actively used the terminology of ‘unconsciousness defence’.80 For 
instance, in People v Lisnow,81 the defendant was acquitted following an apparent unconscious 
assault during which he was experiencing a dissociative state triggered by a continuing traumatic 
neurosis related to his combat experience in Vietnam. Later, in State v Fields,82 the court 
confirmed that dissociation stemming from PTSD is an acceptable basis for raising the 
‘unconsciousness defense’. Again, no specific link to voluntariness was made. Furthermore, this 
ambiguous approach is also present in other categories of cases, such as those involving 
sleepwalking.83  
The discussion so far suggests that, where PTSD is involved, courts do acknowledge it as an 
example of a trigger leading to involuntariness. However, the guidance provided is particularly 
vague, with a focus on consciousness but without clarifying whether it is meant to reflect 
voluntariness, and with no further detail as to what consciousness means in a legal context. For 
instance, one could well describe movement arising out of a psychotic episode as conscious in the 
sense of a defendant being in control of and aware of performing bodily movements.84 At the 
same time, consciousness could relate to comprehending the nature of one’s actions or being 
 
77 ibid 545 (Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon and Beetz JJ).  
78 ibid 546.  
79 ibid (Dickson, Estey and Mclntyre JJ). 
80 A ‘bodily movement during unconsciousness’ is also listed in s.2.01(2)(b) of the MPC as an example of 
involuntary behaviour.  
81 People v Lisnow (1978) 151 Cal Rptr 621. 
82 State v Fields [1989] 376 S.E.2d 740, 743 (Whichard, Justice).  
83 See Subsection 6.  
84 Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233 [23] (Hughes LJ).  
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aware of making choices. In the case of PTSD, it seems that the cause of the involuntary 
movements and the blameworthiness of the defendants take precedence over the need to ensure 
consistency between categories of cases. For example, on one hand there are defendants 
experiencing dissociative states as a result of rape, like T, and on the other hand there are those 
who consume cannabis and enter a psychotic episode with a similar separation between body and 
psyche, like the defendant in Coley.85 Moreover, the focus on consciousness implies that judges 
rely on certain philosophical and cognitive assumptions regarding the nature of voluntary 
movements, which are not exactly clear within case law.86  
 
6. Sleepwalking  
This is a unique category of cases, as it is discussed in courts under both sane and insane 
automatism, as well as the voluntariness requirement. Sleepwalking, also known as 
somnambulism, is a sleeping disorder which manifests itself in episodes of motor activity such as 
walking, but also driving and even violence or other inappropriate actions that should not 
normally occur during sleep.87 It is also becoming increasingly regarded as a type of state 
dissociation,88 which suggests that it raises similar issues to the ones related to PTSD. In England 
and Wales, sleepwalking had originally been categorised under the heading of sane automatism 
and associated with cases of concussion or blackout.89 Subsequently, in Burgess,90 the condition 
 
85 Within the psychiatric community it is commonly argued that dissociative disorders share similar 
symptoms with psychotic ones. See C Deville, C Moeglin and O Sentissi, ‘Dissociative Disorders: Between 
Neurosis and Psychosis’ (2014) Case Reports in Psychiatry, available at: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/425892> accessed 05 March 2018. Notwithstanding that the defendant in 
Coley was at fault for voluntarily consuming drugs, the court rejected automatism not based on the prior 
fault principle but due to the defendant not having been involuntary to begin with.  
86 These assumptions are further investigated in Chapters 3 and 4.  
87 Shreeya Popat and William Winslade, ‘While You Were Sleepwalking: Science and Neurobiology of 
Sleep Disorders and the Enigma of Legal Responsibility of Violence During Parasomnia’ (2015) 8 
Neuroethics 203, 205. 
88 Omri Berger, Dale E McNiel, and Rene´e L Binder, ‘PTSD as a Criminal Defense: A Review of Case 
Law’ (2012) 40 J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 509, 509.  
89 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 409 (Lord Denning). See also Hill v 
Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 284 (Devlin J). Unfortunately, neither court explained what made concussions 
and sleepwalking similar. 
90 R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, 100 (Lord Lane CJ). 
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was perceived as resulting from an internal factor and the court held that sleepwalking should be 
classified as insane automatism. Apart from the distinction between sane and insane automatism, 
what is important to note is that, similar to the PTSD category, consciousness seems to have 
played a significant role in courts’ assessments. For instance, in Burgess, Lord Lane CJ focused 
on the defendant’s lack of ‘conscious motivation’.91 The movements were ‘purposive rather than 
the result simply of muscular spasm, but without his being consciously aware of what he was 
doing’.92 However, no mention was made as to why consciousness had a role to play in findings 
of automatism, much in the same way as the court in T.93 
In contrast with England and Wales, the approach in Canada is slightly different in terms of the 
type of automatism at play. Specifically, in Parks,94 it was held that somnambulism can arise from 
a combination of both internal and external sources such as genetic susceptibility and ordinary 
stress, which can ultimately lead to an effect similar to a concussion, an accepted external cause 
of sane automatism. However, when it comes to the nature of the movements, it appears that the 
court was similarly reliant on the idea of consciousness. For instance, the judges cited with 
approval the dissent of Dickson J in Rabey, where it was argued that automatism should be 
available ‘whenever there is evidence of unconsciousness throughout the commission of the crime 
that cannot be attributed to fault or negligence’.95 Similarly, no specific guidance was given as to 
the interplay between consciousness and voluntariness.  
In Australia, the relationship between sleep and voluntariness appears clearer. Under the MCC, 
conduct ‘performed during sleep or unconsciousness’ should not be deemed voluntary.96 This 
categorisation is also supported within case law. For instance, in Jiminez v The Queen,97 the High 
Court of Australia was asked to consider whether a person driving while asleep could be 
categorised as voluntary. Here, the court stated that once the defendant fell asleep, the movements 
 
91 ibid 98 (Lord Lane CJ) (emphasis added). 
92 ibid (emphasis added).  
93 R v T [1990] Crim LR 256. 
94 Parks [1992] 2 SCR 871, 902-903 (La Forest J).  
95 ibid 905.  
96 MCC, s.4.2(3)(b). 
97 Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572. 
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were no longer voluntary and he could not be responsible for dangerous driving.98 Specifically, 
culpable driving  was ‘no different to any other offence and requires the driving, which is part of 
the offence, to be a conscious and voluntary act’.99 However, similar to the cases discussed above, 
no clear explanation was provided as to the relationship between consciousness and voluntariness.  
In the US, the relationship between sleep and involuntariness seems to be clearer. Under the MPC, 
‘sleep’ is listed as an example of involuntary movement, together with other bodily movements 
performed while unconscious.100 The MPC classification of somnambulism as involuntary has 
been met with scepticism, with some authors arguing that sleepwalking is guided by the person’s 
intentions and is fairly easy to diagnose and prevent.101 However, where defendants were 
acquitted, this has not necessarily been done on the basis of the defendant’s involuntariness, but 
rather on the unconscious nature of the behaviour overall. For instance, in Fain v 
Commonwealth,102 the defendant was acquitted due to his sleepwalking, having been unconscious 
at the time of shooting the victim and not able to understand what he was doing.  
Other cases in the US have established a stronger link between unconsciousness and 
voluntariness, but without much guidance as to the meaning of consciousness. In Bradley v 
State,103 it was argued that ‘a sleepwalker […] is more or less unconscious of his outwards 
relations, none of his acts […] can be rightfully be imputed to him as crimes’. Similarly, in People 
v Sedeno,104 it was argued that an unconscious act is an act committed as a result of 
‘somnambulism, a blow to the head, or similar cause’ to the point that such a person cannot be 
regarded as ‘volitional’. This reference suggests that there are several philosophical implications 
associated with the voluntariness requirement. Moreover, the approach seems to create an 
 
98 ibid [22] (Mason CJ, Brenna, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
99 ibid [9] (emphasis added). 
100 US MPC s.2.01(2)(c).  
101 Mike Horn, ‘A Rude Awakening: What to Do with the Sleepwalking Defense?’ (2004) 1 BCLRev 149, 
158-159. Here, the author cites philosophical and psychological rather than legal debates surrounding the 
nature of sleepwalking. This issue is further discussed in the following chapter.  
102 Fain v Commonwealth (1879) 78 Ky. 183.  
103 Bradley v State 277 SW 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925), 148. 
104 People v Sedeno 10 Cal. 3d 703, 717 (Wright CJ). The reference to volition is indicative of the 
relationship with philosophical concepts. This will be further developed in the following chapter.  
47 
 
inconsistency. Whereas Bradley was found criminally insane, the other defendants were acquitted 
under a ‘defence’ of unconsciousness. The contrast resembles the issues present in England and 
Canada in regard to sane and insane automatism. What is clear though is that, regardless of the 
distinction, movements performed under sleep are clearly regarded as involuntary within legal 
frameworks.  
The focus on consciousness could be less contentious when dealing with cases of epilepsy, for 
example, where the defendant is clearly unconscious and the link between the mind and the body 
can be described as severed.105 However, the emphasis on the notion in cases of sleepwalking 
raises concerns similar to PTSD cases or those involving dissociative states. First, it is not exactly 
clear what courts look for when referring to consciousness, providing guidance that is relatively 
vague. Second, the approach is not consistent across categories. The key notion of consciousness 
emerges here, underpinning the “involuntariness” of those acting in a state of dissociation. This 
can be compared with those who move consciously but without voluntariness in trigger slip cases, 
who in most cases are held liable for their movement. What appears to be central to many of these 
decisions is the perceived blameworthiness of defendants in different settings. Those suffering 
from somnambulism are more easily regarded as having been involuntary compared to those who 
move involuntarily in the context of a morally blameworthy choice.   
 
7. Hypnosis 
Hypnosis is an interesting example in discussions surrounding the nature of the voluntariness 
requirement, particularly given that it involves complex and goal-directed movements, as opposed 
to reflexes, spasms etc.106 Subjects often react to hypnotic suggestions by experiencing feelings  
involuntariness, e.g. an extended arm does not simply ‘feel heavy’, it becomes ‘heavier all by 
 
105 Notwithstanding that the scientific community has consistently criticised Cartesian dualism, the 
distinction between the mind and the body still stands at the core of criminal legal frameworks. Cases of 
epilepsy are a more obvious example of the defendant acting under complete unconsciousness and in which 
there is no connection made between the mind and the body. See also R v Sullivan [1984] AC 156. 
106 For further information on the relationship between hypnosis and voluntariness see Chapter 5.  
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itself’, and such an experience is often the most striking feature a hypnotised person reports.107 In 
England and Wales, courts have not yet encountered defendants who have committed crimes 
under a state of hypnosis. However, there have been suggestions, albeit obiter, in cases where the 
automatism ‘defence’ was raised. For instance, in Quick,108  Lawton LJ argued that a transitory 
malfunctioning of the mind caused by an external factor such as a hypnotic influence would 
suffice for a claim of automatism, but did not expand further on the reasons why. Similarly, in 
Coley,109 Lord Justice Hughes stated that ‘the man under hypnosis’ acts under a ‘complete 
destruction of voluntary control’ as opposed to irrationally and as such, acts under a state of 
automatism but again, no mention was made as to why exactly. A similar approach was also taken 
by the Law Commission, who did not explain its decision to include hypnotic influence as one of 
the limited bases for acquittal under its proposal for a redefined automatism ‘defence’.110  
Despite not dealing with it specifically, it seems that courts would entertain a claim of 
involuntariness arising during a hypnotic trance as a case of automatism. However, neither case 
law, nor law-reforming bodies explain why this is particularly the case. For instance, the court in 
Coley could have clarified the reasons for describing hypnotic trances as destroying voluntary 
control, in contrast with cases where similarly goal-directed but involuntary movement, e.g. 
driving without awareness, would not regarded as destroying control.111 Whilst it is significant 
that hypnosis is categorised as a trigger for involuntary movement, it seems that the legal criteria 
for the application of the law are undermined by inconsistency in the approach of the courts.  
In the US, hypnosis is dealt with under the voluntariness requirement. According to the MPC, 
‘conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion’ is not voluntary for the purposes 
of assigning criminal responsibility.112 However, courts have been sceptical in acknowledging the 
 
107 John F Kihlstrom, ‘The Domain of Hypnosis, Revisited’ in Michael R Nash and Amanda J Barnier (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, Research and Practice (2008 OUP) 33. 
108 R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 923 (Lawton LJ).  
109 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233 [22] (Hughes LJ). 
110 Law Commission (n 11) para 5.106. 
111 This issue is further explored in subsection 9, on non-dangerous intoxicants.  




potential for involuntariness here. In People v Marsh,113 the appellant claimed that he had escaped 
prison whilst under a hypnotic trance given by a friend who told him to ‘go back where he ... was 
having a good time’. In United States v McCollum,114 the defendant, allegedly in a state of 
hypnosis, went to a bank, approached an employee and handed him an envelope containing a 
request for $100.000. However, neither case referenced the MPC and judges did not entertain the 
possibility that hypnosis may have led to involuntary movements. Specifically, both courts 
approached the claims with scepticism and refused the defendants’ assertions that they had not 
been voluntary, denying the possibility for expert witnesses to provide evidence in that regard. 
Given that the defendant in Marsh was already in prison for a different offence, and since 
McCollum had been convicted of robbery before, it could be argued that the courts focused more 
on the incredulous nature of the events rather than engaging with the requirement. Thus, whilst 
the classification of hypnotic movements as involuntary is enshrined within the MPC, it is not 
entirely clear whether it would be applied in practice.115 This suggests that, despite accepting 
hypnosis as a valid example, courts in England and Wales might act with a similar scepticism as 
judges in the US, especially since claims of automatism have been significantly restricted in the 
past decades.116 
Similar to England and Wales, courts in Canada seem to have accepted hypnosis as an example 
of sane automatism. For example, in Book,117 the defendant had been hypnotised at a bar but 
attempts to ‘de-hypnotise’ him were later unsuccessful. He was subsequently charged with 
impaired driving. At the trial, the court was satisfied that the defendant had experienced ‘total 
amnesia’, ‘a deep trance’ and ‘a robot-like state of automatism’ during which he might not have 
realised he was driving a car.118 Moreover, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that when the defendant started driving, he was either acting voluntarily, 
 
113 People v Marsh (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 284, 285 (Griffin PJ).  
114 United States v McCollum (1984) 732 F.2d 1419. 
115 Rogers v State (2003) 105 S.W.3d 630, [14] (Cochran J).  
116 See Chapter 1.1.b. for further details on the narrowing of the application of automatism. 
117 R v Book [1999] ABPC 149. 
118 ibid [12]. 
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intending his acts, or that the automatism was of the insane kind.119 Thus, whilst not expanding 
on the reasons why acts committed under hypnosis are categorised under sane automatism, the 
court made it clear that hypnosis could be accepted as an example of involuntary movement.           
Hypnosis is unique in the sense that compared to situational liability or trigger slip cases, courts 
and statutory codes clearly acknowledge it as an example of involuntariness. However, a lack of 
detail on the type and degree of hypnotic movement still remains, with courts not willing to 
engage with the notion extensively in the context of the voluntariness requirement. Specifically, 
no mention is made by either courts or law-reforming bodies as to what makes hypnosis conducive 
to involuntary movements, beyond assertions that they can lead to a destruction of voluntary 
control or involve a robot-like state. This approach becomes problematic when comparing 
hypnosis to other categories of similar, goal-directed movements, but which do not fall within the 
category of involuntariness. Because of the lack of detail regarding hypnotic movements, such a 
category of cases may best be suited as a case study to test the applicability of the test of 
voluntariness.120 
 
8. Dangerous Intoxicants 
A substantial proportion of criminal offences are committed by people under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs.121 The legal position on dangerous substances is that, where intoxicated 
defendants are directly responsible and at fault for becoming intoxicated, they should not be 
exempt from criminal culpability.122 Thus, where such offences lack the requisite mens rea for 
the offence, the law still finds defendants liable under the doctrine of prior fault.123 Nevertheless, 
 
119 ibid [14].  
120 See Chapter 5.  
121 HM Keating, SR Kyd Cunningham, T Elliott, and MA Walters, Clarkson and Keating: Criminal Law 
(8th ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2014) 428.  
122 See for example Law Commission (n 11) para 3.15.  
123 According to prior-fault intoxication rules, where defendants claim that they did not act with the relevant 
mens rea, the law operates to construct liability by replacing the missing mental element with the fault of 
becoming intoxicated in the first place. In other words, where the defendant does not satisfy the mens rea 
required at the time of the offence (T2), the earlier fault at T1 replaces the missing element at T2. 
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in some cases, the intoxication can be so acute or the reaction to a substance can be severe enough 
to give rise to involuntariness.  
Within case law, the approach taken in cases of involuntariness triggered by the consumption of 
dangerous intoxicants is similar to that taken where defendants lack mens rea due to intoxication. 
Here, the law is primarily concerned with the defendant’s level of blameworthiness, under the 
prior fault rules. For instance, in Bratty,124 Lord Denning argued that an involuntariness arising 
from a state of drunkenness should be dealt with by reference to the basic vs. specific intent 
distinction that is applied in all cases of prior fault intoxication. A similar approach was taken in 
Lipman, 125 where Lord Denning’s statement in Bratty was acknowledged and applied to the case 
of self-induced drug intoxication. Here, the defendant experienced a hallucinogenic trip as a result 
of taking LSD, which resulted in the death of the victim by asphyxiation. While not directly 
relevant to the way in which in automatism and/or voluntariness have been defined, it should be 
noted that the approach taken by courts in such instances has not always been as clear and 
consistent as in other cases of prior fault intoxication.126 In fact, it appears to be more stringent 
than the approach taken in those cases in which defendants lack mens rea due to intoxication.127  
For present purposes, it is important to address the way in which courts have rationalised 
automatism in the context of prior fault. For instance, Coley involved a psychotic episode 
triggered by cannabis in which the defendant nearly killed his neighbour’s partner.128 This 
occurred under an alleged blackout, with the defendant having no recollection of the events. Here, 
the court emphasised that rather than referring to ‘wholly involuntary movement’, the ‘better 
 
124 Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, 410 (Lord Denning). Following DPP v 
Beard [1920] AC 479; and Attorney General of Northern Ireland v Gallagher (Patrick) [1963] AC 349; 
and DPP v Majewski [1977] 1 AC 433, prior-fault intoxication only constructs liability for offences of basic 
intent, but not specific intent. In its simplest form, the distinction between the two lies in that offences that 
cannot be committed recklessly are categorised as specific intent offences. For instance, an intoxicated 
defendant cannot be found guilty of murder due to it requiring an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily 
harm. Instead, they can be found guilty of the basic intent offence of manslaughter. Such distinction has 
led to multiple categorisations of the intoxication rules, as both inculpating in the case of basic intent 
offences and mitigating in relation to specific intent offences.  
125 R v Lipman (Robert) [1970] 1 QB 152. 
126 This relates particularly to the level of foresight required from the defendant in respect of the effect that 
certain substances may have on their voluntariness. See next section; and Chapter 6.2.c. 
127 See Subsection 9.  
128 Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233. 
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expression’ should be ‘complete destruction of voluntary control’.129 Here the judges seemed to 
associate voluntariness with control. Equally, they also seemed to place an emphasis on 
consciousness. Specifically, the defendant’s behaviour was deemed not to be automatic, but 
conscious ‘in the sense that they are aware of what they do physically’, i.e. ‘conscious in the belief 
that he is a character’.130 However, it is not entirely clear whether the court would have issued 
such a stringent rationalisation of involuntariness had the defendant not been morally culpable. 
For instance, apart from prior fault, defendants suffering from PTSD or those who move 
involuntarily during sleepwalking do not seem to differ considerably in their experience. 
However, in developing a strict standard, there is a potential for inconsistency across categories 
in the way courts approach the issue of (in)voluntariness. It would have been preferrable for courts 
not to be influenced by the blameworthiness of the defendant in their analysis of whether the 
movements were involuntary or not, and only assess the culpability of the defendant in becoming 
intoxicated once involuntariness was established. This approach provides an additional warning 
as to the inappropriate classification of automatism as a defence. Under this categorisation, it is 
easier for courts to justify strict rules when seeking to block defences rather than having to utilise 
prior fault to construct the lacking element of voluntariness. In other words, it is easier to adopt a 
terminology of barring acquittal due to fault as opposed to one of constructing liability, as it turns 
the evaluation into a wider moral assessment rather than a factual one, solely limited to the 
involuntariness in question.131 
 
129 ibid [22] (LJ Hughes).  
130 ibid [23]. 
131 For further detail on the implication of categorising automatism as a defence in the context of prior fault, 
see J J Child and Alan Reed, ‘Automatism is Never a Defence’ (2014) 65 NILQ 167. The fact that courts 
engage in a moral assessment has also been identified by Loughnan and Wake, who argued that courts 
utilise ‘moral culpability lines’ as a way to demarcate the limits of the automatism ‘defence’, since the 
doctrine is the most ‘overtly morally-evaluative part of the “mental incapacity terrain”. See Arlie Loughnan 
and Nicola Wake, ‘Of Blurred Boundaries and Prior Fault’ in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds), 
General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate 2014), 119-120; 
and Loughnan (n 70) 132. However, this thesis takes the view that moral culpability should only play a role 




An interesting contrast can be made between Coley and Daviault,132 a case decided by the 
Canadian Supreme Court. Here, the defendant allegedly raped the victim whilst under an acute 
state of intoxication. However, the court did not apply the prior fault rules and acquitted the 
defendant based on his involuntariness, which was deemed to go beyond the inability to form the 
mens rea of the offence. In particular, the judges acknowledged the relevance of voluntariness, 
arguing that certain states of intoxication could be so acute as to render a person unable to perform 
a ‘willed act’.133 The decision attracted widespread criticism on the basis that the defendant 
avoided liability for rape, which ultimately led to Parliament enacting legislation that prevented 
such a verdict. Specifically, s.33.1(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada now states that it is not 
possible to use intoxication as a ‘defence’ for lacking ‘the general intent or the voluntariness 
required to commit the offence’. Most importantly, the legislature emphasised that regardless of 
whether a person was aware or able to consciously control their movements, intoxication could 
not be used as a way to escape liability when that interfered with the bodily integrity of another 
person.134 Unfortunately, neither courts nor legislators provided sufficient clarification on the 
meaning of voluntariness in law, beyond the association with notions of consciousness and 
control.   
In Scotland, the court in Ross v HM Advocate135 had to address the relevance of involuntary 
intoxication for a finding of automatism. In this case, the defendant appealed against a conviction 
for attempted murder, claiming that, at the time, his lager had been spiked without his knowledge 
with temazepam and LSD. Lord Hope stated that the defence of automatism was based on ‘an 
inability to form mens rea due to some external factor which was outwith the appellant's control 
and which he was not bound to foresee’.136 Compared to cases such as those from England and 
Wales,137 the court was not concerned about the possibility of defendants making false claims. 
 
132 R v Daviault [1994] 3 SCR 63.   
133 ibid 77 (Cory J). The distinction between acts and movements is addressed in Chapter 3.2. 
134 Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, cC-46, s.33.1(2).  
135 [1990] JC 210. 
136 ibid 218 (Lord Hope). This argues against viewing voluntariness as an element of the mens rea of an 
offence. For further detail see Chapter 3.3. 
137 In particular, see next section, on non-dangerous intoxicants.  
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Instead, it argued that sufficient safeguards are available to mitigate this risk. Such safeguards 
related to the requirements that the external trigger of automatism must not be self-inflicted, that 
the trigger is not one which the defendant could have foreseen, and that the trigger ‘must have 
resulted in a total alienation of reason amounting to a complete absence of self-control’.138 In 
Cardle v Mulrainey,139 the ability to reason was deemed to be concerned mostly with the ‘total 
alienation of the accused's mental faculties of reasoning and of understanding what he is doing’, 
whereas the inability to exert self-control related more to the ‘inability to complete the reasoning 
process’. It seems that in such cases, the focus was not necessarily on physical capacities, but 
rather the ability to tell right from wrong, understand the consequences of one’s actions etc.140 In 
this respect, the statement in Ross aligned automatism with the then definition of insanity based 
on ‘absolute alienation of reason’.141 However, given that both Ross and Cardle concerned 
unintentional intoxication, it is not clear whether the court would have been influenced by the 
blameworthiness of the defendant had they intentionally consumed alcohol or drugs.  
Overall, the rationalisation adopted by courts, such as that taken in Coley, is somewhat puzzling, 
when compared to cases related to PTSD, sleepwalking or hypnosis. For example, the defendant 
in T was found to be involuntary but equally conscious in the sense of being aware of their 
physical movement, and still exercised a degree of control, in the sense of it not being ‘completely 
destroyed’. However, it is uncertain whether what is now the leading case on automatism in 
England and Wales would have promoted such a strict standard had the defendant not been 
culpable in losing voluntariness. Such a narrow application of automatism, where nothing short 
of the destruction of control would lead to an acquittal, will be taken regardless of whether or not 
the defendant was at fault for becoming involuntary. This also has evidential implications, for it 
makes it virtually impossible for defendants to meet the evidential burden needed for the 
 
138 Ross v HM Advocate [1990] JC 210, 218 (Lord Justice-General [Hope]). 
139 [1992] SCCR 658, 668 (Lord Justice-General). 
140 This thesis adopts the view that voluntariness should be solely concerned with a person’s physical ability 
to move. For further information, see Chapter 3. 
141 Since then, insanity has been replaced with a ‘mental disorder’ defence. For further detail, see Claire 
McDiarmid, ‘How Do They Do That? Automatism, Coercion, Necessity, and Mens Rea in Scots Criminal 
Law’ in Reed and Bohlander (n 122) 161. 
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prosecution to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, in developing a 
test based on the complete destruction of control, the court did not clarify whether a loss of control 
could be equated with a loss of voluntariness, or whether the remit of the automatism ‘defence’ 
extended beyond the issue of voluntariness. This approach is present in other jurisdictions as well. 
For instance, the fact that legislators in Canada have addressed the issue of automatism resulting 
from intoxication does not reflect a particular understanding of the voluntariness requirement, 
beyond mere associations to ideas of control or consciousness. Ultimately, the way in which 
voluntariness is assessed appears to rest more on the defendant’s moral blameworthiness and 
matters of public policy, rather than on legal principles, similar to trigger slip cases. In most cases, 
the issue is also intensified by the application of automatism as an excusatory defence, inviting 
assessments regarding the defendant’s culpable behaviour overall, rather than just their 
voluntariness.  
 
9. Non-Dangerous Intoxicants 
Generally, courts distinguish dangerous from non-dangerous intoxicants in the application of 
prior fault rules. Whilst the loss of voluntariness arguably arises and manifests itself similarly to 
that triggered by dangerous substances, the law treats defendants distinctly. For instance, in 
Hardie,142 a case which involved the ingestion of Valium, the court placed an emphasis on the 
defendant not being aware of the risks associated with the drug, as well as the lack of general 
evidence that Valium could make a person aggressive or unable to understand the risks to 
others.143 Thus, the court here drew a distinction between dangerous and non-dangerous 
intoxicants, stating that the latter does not raise a conclusive presumption that the prior fault rules 
apply, including cases where the administration of the intoxicants leads to automatism.144   
 
142 R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64.  
143 ibid 69 (Parker LJ).  
144 ibid 70. 
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A paradigm example of cases involving non-dangerous intoxicants involves hypoglycaemia, 
where people suffering from diabetes can develop a reaction to insulin to the point that they 
experience confusion, unusual movements, or even seizures.145 Such movements raise issues 
regarding the voluntariness of an individual and are particularly dangerous whilst driving.146 
Similar symptoms can also arise in episodes of hyperglycaemia, for example where people forget 
to administer insulin. These episodes can involve drowsiness, confusion, blurry vision, but also 
unconsciousness.147 When a particular offence is committed under either of the two 
circumstances, the law appears to acknowledge that not all defendants will have moved 
voluntarily.  
From a legal perspective, it seems that both hypoglycaemia and hyperglycaemia are accepted as 
examples of states potentially leading to involuntariness, albeit under distinct headings. 
Particularly, a distinction is made between those who forget to administer themselves insulin and 
those who develop an adverse reaction to the drug. On one hand involuntariness caused by a state 
of hyperglycaemia is triggered by an internal factor and leads to a finding of insanity – ‘disease 
of the mind’.148 On the other hand, when insulin, an external factor, leads to involuntary 
movement, generally under a state of hypoglycaemia, the law regards this as a case of non-insane 
automatism. This latter scenario ‘results in an outright acquittal, provided there is no fault on the 
defendant’s part.149 Despite the fact that the distinction has been extensively criticised for its 
illogical nature,150 it is clear that both cases are seen by courts as potentially leading to 
involuntariness.  
 
145 NHS, ‘Low Blood Sugar (Hypoglycaemia)’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/low-blood-sugar-
hypoglycaemia/> accessed 27 April 2018.  
146 UK Government, ‘Hypoglycaemia and Driving’, <https://www.gov.uk/hypoglycaemia-and-driving> 
accessed 27 April 2018. 
147 Robert Ferry Jr., High Blood Sugar (Hyperglycemia) 
<https://www.emedicinehealth.com/high_blood_sugar_hyperglycemia/article_em.htm#high_blood_sugar
_symptoms> accessed 27 April 2018. 
148 R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287, 291 (Lord Lane CJ). 
149 R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 922 (Lawton LJ).  
150 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [20] (Hughes LJ).  
57 
 
Much like other cases where the voluntariness of the defendant is in question, including dangerous 
intoxicants, courts dealing with diabetic defendants in England and Wales rely on alternative 
notions in order to establish whether automatism applies. In particular, an emphasis appears to be 
placed on the ability to control one’s movements, as opposed to consciousness, as was the case 
with sleepwalking or PTSD. For instance, in Watmore v Jenkins,151 a claim of automatism in 
relation to careless driving was dismissed on the grounds that there had not been ‘a complete 
destruction of voluntary control’ as the defendant ‘continued to perform the functions of driving’. 
Similarly, in Broome v Perkins, the defendant had driven erratically for a few miles throughout 
an episode of hypoglycaemia that ultimately resulted in a collision.152 The court there stated that:  
When driving a motor vehicle, the driver’s conscious mind receives signals from 
his eyes and ears, decides on the appropriate course of action as a result of those 
signals, and gives directions to the limbs to control the vehicle. When a person’s 
actions are involuntary and automatic his mind is not controlling or directing his 
limbs.153 
As such, because for sections of the journey, the defendant’s ‘mind’ was in control of the limbs, 
his driving had not been involuntary.154  
Automatism resulting from the ingestion of insulin or lack thereof suggests that the ‘connection’ 
between the mind and the body must be completely severed in order for a defendant to be 
acquitted. Apart from the narrow connection, this category of cases is complicated by the setting 
in which the offence occurs, i.e. driving, where separate considerations arise. For example, in Hill 
v Baxter, Pearson J listed four different scenarios in which a defendant would not be deemed to 
have been driving at all:  
(1) […] an epileptic fit, so that he is unconscious and there are merely spasmodic 
movements of his arms and legs. (2) […] a state of coma and is completely 
unconscious. (3) He is stunned by a blow on the head from a stone which passing 
traffic has thrown up from the roadway. (4) He is attacked by a swarm of bees so 
 
151 Watmore v Jenkins [1962] 2 QB 572, 586-587 (Winn J). Here, the court referred to the case of Hill v 
Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 286 (Pearson J): in order to succeed with a claim, the defendant must be ‘rendered 
unconscious or otherwise incapacitated from controlling the car.’ In contrast with Watmore, the case 
involved ‘sudden illness’ and not diabetes. 
152 Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321. 
153 ibid 332 (Glidewell LJ) (emphasis added). 
154 ibid 333. 
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that he is […] prevented from exercising any directional control over the 
vehicle.155 
While it is quite clear that the degree of control plays an important part in driving, one issue with 
the aforementioned examples is that courts use the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘control’ 
interchangeably and with no explicit reference to the requirement of voluntariness, to the extent 
that it is not entirely certain which one of them accurately explains what it means to be 
(in)voluntary.156  
An additional issue arising from non-dangerous intoxicants is the one of prior fault. A significant 
area that lacks clarity is the type of foresight required for a defendant to be denied the ‘defence’. 
On one hand, following Quick, the prior fault rules would apply where the loss of voluntariness 
at Time 2 (T2) could have objectively been foreseen at Time 1 (T1), i.e. where it ‘could have 
reasonably been foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something’.157 On the other 
hand, there is the more lenient view that prior fault would solely apply where the person had 
subjectively foreseen at T1 the risk of becoming involuntary at T2. For instance, in Bailey,158 
Griffiths LJ stated that in contrast with alcohol or dangerous drugs, it is not common knowledge 
that a failure to eat after an insulin shot would lead to a loss of control. It was only if the defendant 
had been aware of the risk but deliberately ran or disregarded it that he would be found reckless.159 
This approach has also been confirmed by the Law Commission, who argued that subjective 
foresight, albeit in a broader sense than Bailey, should be required.160 This means that the 
defendant must have ‘personally been aware of the risk of that loss of control occurring and had 
proceeded unreasonably to take that risk’.161    
 
155 In Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 286. Pearson J (emphasis added). 
156 There is wide academic literature pointing towards the notion of control as the appropriate terminology. 
See Stanley Yeo, ‘Putting Voluntariness Back into Automatism’ [2001] 32 VUWLR 387; and Stanley Yeo, 
‘Clarifying Automatism’ (2002) Int'l JL & Psychiatry 445; and Law Commission (n 11) para 5.2. This issue 
is further discussed in the following chapters.  
157 Quick [1973] QB 910, 922 (Lawton LJ).  
158 R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760, 765 (Griffiths LJ). See also R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64, where a similar 
argument was made in relation to the ingestion of diazepam.  
159 ibid. 
160 Law Commission (n 11) para 6.28. Contrast with the approach in R v Bailey 1 WLR 760, where the 
defendant must have been aware of the risk of unpredictable and uncontrollable conduct. 
161 ibid (emphasis added). 
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Such a contrasting approach seems unprincipled and arguably creates confusion as to which 
perspective is to be followed. Moreover, if the objective view is applied, it raises issues of judicial 
fairness and undermining of the principle of maximum certainty in cases where diabetic drivers 
shouldn’t necessarily be criminalised. For instance, Rumbold and Wasik note the existence of a 
rare phenomenon of ‘hypoglycaemic unawareness’ in which the adrenaline discharge that usually 
triggers the warning signs of a crisis does not occur in time for a person to be aware of the 
symptoms.162 In such cases, a person can be driving under severe mental impairment without ever 
having had the opportunity to foresee the risk attached to their behaviour.163 However, following 
an objective foresight approach, such a defendant would be denied a claim the automatism.  
The confusing approach regarding foresight of risk can be said to also have an impact on the 
relationship between automatism and the intoxication rules, particularly since cases of 
automatism concerning diabetic drivers involve the administering of insulin. Take the example of 
Lipman.164 Here, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, a basic intent offence, as his 
intoxication substituted the lack of voluntariness at T1. To contrast this, following the all-
encompassing language in Quick, a diabetic defendant could theoretically be prosecuted for a 
specific intent offence if he lacks objective foresight.165 This bizarre inconsistency has led 
Mackay to argue that if intoxication is correctly categorised as an external factor in automatism, 
then it should be treated on an equal basis with other factors.166 Moreover, such a disparate 
approach only adds to the confusion and rather unprincipled understanding of the automatism 
doctrine, starting with the requisite level of control and the importance of moral blameworthiness 
in assessments of voluntariness.  
Overall, the guidance provided by courts in cases involving non-dangerous intoxicants is 
relatively vague. On one hand, there is an acknowledgement that the automatism doctrine is 
 
162 John Rumbold and Martin Wasik, ‘Diabetic Drivers, Hypoglycaemic Unawareness, and Automatism’ 
(2011) 11 CrimLR 863, 865. 
163 ibid 868. 
164 R v Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152. 
165 R D Mackay, ‘Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism’ [1982] CrimLR 146, 155. 
166 ibid 152. See also Child and Reed (n 122) 179-180. 
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applicable in such cases. On the other hand, no specific clarification is provided as to the definition 
of voluntariness. This leads to the emphasis being placed on alternative notions such as control 
and consciousness, which can generate inconsistency across categories of cases, as seen in the 
previous subsections. Moreover, the discrepancy in the approach to prior fault suggests that the 
defendant’s level of blameworthiness in not managing their use of medication adequately does 
have a role to play in the criminalisation of involuntary movement, similar to cases of situational 
liability. Even if the subjective approach is to be preferred, as the Law Commission also 
confirmed,167 this still does not resolve the main problems with this category of cases. For 
instance, why is foresight of unconsciousness enough to apply the prior fault rules, as opposed to 
foresight of unconsciousness leading to involuntariness? Equally, the categorisation of 
automatism as a defence makes it evidentially difficult to separate issues of voluntariness from 
those of prior fault. That is, rather than first ensuring that voluntariness has been completed as an 
element of the offence, with prior fault as a subsequent consideration, the approach taken is that 
of barring the application of a ‘defence’.168 Instead of using prior fault as a method of inculpation, 
to replace the missing element of voluntariness, the approach taken is that of ‘punishing’ 
individuals for creating the conditions of their ‘defence’. This can potentially lead to over-
criminalisation.169  
 
10. Conclusion   
Despite acknowledging the relevance of the voluntariness requirement or categorising certain 
triggers such as sleepwalking or PTSD under the heading of automatism, it seems that courts 
avoid explaining what is actually meant by voluntariness. Even where judges are explicit in their 
mentioning of the requirement of voluntariness, it is usually done by reference to alternative 
 
167 Law Commission (n 11) para 6.28. 
168 Here, it is argued that, once an evidential burden is satisfied, the prosecution should first prove that the 
defendant had been voluntary. In the absence of voluntariness, the prosecution would then be entitled to 
prove the defendant’s prior fault, to replace the missing element of the offence. 
169 For further information see Chapter 1.1.b. 
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language surrounding the notions of ‘control’ or ‘consciousness’. These new terms arise without 
any clarification as to whether they are meant to be synonymous with others. For example, there 
is no mention made in any of the categories as to what makes ‘control’ or ‘consciousness’ relevant 
to voluntariness or why they should be used as a standard for identifying voluntariness. The 
reference to alternative language also implies that courts approach the notions with a degree of 
certainty, when in fact this is not necessarily the case. In particular, such terms have various 
philosophical and neuroscientific foundations that can and should provide meaning to the way in 
which it is understood legally.170 However, courts do not acknowledge or engage with these 
issues. Whether or not judges are aware of these foundations but choose not to discuss them, the 
potential for philosophy and neuroscience to provide clarification should not be ignored. 
Notwithstanding the scarce reference to the voluntariness requirement, it seems that courts 
develop different standards across different categories of cases, according to the type of trigger 
or circumstance in which involuntariness arises. This is seen in trigger slip cases, as well as those 
involving driving offences or dangerous drugs, which often involve defendants making more 
blameworthy choices than the ones suffering from PTSD, sleepwalking, or being hypnotised. It 
is here where the role of the prior fault rules would appear central as an alternative route to 
liability, but the exact part it should play is unclear in several categories, particularly those related 
to drugs or other intoxicants. At the same time, the inconsistency between categories cannot be 
attributed solely to policy reasons. Particularly, cases involving non-dangerous drugs seem hard 
to reconcile with those in which, for example, the defendant is driving while under a hypnotic 
trance but is still able to move their limbs in a somewhat purposeful way. Here, what is sought is 
a ‘complete destruction of voluntary control’.171 It is puzzling, however, that it was the same case 
which confirmed that movements committed under hypnosis are a valid example of 
involuntariness, when one could argue that bodily movements performed under a trance are as 
goal-directed as the ones under a hypoglycaemic state.172 The same can also be said about 
 
170 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
171 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233.  
172 In fact, the Canadian case of R v Book [1999] ABPC 149 involved a driving offence. However, the court 
did not engage in a discussion on the level of control needed for a finding of automatism.  
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sleepwalking, an automatism of the insane kind, which also consists of goal-directed movement. 
It appears that the law has progressed in a piecemeal fashion without any guiding principles as to 
when conduct is and is not voluntary.  
The lack of definitions and the inconsistency across categories has the potential for cases to be 
treated differently for no principled reason. Furthermore, the absence of clarification as to how 
voluntariness should be identified leads to legal uncertainty and ambiguity as to the status and 
application of the requirement. However, the importance of clarity and certainty within the law 
should not be understated. Such a principle is instrumental in ensuring that there is fairness and 
consistency in the treatment of defendants. The severe curtailment of the doctrine of automatism, 
and particularly the alarmingly narrow mental connection required for the ‘defence’ to apply, 
could be attributed not just to policy reasons but also to a lack of understanding of the fundamental 
principles behind the notion of voluntariness. It is for this reason that the present thesis seeks to 
produce a statutory definition of voluntariness, which should be interpreted independently from 
existing case law, given the somewhat disorganised way in which the existing law on automatism 
and insanity (as it relates to voluntariness) has evolved. In other words, it is argued that the current 
law should be abolished and a new statutory definition should be introduced, which should be 
interpreted independently from the case law that has been developed so far. Certainly, while 
clarity and consistency is the primary goal here, it is acknowledged that the definition that will be 
developed within this study, like any statutory instrument, may suffer from being incomplete.173 
However, the focus of the courts should be forward-looking, seeking to develop case law that 
interprets the definition in line with the meaning and significance, as explored in the present 
analysis. In this context, the following chapters will address disciplines outside law, specifically 
philosophy and neuroscience, in order to explore whether they can provide more complete 
definitions than existing statutory instruments and case law from common law jurisdictions. In 
 
173 For further detail on the incomplete nature of statutory rules, see Eben Moglen and Richard J Pierce, Jr., 
‘Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation’ (1990) 57 The University of 
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UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN A PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
If we accept that, as a minimum condition of criminal responsibility, the defendant must have 
been voluntary, then any investigation into what it actually means to be voluntary should expect 
a broader account of the nature or the defining characteristics of the requirement. The previous 
chapter has analysed the way in which issues of voluntariness are addressed by courts or feature 
within statutory documents. However, as shown, the jurisprudence has not been consistent across 
categories, with instances of involuntariness being dealt with on a case by cases basis, rather than 
through the application of well-defined concepts. In addition, when courts do address the 
voluntariness of the actor in question, this is usually analysed loosely by reference to concepts 
such as control or consciousness. However, it is not entirely clear what such concepts mean for 
the law, nor is their relevance for the requirement of voluntariness explored in detail. In this 
context, to understand the foundational significance placed on these terms in court, but also to 
give them a consistent and robust meaning, the following chapter will expand the analysis beyond 
legal cases to address the way they are conceptualised within the philosophy of action. Based on 
this analysis, the chapter develops a provisional definition of voluntariness.  
The philosophy of action (and the distinct discipline of neuroscience, a topic which is addressed 
in the following chapter) is central to our quest of understanding what voluntariness means and 
how it should be defined. As the name suggests, this area of investigation is concerned with the 
nature of human action and includes questions such as: ‘what counts as an action?’, ‘How is it 
initiated?’, and ‘what does it consist of?’.1 Moreover, this discipline has long been used as a 
 
1 See for example Carl Ginet, On Action (CUP 1990) ix; and Jonathan Dancy and Constantine Sandis, 
‘Introduction to Part I’ in Philosophy of Action: An Anthology (Wiley Blackwell 2015).   
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source of theoretical support within legal theory. When it comes to existing literature, academics 
such as Michael Moore or R A Duff have tried to position or even criticise the act requirement in 
law using philosophical concepts. Here, voluntariness has played a crucial role, particularly in the 
frequent presentation of action as a willed bodily movement and the positioning of the 
voluntariness requirement as part of the actus reus of an offence.2 At the same time, this 
philosophical debate has at times deterred efforts to codify the requirement. For instance, 
committees in both Australia and New Zealand have referenced philosophical intricacies as 
reasons for not clarifying concepts such as ‘conduct’ or ‘action’.3 Such intricacies refer primarily 
to the ambiguous meaning that can be attributed to the notion of voluntariness, from ‘a particular 
attitude, desire, intention’ to ‘simple awareness’.4 The issue of philosophical ambiguity can apply 
to case law as well for, as revealed in the previous chapter, judges often rely on alternative notions, 
but without providing sufficient justification for doing so.  
At the same time, while the philosophy of action (often referred to as action theory) is an area of 
research that can contribute to a better understanding of the voluntariness requirement in criminal 
law, it is important to emphasise that it is beyond the scope of the present thesis to provide a 
thorough analysis of existing philosophical theories. To do so would leave little room to discuss 
remaining considerations needed for an analysis of voluntariness in law. In fact, notwithstanding 
the potential for philosophy to inform legal debates, it is still the case that the two disciplines are 
distinct. As Child argues, accounts of action in general should not be conflated with voluntary 
acts within criminal law, for to do so could lead to unneeded complexity, as well as open the 
floodgates for criticism from alternative theories of action.5 In other words, favouring one 
 
2 The position of the voluntariness requirement within the structure of offence elements is discussed in 
Section 3.  
3 See J J Child, ‘Defence of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law from Philosophies of 
Action’ (2021) 24 New Criminal Law Review; and New Zealand Report on 1989 Crimes Bill (1991) 9-12; 
and Australian Model Criminal Code, Parliamentary Counsel’s Committee (Commentary) s.202. See also 
Chapter 2.2.  
4 Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion Paper (2013) para A47. 
See also Law Commission, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Volume 2: 
Commentary on Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) para 11.1: ‘The word “involuntary” is 
not needed – happily, in view of the variable use to which it tends to be put’.  
5 Child (n 3) 7. 
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philosophical conceptualisation of action over another and equating it with its legal counterpart 
would leave it vulnerable to unnecessary attacks from philosophy. Similarly, Duff argues that we 
should make a distinction between voluntary acts in law and action as it is understood ordinarily.6 
In this context, the present chapter will survey existing literature, with a view to identify those 
aspects within action theory that can help define terms for the law, as well as unpack the normative 
benefits of implementing those terms within the legal understanding of voluntariness. 
Specifically, the remainder of this chapter will seek to answer the following research questions: 
What is the target of voluntariness? How does the philosophy of action conceptualise 
voluntariness? Which rationalisation best fits the descriptive and normative goals of the legal 
requirement? 
The chapter will look to various potential conceptualisations of voluntariness. Specifically, it will 
address whether they are practically suitable as a model, but also whether they fulfil the liberal 
goals of the criminal law. Such goals relate primarily to the preservation of the autonomy and 
agency of individuals, particularly considering that the voluntariness requirement is generally 
thought of as ‘the foundation of moral responsibility’, or the minimum requirement for the 
attribution of blame.7 Therefore, identifying which model best reflects people’s autonomy is 
equally important to selecting the one that works best in practice.  
 
2. What is the Target of Voluntariness?  
a. Bodily Movements   
From a legal perspective, the voluntariness requirement is frequently associated with the existence 
of a voluntary bodily movement or, in limited cases, the voluntary omission of bodily movement.8 
In particular, criminal responsibility can only be attached in those cases where the defendant 
 
6 R A Duff, Criminal Attempts (OUP 1996) 241. This limitation will be further addressed within the chapter, 
particularly when discussing the target of the requirement. 
7 A P Simester, ‘On the So-called Requirement for Voluntary Action’ (1998) 1 BuffCrimLR 403, 406. 
8 For example, the US Model Penal Code (MPC) s.1.12(2), where an act or action is defined as ‘a bodily 
movement whether voluntary or involuntary’. Whether the requirement requires a voluntary act, as opposed 
to a voluntary movement will be discussed shortly.  
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voluntarily moved or omitted to move their body in the requisite prohibited manner. This 
argument relates to metaphysical accounts of action, where the focus is placed on bodily 
movements as representations of action. According to Moore, the proponent of the so-called 
‘orthodox’ or ‘standard’ theory of action, the criminal law requires an act, understood as ‘a simple 
bodily movement […] before criminal responsibility attaches, and that such a movement is all the 
action a person ever performs’.9 However, this approach of equating bodily movements with acts 
may be inappropriate in that the voluntariness requirement is not necessarily concerned with the 
voluntariness of an act, especially that of an actus reus, but rather with the simple physical 
movement performed by an agent.  
Within the philosophy of action, it is commonly argued that bodily movements can be reduced to 
the ‘basic action’ that lies at the foundation of all ‘complex actions’. Specifically, when an agent 
performs a basic action, they do not perform any other action first in order to cause the basic one 
to happen, i.e. the basic action is not the effect of a previous one.10 These types of actions are 
thought of as irreducible bodily movements, or ‘absolutely basic’ actions,11 such as movements 
of the arms and legs, eye-blinking etc.12 In contrast, complex actions do not just involve bodily 
movements, but also circumstances and results such as opening and closing doors, driving, or 
even stabbing someone to death in the midst of an altercation. Complex actions are often 
rationalised as causal – doing something else first, which causes the complex action to occur.13 
In a sense, as Duff argues, they can be basic as well, but by reference to further complex actions, 
in the way throwing stones is basic relative to breaking windows.14 However, what is said to 
characterise any complex action is that it is initiated by a basic one, or represents ‘the effect of a 
chain of causes the originating member of which is a basic action’ of the agent.15 Taking the 
 
9 Michael S Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law 
(Clarendon Press 1993) 45.  
10 Arthur C Danto, ‘Basic Action’ (1965) 2 AmPhilQ 141, 142. See also Julia Annas, ‘How Basic Are Basic 
Actions?’ (1977/78) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 195. 
11 Duff (n 6) 248. 
12 Annette Baier, ‘The Search for Basic Action’ 8 AmPhilQ 161, 161. 
13 Joel Feinberg, ‘Action and Responsibility’, cited in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (2nd 
edn, OUP 2001) 56. See also Danto (n 10) 142.  
14 Duff (n 6) 248. 
15 Danto (n 10) 142. 
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stabbing example, the basic action of moving one’s arm would lead to the complex actions of 
piercing the skin, artery, and subsequently causing a haemorrhage resulting in the death of a 
person.  
At the same time, while some theorists like Danto or Feinberg have distinguished the basic from 
the complex action, others would see the relationship as one of the former being subsumed into 
the latter. For instance, Davidson argues that basic actions are all the actions that people do, with 
their circumstances and results amounting to mere descriptions.16 In an oft-cited argument, the 
author explains that ‘we never do more than move our bodies: the rest is up to nature.’17 Davidson 
uses the metaphor of an accordion, which remains intact through stretching and squeezing, and 
where any changes suffered are understood as ways of describing the same object.18 Thus, if we 
were to envisage a scenario in which a person is shot and killed, the agent’s basic actions would 
relate purely to the movement of the finger, with the remainder of the circumstances and results 
of that complex action originating from that basic act of pressing the trigger. Applied to the 
criminal legal context, an understanding of the voluntariness requirement as focusing on basic 
actions would solely require a voluntary bodily movement. Once the basic action is found to have 
been voluntary, then the criminal law can impose more complex descriptions that amount to 
elements of the criminal offence, e.g. whether death ensued, whether the agent intended the 
victim’s death etc. According to Child, focusing on bodily movements as the target of the 
voluntariness requirement would also fulfil the normative needs of the requirement, acting as ‘the 
basic ingredient of responsible agency’.19  
At the same time, the differentiation between basic and complex action lends itself to several 
conceptual difficulties. On the one hand, the distinction is appealing from a causal viewpoint, 
helping to identify a voluntary bodily movement as the starting point in a causal chain that 
 
16 Davidson (n 13) 59. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid 58. The ‘accordion effect’ is a refined version of Feinberg’s idea that an agent’s action could be 
‘squeezed down to a minimum or stretched out’. However, where Davidson disagrees is in the focus on 
causation, which implies that the resulting complex action must be distinct from the initiating basic one.   
19 Child (n 3) 7. 
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involves complex circumstances and results. On the other hand, it is problematic to rationalise 
such movement as causally basic, in the context of there being muscle contractions and 
neurological processes or events that help produce the motion.20 According to the standard 
conceptualisation of basic actions, the agent need not do anything distinct from that action in 
order to perform it.21 However, if we wanted to rely on bodily movements as basic actions, we 
would have to show that our pre-movement processes are not actions themselves.22 In turn, those 
who believe that the flexing and relaxing of muscles are actions would have to show that the 
sending of nerve signals to the muscles are not actions, and so on. Under this view, we would be 
faced with the potential for infinite regress or at least be led to conceptualise action by reference 
to neurological events that do not seem to match our intuitive notion of action, and are therefore 
problematic to categorise as basic action.23 As Duff argued, it would seem ‘perverse’ to refer to 
neuron firings as actions.24 Moreover, such a rationalisation would trigger wider debates related 
to agency and, particularly in the context of the criminal law, attribution.  
Alternatively, the focus could remain on bodily movement, but in conjunction with an additional 
mental criterion, one that is intuitively closer to our understanding of action. One such criterion 
could be, as Child has noted, intention.25 For instance, one could view basic actions as ‘the 
immediate or direct object of the agent’s intention’.26 But similar to the previous criticism, in 
order to focus on bodily movements as intentionally basic, one would have to show that pre-
movement processes are not intentional, or at least not intended in the same manner. In addition, 
such a conceptualisation seems to be at odds with more complex routines where, once we have 
acquired the skill required to perform them, we are not aware of what we are doing at the level of 
 
20 See Alvin I Goldman, ‘The Volitional Theory Revisited’ in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, Action 
Theory: Proceedings of the Winnipeg Conference on Human Action, Held at Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, 
9-11 May 1975 (D. Reidel 1975) 69; Baier (n 12) 166; and Child (n 3) 8. 
21 Arthur C Danto ‘II. Causation and Basic Actions: A Reply en passant to Professor Margolis’ (1970) 13 
108, 109  
22 Berent Enç, How We Act (OUP 2003) 11; and Ron Shapira, ‘Structural Flaws of the “Willed Bodily 
Movement” Theory of Action (1998) 1 BuffCrimLR 349, 361. 
23 Child (n 3) 9; and Enç (n 22) 11. 
24 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
60. 
25 Child (n 3) 9. 
26 ibid. See also Duff (n 6) 257. 
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physical movement.27 For instance, Baier refers to tying one’s laces, where one could do it, but 
would not be able to show how that was done other than having to do it again.28 The bodily 
movement in such an example is not consciously and directly intended itself, but only in reference 
to the complex action, to the point that, as Duff has argued, the tying of the laces is intentionally 
basic to the movements required to do so, rather than the other way around.29 Referring to such 
cases, Moore has responded by arguing that at some point in our lives, we did not possess the 
requisite skills to perform the complex behaviour and so had to learn them, with the simplest 
objects of attention being to learn how to move one’s finger.30 However, whilst this is true of the 
earliest stages in our lives, when the movement of the finger was intentionally basic, this is not 
the case later in life.31 Moreover, it is not entirely clear that the direct objects of intention are 
bodily movements. As Duff has emphasised, giving the example of learning to speak, at no stage 
in the process does a child learn what movements must intentionally be made in order to produce 
sounds.32 In this context, appealing to intention as an additional criterion of basicness does not 
help alleviate the metaphysical realists’ problems associated to categorising basic action as 
‘bodily movement’.   
These conceptual difficulties suggest that an account of action as bodily movement may be 
philosophically untenable but at the same time, it is important to highlight that, from a legal 
viewpoint, the aforementioned objections need not defeat the identification of bodily movement 
as the target of the voluntariness requirement. As Duff argued, the legal question of ‘what is a 
voluntary act?’ is more minimal than the philosophical one of ‘what is action?’33 However, 
according to Child, inadvertently or not, the trend within existing scholarship has become one of 
 
27 See Moore (n 9) 129.  
28 Baier (n 12) 166. Such examples have led theorists such as Ripley to argue that basic actions can become 
larger than simple bodily movements, in accordance with the skills we acquire throughout our life. See 
Charles Ripley, ‘A Theory of Volition’ (1974) 11 AmPhilQ 141, 145; and Kevin W Saunders, ‘Voluntary 
Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition’ (1988) 49 UPittLRev 
443, 457. 
29 Duff (n 6) 258. 
30 Moore (n 9) 129. 
31 Duff (n 6) 258-259. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid 241. 
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combining the voluntariness requirement in law with comprehensive theories of action in 
general.34 This has forced legal scholars to have to side with a specific philosophical 
understanding of action, rather than analyse the standalone issue of voluntariness in law.35 In this 
context, rather than pursuing one philosophical conceptualisation, it is argued that the most 
practical approach would be to attempt to demarcate the legal requirement of voluntariness within 
philosophical debates. For instance, whilst a criterion of basicness is required in order to identify 
bodily movement as the target of the voluntariness requirement in law, this should not be 
understood in a wider philosophical context due to the fact that the inclusion of such criterion 
within each philosophical explanation is open to contradiction and alternative explanation. 
From a legal viewpoint, identifying bodily movement as causally basic does not lead to the same 
criticism that could be brought against metaphysical realists. This is due to the fact that the 
criminal law does not focus on pre-movement processes, irrespective of their status as action.36 
However, one problematic aspect that remains is that of omissions liability.37 Within criminal 
law, omissions liability is generally imposed in those cases in which defendants refrain from 
acting when they have a duty to do so, for instance in the case of parents towards their children,38 
doctors and their patients,39 or Police officers and the public.40 The extent to which liability can 
be imposed for failures to move rests primarily on the values which the criminal law seeks to 
uphold, as well as the way in which such values are understood. Specifically, taking the 
‘conventional view’, one could rationalise omissions liability as the imposition of positive duties 
 
34 Child (n 3) 4-5. 
35 ibid 5. For example, Moore has promoted a definition of action as ‘willed bodily movement’ both within 
the voluntariness requirement and action theory. See Moore (n 9) 45. 
36 The same can be said in relation to so-called mental acts such as calculating or deliberating, which could 
be considered an additional challenge to the conceptualisation of voluntariness on the basis on bodily 
movements. However, except for archaic offences, such as envisaging the death of the monarch, thought 
offences are not a part of the criminal law.  
37 An additional aspect is that of possession offences. However, it is argued that possession offences 
nevertheless require bodily movements, albeit at an earlier stage, either by acquiring, for example illicit 
substances, or omitting to dispose of them. The same approach can be extended to status offences, where 
the agent either does something to assume a particular status or fails to rid themselves of it. See Francisco 
Munoz-Conde and Luis Ernesto Chiesa, ‘The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept of Criminal Law’ (2007) 
28 Cardozo LRev 2461, 2476; and Child (n 3) 15-16.  
38 Gibbins v Procter (1918) Cr App R 134. 
39 Re A (children) [2001] Fam 147. 
40 Dytham [1979] 3 All ER 641. 
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to act only in limited circumstances, due to the respect for autonomy and liberal values that the 
law reflects.41 Here, autonomy is understood not only as the freedom to act as one wishes, but 
also as the freedom not to, for to do otherwise would be categorised as ‘paternalistic’ and 
infringing people’s right to self-determination.42 Therefore, people are allowed to put themselves 
first, unless they have assumed a duty, either contractually or by virtue of their relationship.  
In the present context, omission liability can potentially represent a challenge to the argument that 
the target of voluntariness is bodily movements, considering the apparent lack thereof in these 
cases. For example, Hornsby criticises the ‘standard story’ of action as willed bodily movement 
on the basis that it leaves out those categories like ‘omitting, refraining, letting happen’ and puts 
a strain on proponents to justify them.43 Indeed, according to theorists such as Moore, omissions 
cannot be categorised as bodily movements, considering that they lack the requisite motion and 
physical exertion.44 The strain referred to by Hornsby can be seen here, where Moore is forced to 
make a distinction between metaphysical and moral considerations, deeming the existence of 
omissions liability an exception to the rule.45 Acknowledging the legal justification for imposing 
this liability, Moore states that:  
[…] the only exception to this is for those omissions that violate our duties 
sufficiently that the injustice of not punishing such wrongs outweighs the diminution 
of liberty such punishment entails.46 
 
41 Andrew Ashworth, ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424, 428. The 
author is a proponent of the ‘social responsibility view’, which stems out of a ‘communitarian social 
philosophy’ that values individual life, ‘both intrinsically and for its contribution (or potential contribution) 
to the community’. As such, preserving the life of others is an interest that outweighs that of preserving the 
freedom not to act. See also Introduction for an exploration of the focus on liberalism within the criminal 
law. 
42 ibid 430.  
43 Jennifer Hornsby, ‘Agency and Actions’, in John Hyman and Helen Steward (eds), Agency and Action 
(CUP 2004) 6. 
44 Moore (n 9) 82. See also Michael S Moore, ‘Renewed Questions about the Causal Theory of Action’ in 
Jesus H Aguilar and Andrei A Buckareff (eds), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal 
Theory of Action (MIT Press 2010) 27. 
45 Moore (n 9) 89. See also Alvin I Goldman, Theory of Human Action (Princeton University Press 1970) 
48: ‘I find this a difficult problem indeed, and I do not have any solution to propose.’  
46 Moore (n 9) 59. 
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This argument is also reflected within legal discourse, where most commentators draw a 
distinction between acts and omissions, focusing on the unique nature of the relationship between 
parties or the limited applicability of the doctrine.47  
At the same time, excluding omissions from the category of ‘actions’ can obscure the fact that 
both share similar characteristics, particularly when it comes to the normative and descriptive 
goals of the voluntariness requirement. For instance, as Smith argued, when someone refrains 
from moving their body, they exercise agency in the same way as those who do move their bodies 
do.48 The author gives the example of a person who decides they should not eat chocolate and 
thus refrains from moving their arm towards the chocolate box. Here, the agent is said to still 
exercise control over their body, ensuring that the arm remains still, or positioned somewhere 
different from the box.49 Even when voluntariness is conceptualised in a different way, similar 
comparisons can be made. For instance, when voluntariness is described by reference to intention, 
in both cases, the agent can intentionally move their arm to take the chocolate or intentionally 
abstain from doing so. These alternative conceptualisations suggest that there is no apparent 
distinction between voluntary bodily movements and voluntary omissions, both instances being 
potentially reflective of the person’s agency and therefore attributable to them.50  
Those theorists who challenge the focus on bodily movements as the source of action could see 
the similarities between voluntary bodily movements and omissions as supporting the need to 
conceptualise action differently. For instance, Fletcher argues that bodily movements have ‘no 
moral relevance’, considering that one can exercise agency in the absence of movement, using 
omissions as the biggest counterargument to this conceptualisation.51 However, there is a case to 
be made that omissions can nevertheless be compatible with a conceptualisation of bodily 
 
47 In fact, most criminal law textbooks allocate sections to the distinction between acts and omission. See 
for example Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law (9th edn, Palgrave 2015) 45; and Stuart Macdonald, Text, 
Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (Pearson 2015) 58.  
48 Michael Smith, ‘The Standard Story of Action: An Exchange (1)’ in Aguilar and Buckareff (n 44) 48.  
49 ibid 49. Smith here refers to control, but Section 4 of the chapter explores the conceptualisation of 
voluntariness through additional concepts, including volitions and intention.  
50 These various conceptualisations will be analysed in-depth shortly. 
51 George P Fletcher, ‘On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements (1994) 142 UPaLRev 1443, 1444. 
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movements as the target of the voluntariness requirement. One argument in favour is that most 
omissions can be defined by reference to other bodily movements. According to Vermazen, 
‘negative acts’, also known as ‘not-ϕ-ing’ (not-eating, not-coughing etc.), do not necessarily have 
to be equated with ‘not-moving’, for they can generally identify with some other movement of 
the agent’s.52 For instance, using the chocolate scenario, the not-eating can be identified with an 
act that they are doing instead, such as moving or facing away from the chocolates, drinking 
water, eating something else, and so on. In some cases, positive acts can be linked to a ‘pro-
attitude’ toward not doing something, the agent voluntarily keeping themselves occupied by doing 
something else.53 At the same time, one could argue that there are cases in which there is 
absolutely no bodily movement performed by the agent, such as lying still, but even here, as 
Vermazen argues, the fact that the agent does that by ‘activating the appropriate muscles’ can 
suggest some type of positive manifestation.54 This latter argument can be considered as 
contentious, especially in the previous context of the infinite regression argument and the dangers 
of looking beyond bodily movements to muscle contractions, neural processes, and so on. 
However, notwithstanding the conceptual difficulty such argument potentially brings to 
metaphysical accounts of action, this does not necessarily bar the inclusion of omissions to move 
one’s body within the voluntariness requirement, when that is understood as targeting bodily 
movements. Moreover, from a legal viewpoint, whether the omissions are taken as an exception 
to the requirement for bodily movement or not, this does not impact the application of the 
voluntariness requirement. The focus of the requirement on bodily movements, i.e. basic actions, 
does not extend the analysis to wider circumstances and results. Therefore, issues such as whether 
an absence of bodily movement can be causally tied to a particular result or state of affairs are 
considerations for actus reus and mens rea assessments particular to each offence, rather than the 
requirement of voluntariness applicable to all offences. In other words, focusing on the voluntary 
 
52 Bruce Vermazen, ‘Negative Acts’ in Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B Hintikka (eds), Essays on Davidson: 





lack of bodily movement as a requirement of voluntariness in omissions would suffice, regardless 
of philosophical and criminal legal intricacies. 
 
b. Act Descriptions  
Rather than acknowledging the philosophical difficulties in focusing on bodily movements, an 
alternative could be to focus on act descriptions instead. According to Duff, an analysis of action 
solely based on producing bare bodily movements does not have explicatory power without an 
accurate understanding of the ‘context-dependent meanings’ of action, when such meanings 
exist.55 For Duff, it is actions understood as ‘social phenomena’ which are the object of the law 
and what the criminal law is actually interested in.56 Because of this, the law should be concerned 
with our capacity to engage in reasoning and to achieve results that make a difference in the 
world.57 A similar understanding is promoted by Fletcher, a proponent of the so-called 
‘communicative’ theory of action, whereby acts or omissions should be taken as a type of 
expression or communication that is understandable to everyone.58 In particular, Fletcher is 
critical of Moore’s emphasis on bodily movement, which he considers to be ‘in abstraction to the 
way we act in relationships with other people’.59 What is important is not just the ‘objective 
externalisation’, but also the ‘subjective relationship between the actor and the act’.60 That is, an 
agent’s resistance to the norm is reflected through the intensity and degree of their intent. 
Such theorists focus on the way we understand and refer to actions in everyday situations, which 
is usually inclusive of circumstances and results. For example, rather than talking about the 
movement of our arms and legs, we are interested in whether someone is opening the door or 
driving. This approach is persuasive, but it has limitations. According to Saunders, when there is 
 
55 Duff (n 6) 296. Here, Duff gives the example of greeting someone by waving an arm.   
56 ibid. See also R A Duff, ‘Action, the Act Requirement and Criminal Culpability’ (2004) 55 Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplements 69. 
57 Duff (n 56) 84.  
58 George P Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, International. Volume 1, 
Foundations (OUP 2007). See also Munoz-Conde and Chiesa (n 36) 2465. 
59 Fletcher (n 51) 1453. 
60 Kai Ambos, ‘Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on George Fletcher’s Grammar of 
Criminal Law’ (2007) 28 Cardozo LRev 2647, 2654. 
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nothing peculiar about one’s bodily movement, describing acts by reference to their descriptions 
is merely ‘a form of shorthand’.61 Characterising the movement of one’s arm as a stabbing is 
meant to appeal to the listener’s life experience and convey to them what happened in a concise 
manner, such that the event is understood in, to use Duff’s terminology, its ‘context-dependent 
meaning’. However, when the way in which the movement was performed is put into question, 
for example when the movement is alleged to have been involuntary, then the shorthand 
explanation is no longer acceptable. While the circumstances and consequences of an action are 
legally relevant, it is argued that they relate to wider actus reus considerations that can only be 
made once it is established that there is an action attributable to the agent in the first place. 
Furthermore, in order to attribute an action to agent, the ‘vantage point of the actor’ and the first-
person viewpoint are essential.62  
Having addressed both bodily movements and act descriptions as potential targets of the 
voluntariness requirement, it is argued that the preferred option is the former one. Such an 
approach is also consistent with some of the legal assumptions identified in the previous chapter, 
for instance, in relation to courts’ reference to an agent’s complete destruction of control over 
bodily movements, awareness of movements etc.63 Moreover, this approach is also present within 
criminal law statutes such as the US Model Penal Code (MPC), which defines an ‘“act” or 
“action”’ as ‘a bodily movement, whether voluntary of involuntary’.64 Equally, from a 
philosophical perspective, since action is generally traced back to bodily movement,65 focusing 
on movements as the object of the voluntariness requirement would not be theoretically 
contentious. What should be noted, however, is that, in contrast with these definitions, the present 
thesis avoids discussing the issue of voluntariness in relation to concepts such as ‘actions’ or 
‘acts’, as it creates unneeded confusion and invites assessments as to the meaning, circumstances, 
and consequences of certain bodily movements. As argued so far, the voluntariness requirement 
 
61 Saunders (n 28) 451. 
62 Douglas Husak, ‘Rethinking the Act Requirement’ (2007) 28 Cardozo LRev 2437, 2452.  
63 See Chapter 2, sections 5-9.  
64 US MPC, s. 1.13 (2): ‘"act" or "action" means a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary’.  
65 According to Davidson, all actions are basic bodily movements that can simply be described in terms of 
their circumstances, results etc. See Davidson (n 13) 56 and section 2.a. above. 
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is not as concerned with moral blameworthiness as it is with attribution, agency and autonomy.66 
That is, it is only once an agent is found to have moved autonomously, in full exercise of their 
agency, that the criminal law can subsequently carry out further assessments. These relate to the 
consequences or circumstances in which those movements were carried out, what they amounted 
to, whether any criminal intention, recklessness etc. accompanied them, and so on. At the same 
time, ascertaining that the target of the requirement should be that of bodily movements does not 
bring us closer to understanding what it means to move voluntarily. As such, the remainder of the 
chapter will explore various concepts that have been promoted as ways to rationalise the 
requirement. Before exploring which conceptualisation of voluntariness would be the most 
appropriate to adopt, it is important to briefly explain the position of the voluntariness requirement 
within the hierarchy of offence elements, in order to clearly delineate the parameters of the 
remaining analysis. 
 
3. Voluntariness and the Structure of Offence Elements 
 
Normatively, the voluntariness requirement is primarily concerned with distinguishing a wrong 
committed by an autonomous agent from an accident or happening. As ‘the foundation of moral 
responsibility’,67 the requirement is central to assessments of criminal responsibility. However, 
the lack of clarity and consistency as to the application of the requirement, particularly in terms 
of the definition of voluntariness, contributes to the diminishing of the central role of this 
requirement in law. This approach can be explained by the courts’ and lawmakers’ focus on 
assessing involuntariness as opposed to voluntariness, as well as only addressing the issue in rare 
and exceptional cases, through the ‘defence’ of automatism.68 However, whether someone was 
 
66 This is also one another reason why automatism must not be viewed as a defence, as it invites assessments 
into one’s culpability, as opposed to simply focusing on whether there is a bodily movement (or lack 
thereof) which can be attributed to the agent.  
67 Simester (n 7) 406. 
68 See Chapter 1.1.b. 
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voluntary when moving is the first question that the criminal law should ask before making any 
assessments regarding the actus reus or mens rea of the offence in question.69  
Existing literature reveals that there is a lack of consensus as to the position of the voluntariness 
requirement within the structure of offence elements. For instance, the requirement has often been 
described as the ‘voluntary act requirement’ but there is confusion as to whether it is meant to be 
synonymous with the actus reus of the offence or separate from it. Husak refers to actus reus as 
the ‘act requirement’ and emphasises that an act without voluntariness is no act at all. 70 Such a 
view, that one’s voluntariness is implied from the act requirement itself, is also supported by 
academics such as Wilson and Duff.71 However, there are others who argue that the act 
requirement is separate from the voluntariness requirement. For instance, according to Robinson, 
involuntary acts or omissions are treated as part of the umbrella of actus reus, but the 
voluntariness requirement itself is distinct from the ‘act-or-omission requirement’ in that it is an 
‘independent doctrine’.72 Similarly, Farrell and Marceau include the voluntariness requirement 
within the actus reus of an offence but distinct from an act requirement, emphasising that the 
distinction is both descriptive and normatively accurate.73 The reason is that not all offences 
require a voluntary act because not all of them require acts in the sense of overt movement.74 In 
other words, the absence of bodily movements, i.e. omissions, can be voluntary too. 
At the same time, the voluntariness requirement has also been considered by some as an element 
of the mens rea.75 Such a classification could be attributed to the philosophical roots of the 
doctrine. Specifically, the legal requirement for voluntariness can be traced back to the philosophy 
 
69 The present thesis adopts the view that the target of the requirement is bodily movement, as opposed to 
action, behaviour, conduct etc. For a discussion as to why bodily movements are preferred, see above, 
Section 2.  
70 Husak (n 62) 2455. 
71 See William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Hart 2002) 115; and Duff (n 56) 69. 
72 Paul H Robinson, ‘Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?’ in Stephen 
Shute, John Gardner and Jeremy Horder (eds), Action and Value in the Criminal Law (OUP 1993) 196. 
Here, the author also includes omissions within the requirement, but this has not been universally agreed. 
For example, Moore does not consider omissions as compatible with criminal responsibility. See Moore (n 
9) 59; above, Section 2.a.  
73 Ian P Farrell and Justin F Marceau, ‘Taking Voluntariness Seriously’ (2013) 54 BCLRev 1545, 1574-
1575.  
74 ibid 1575. See also above, Section 2.a. 
75 See J J Child and Alan Reed, ‘Automatism Is Never a Defence’ (2014) 65 NILQ 167, 172. 
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of conduct of the eighteenth century, through Hume and Austin, and has been translated into 
modern legal thinking by reference to the concept of ‘willed bodily movements’.76 The transition 
into modern law was made by introducing an additional ‘psychological’ element in order to 
ascribe criminal responsibility.77 Following from the traditional or ‘volitionist’ philosophical 
view of action as ‘willed’,78 it is commonly argued that the law adopted the notion it is not enough 
for the agent to perform a bodily movement and that some form of mental manifestation is also 
required to complete the offence.79 Perhaps this rationalisation of the voluntariness requirement 
as connected to concepts such as ‘willing’ or ‘volition’ has led to the categorisation of the 
requirement as an element of the mens rea of the offence, rather than the actus reus. For example, 
being involuntary is considered a denial of mens rea in Scotland, with an apparent emphasis on 
the lack of awareness that the behaviour is wrong.80  
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the voluntariness requirement is distinct from the mental 
element required as part of an offence. Assessments such as those regarding one’s intention, 
recklessness etc. in relation to their conduct go beyond whatever mental manifestation one may 
have as to their physical movement. Fundamentally, such evaluations have more to do with a 
person’s awareness of the wrongness of their behaviour rather than mere attribution of movement. 
Certainly, voluntariness could be described by reference to concepts such as awareness or 
intention, which do involve a mental manifestation.81 However, the focus of these concepts should 
not be on the mental state as it relates to the offence in question (e.g. an intention to kill or cause 
grievous bodily harm in the case of murder), but on the physical movement. Depending on how 
 
76 HLA Hart, ‘Acts of Will and Responsibility’ in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy 
of Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 90. The reference to willed bodily movements is present in criminal law 
textbooks. See, for example, David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, 
OUP 2015) 60. This aspect is discussed next, in Section 4.a.  
77 Hart (n 76) 90. 
78 Duff (n 56) 76. 
79 Gideon Yaffe, ‘The Voluntary Act Requirement’ in Andrei Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) 175. 
80 Ross v HM Advocate (1991) JC 201, 218 (Lord Justice-General [Hope]): the defence of automatism is 
based ‘on an inability to form mens rea due to some external factor which was outwith the accused's control 
and which he was not bound to foresee.’ See also Child and Reed (n 75) 172.  
81 The multiple conceptualisations of voluntariness will be discussed in Section 4. 
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voluntariness may be defined, a mental state may be that of intending to move, being aware of 
moving etc. This is a separate, albeit a linked consideration, from the mens rea assessment.82 
Equally, this study adopts the view that the voluntariness requirement is distinct from the act 
requirement in law. As argued in the previous section, the target of the voluntariness requirement 
should be categorised as relevant to bodily movement only; the circumstances or results of which 
meet the definition of a particular offence. In other words, one need not commit the actus reus 
voluntarily, but simply move voluntarily. Whether the movement itself was produced in 
circumstances or caused results which meet the actus reus of an offence should be a matter for 
subsequent consideration for the law. Indeed, as a ‘matter of analytical convenience’,83 such an 
assessment might be regarded as a pre-step within the broader umbrella of actus reus, following 
Robinson, Farrell and Marceau. However, this should precede considerations regarding the 
description of a certain movement (e.g. whether an arm movement amounts to a stabbing), its 
circumstances and/or results. To an extent, integrating the requirement for voluntary movement 
within the actus reus, as a pre-condition of liability, would also match the traditional distinction 
between mind and body which the criminal law continues to be based upon.84 That is, in its 
simplest form, the criminal law still relies on a separation between the physical and mental 
elements of criminal responsibility, as illustrated through the actus reus – mens rea distinction.85 
As such, for present purposes, in the interest of convenience and practicality, it can be argued that 
the actus reus relies on the existence of a voluntary movement, followed by the relevant type of 
circumstance and/or result.  
 
82 For instance, the intention to move one’s finger on a trigger could be evidence that an intention to kill 
had been formed. See Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2. 
83 According to Keating and others, this should be behind dividing criminal offences into their constituent 
elements of actus reus and mens rea. See HM Keating and others, Clarkson and Keating: Criminal Law 
(8th ed, Sweet and Maxwell 2014) 78. 
84 The distinction between actus reus and mens rea is largely associated with the Cartesian separation 
between mind and body, or dualism, which can be traced back to the philosophy of Descartes. However, in 
recent decades, such separation has been subjected to extensive criticism.  For further information, see Dov 
Fox and Alex Stein, ‘Dualism and Doctrine’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S Pardo (eds), Philosophical 
Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016).  
85 Such a separation is very general, for there are mental states which inevitably play a part in the actus reus 
of certain offences, e.g. fear in robbery or consent in rape. For further detail see Paul H Robinson, ‘Should 
the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?’ in Stephen Shute, John Gardner, and 
Jeremy Horder (eds), Action and Value in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press 1993) 188-189.  
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In this context, given the focus of the voluntariness requirement on the (lack of) bodily movement, 
it is preferrable that the requirement is viewed as a subset of the actus reus requirement. That is, 
as a pre-condition to assessments regarding the circumstances and results of a certain movements, 
in accordance with the requirement of each criminal offence. Certainly, as stated above, a mental 
manifestation may be central to a state of voluntariness, but that manifestation must relate to a 
bodily movement, which is ultimately the object of the requirement. This is why voluntariness is 
somewhat closer to actus reus rather than mens rea considerations.86 Under this conceptualisation, 
the voluntary requirement becomes the gateway to criminal responsibility assessments in that it 
is only once this element is completed that the criminal law can look to wider analyses relating to 
the circumstances and effects of a movement, as well as the mental state attached to those 
circumstances or results. Most importantly, positioning the requirement in this way, as the 
foundational element of the offence, further emphasises the need for developing a legal standard 
of voluntariness. This standard should apply to any assessment, as an essential ingredient of 
criminal responsibility. 
 
4. What is Voluntariness?  
 
a. Volition  
According to the ‘orthodox’ view, it is commonly argued that voluntary bodily movements are 
caused by volitions.87 This classification of volitions as the source of movement is a claim 
 
86 Alternatively, it could be argued that the requirement is part of both actus reus and mens rea. See for 
example Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (OUP 2012) 127: ‘the 
most precise way to conceptualize the relationship between the automatism doctrine and the elements of an 
offence is that it relates to both actus reus and mens rea’. Equally, it could be argued that the requirement 
is part of neither actus reus, nor mens rea. See Lisa Claydon, ‘Involuntary Action and Criminal 
Responsibility’ (PhD thesis, De Montfort University 2001) 13. However, regardless of which view is taken, 
it is important to note that the voluntariness requirement is distinct from the actus reus and mens rea 
relevant to each offence. 
87 Moore (n 9) 45.  
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originated from the philosophy of conduct of the eighteenth century, through Austin88 and other 
English philosophers,89 to modern writers.90 According to John Austin:  
The desires for [those] bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for 
them, are sometimes styled ‘volitions:’ – more frequently, ‘determination of the will’ 
or of ‘the power or faculty of willing.91 
For Austin, volitions are essentially ‘acts of the will’, i.e. the only desires that are ‘followed by 
their objects immediately, or without the intervention of means’.92 Similarly, Thomas Reid refers 
to volitions as ‘the act of willing and determining’.93 This emphasis on will is also present within 
contemporary legal scholarship and case law, with ‘voluntary acts’ being often rationalised as 
‘willed’.94 Moreover, the reference to volitions or willing is present in statutory documents from 
the United States.95 This conceptualisation of voluntariness relies on volitions to explain what 
causes bodily movements or, as Duff described it, to provide a defining ‘mark of action’.96  The 
‘mental attitude to conduct’ or element that is the volition generates bodily movements and is 
taken to be the separating line between voluntary and involuntary movements.97 However, beyond 
 
88 See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, Volume 1 (Verlag Detlev 
Auvernmann KG 1972), Lectures XVIII-XIX. 
89 See John Bricke, ‘Hume, Freedom to Act, and Personal Evaluation’ (1988) 5 History of Philosophy 
Quarterly 141. 
90 Hart (n 76) 90. Earlier versions of the ‘orthodox theory’ had been subjected to a certain degree of ridicule, 
particularly since the rationalisation of action was one of a ‘spiritual mind pulling (in some causally 
mysterious way) the levers which run the body’. See Vincent Chiao, ‘Action and Agency in the Criminal 
Law’ (2009) Legal Theory 1, fn 11. Moore is believed to have resurrected and refined the view, particularly 
in a legal context. 
91 Austin (n 88) 418-419.  
92 ibid 414.  
93 Cited in Vernon J Bourke, ‘Will in Western Thought’ (Sheed and Ward 1964) 109. Burke also cites other 
English philosophers describing volitions as acts of will, such as David Hume, John Stuart Mill or John 
Locke. A similar connection is made within the legal sphere. See Law Commission, Criminal Liability: 
Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion Paper (2013) para A.76. 
94 See for example David C Ormerod and others, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, OUP 2015) 
60; and Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2. However, as argued in the previous section, the reference to acts 
in the context of the voluntariness requirement is to be avoided.  
95 See for example the Ohio Revised Code, 2901.21(F)(2): ‘Reflexes, convulsions, body movements during 
unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actor’s volition, are 
involuntary acts’.  
96 Duff (n 6) 265. 
97 Kenny cited in Hart (n 76) 99. 
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that, it is not entirely clear what a volition is, or what its explanatory power might be within the 
legal context.  
From a philosophical viewpoint, the existence of volitions has not been a widely accepted one. 
Despite its long-lasting presence in Western thought, the concept came under attack during the 
first half of the twentieth century. For Ryle, volitions were thought to be a ‘myth’, confusing and 
elusive, ‘an inevitable extension of the myth of the ghost in the machine’.98 Ryle was one of the 
main critics of the so-called ‘mind-body dualism’, a theory credited to Descartes, according to 
which the mind and the body are two separate entities, each with its own mechanisms.99 Referring 
to Cartesian dualism as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’, Ryle expanded his critique to 
include volitions in the list of artificial concepts used to explain action.100 Other critics followed, 
to the extent that today, volitional theories are still categorised as belonging to the realm of 
‘unfashionable’ research areas.101 
One of Ryle’s major criticisms of volitions relates specifically to the issue of infinite regression.102 
In ‘The Concept of Mind’, Ryle criticises volitions on the basis that, if we considered a movement 
like pulling the trigger of a gun a voluntary occurrence, then it must follow that the volition that 
generated it itself must have been produced by another volition, and so on.103 The primary reason 
why this criticism was put forward could be attributed to a contentious point within volitional 
theory, that of whether volitions represent actions that the agent performs in their mind – acts of 
will – or whether they simply amount to the passive experience of mental thought. If the former 
is assumed, then by virtue of it being a voluntary action, the volition itself must have been caused 
by another volition, to the point that there is ‘an infinite sequence of volitions, each being the 
“object” of its predecessor’.104  
 
98 Gilbert Ryle, ‘The Concept of Mind’ (Penguin 2000) 50. 
99 Dov Fox and Alex Stein, ‘Dualism and Doctrine’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S Pardo (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016) 106. 
100 Ryle (n 98) 5.  
101 E J Lowe, Free Agency, Causation and Action Explanation (Palgrave 2009) 347. 
102 This is similar to that referred to previously in the context of bodily movements. 
103 Ryle (n 98) 54. 
104 Goldman (n 20) 69. See also A I Melden, Free Action (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1961) 54. 
84 
 
For present purposes, given that focus of the legal requirement of voluntariness is on bodily 
movements, rather than mental ‘actions’, the focus on the legal assessment could turn to the 
volition that immediately precedes the bodily movement. Moreover, considering that most 
conceptualisations of action focus on some overt physical movement,  it would not necessarily be 
too contentious if the infinite sequence of volitions objection would be avoided.105 This could be 
achieved by making a conceptual distinction between ‘ordinary’ actions and volitions. For 
instance, Ginet describes volition as a ‘mental action’, but understood as:  
[…] an aspect, a constituent of its seeming to one that one voluntarily exerts the 
body. One will not find volition if one looks for it among the antecedents of the 
experience of voluntary exertion itself, if one supposes it to be a prior mental 
occurrence that triggers the whole package of the exertion and the experience of it.106 
For Ginet, volitions are mental processes distinct from what some theorists would categorise as 
mental acts – calculating, deliberating, etc.107 – they are the vehicle through which bodily 
exertions are generated and their structure is not that of a mental act causing a different mental 
event.108 At the same time, this differentiation between types of mental exertions does lend itself 
to criticism and can be catalogued as ‘ad hoc’,109 for it is not entirely clear why volitions should 
be distinguished or even privileged over other mental acts. As Enç argues, theorists saved 
themselves from the ‘embarrassment threatened by certain types of questions’ that would 
normally be posed about regular acts by cataloguing volitions as privileged acts, protecting them 
against any philosophical challenge.110  
In contrast to Ginet, other theorists like Moore prefer to categorise volitions as passive mental 
states which mediate between intentions and actions, and which agents do not ‘actively bring to 
mind’.111 One issue with this argument is that labelling volitions as passive states seems at odds 
 
105 For further detail, see Section 2. 
106 Ginet (n 1) 29 (emphasis in text). 
107 See for example R A Duff (n 56) 81. 
108 Ginet (n 1) 30.  
109 Brand cited in Moore (n 9) 116. 
110 Enç (n 22) 8.  
111 Moore (n 9) 116.  
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with the significance attributed to them, both from a causal and agency viewpoint. Because of 
this, it might be better to accept volitions as mental acts, whilst at the same time acknowledging 
the infinite regress criticism. According to Zhu, such arguments should not be dismissed but 
instead serve as a way to stimulate empirical research, especially considering the headway made 
by cognitive neuroscience in the past few decades and the potential for brain imaging to provide 
insight into the processes behind the initiation of action.112 
From a legal perspective, the infinite regression criticism does not necessary apply, much in the 
same way as the argument goes in the context of bodily movements. Regardless of whether 
neuroscience dispels the regression argument in the future, our present purpose is not to 
conceptualise the voluntariness of volitions but that of bodily movements, in order to accurately 
develop a legal standard of voluntariness. At the same time, the limited explanatory power of the 
notion suggests that volitions may not the most appropriate way of defining the source of 
voluntariness. In fact, the use of the notion is not widely supported within legal scholarship. For 
instance, the Law Commission takes a broad approach when characterising them not just as ‘the 
general power that leads a person to act, or the will’, but also as ‘the translation of a decision or 
choice into action’.113 However, the Commission does not find the concept of volition ‘a very 
helpful term’, because it is not one that is in general use, preferring to focus on control instead.114 
Moreover, defining voluntariness in relation to willing is considered to be under-inclusive, given 
that, in the Commission’s opinion, certain habitual actions such as sneezing may be ‘unwilled’ 
but nevertheless voluntary.115  
On the one hand, arguments such as that of the Law Commission may not be persuasive enough, 
considering that no specific detail was provided as to why habitual actions are not willed. On the 
other hand, the use of volitions as a way to rationalise voluntariness does not seem to bring us 
 
112 Jing Zhu, ‘Understanding Volition’ (2004) 17 Philosophical Psychology 247, 266. 
113 Law Commission (n 93) para A.76. 
114 ibid. Control will be analysed later in the chapter, at 3.4.c.  
115 ibid paras A.52-53. Here, the Commission does not expand on its rationale behind categorising habitual 
actions as voluntary. At the same time, it appears to associate willing more with intentions and desires 
rather than volitions, and therefore the criticism brought against the notion may not apply to volitions 
necessarily.   
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closer to understanding the difference between voluntary and involuntary movement. One could 
argue that where someone is ‘willing some change’,116 or where the event amounts to or expresses 
‘propositional attitudes’,117 then the agent is acting voluntarily. However, such characterisations 
of volitions are highly abstract and do not capture the essence of the requirement, regardless of 
whether or not it is possible to extricate them from the movement.118 In fact, even the idea that 
volitions cause bodily movement is not as explanatory as one would expect, considering that it is 
scientifically demanding to fully understand how mental events or processes generate 
movement.119 
Equally, from a normative perspective, due to the highly abstract nature of volitions, it is harder 
to connect them with ideals of autonomy and agency. At times, where volitions have been 
addressed in the context of reflecting an agent’s freedom, this has been done by reference to 
alternative concepts. For instance, according to Bourke, willing has often been used to describe 
decision-making processes reflective of the freedom and liberty of the volitional agent.120 
Freedom would be understood here as:  
that power or condition of an agent which enables him to act, or refuse to act, and to 
do so in ways which he determines, without compelling restraints from forces 
external to, or internal to, his own personality.121 
Under this analysis of freedom, the emphasis would be on desire or choice, such that a person 
acts freely if they do something ‘because [they] want to’.122 However, this rationalisation would 
turn volitions into a different type of concept than that envisaged above, for instance, one that is 
 
116 H A Prichard, ‘Acting, Willing, Desiring’ in Jonathan Darcy and Constantine Sandis (eds), Philosophy 
of Action: An Anthology (Wiley Blackwell 2015) 73, See also Duff (n 6) 265. 
117 Goldman (n 20) 68. 
118 For example, McCann argues that the attempts made by paralysed individuals to move their bodies 
represent ‘sound evidence’ that volitions are part of the process. Hugh McCann, ‘Trying, Paralysis, and 
Volition’ (1975) 28 The Review of Metaphysics 423, 424. 
119 William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Hart Publishing 2002) 108. The third chapter will 
explore this issue in-depth, critically addressing the scientific evidence surrounding voluntary behaviour.  
120 Bourke (n 93) 79. 
121 ibid 79. Here, the author explains that the connection between volition and freedom came primarily from 
the Old Testament and other Christian teachers, as opposed to Greek philosophers, who were associating 
freedom with social and political liberties.   
122 Anthony Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (Routledge 1978) 25. 
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focused on intentions or desires. Taken in that sense, this understanding of volitions, and even 
more widely, of voluntariness, is equally unconvincing.123 As such, it is argued that the normative 
advantages of using volitions are limited. This is because they feed off of alternative 
conceptualisations that may be better suited at rationalising voluntariness overall, including from 
a descriptive viewpoint. Therefore, it is preferred that they are addressed in that specific context.  
In this context, whilst volitions are to a certain extent useful in conceptualising voluntary 
movement, it is argued that they do not help us understand what it is about movement that makes 
it voluntary. For example, they do not illustrate the difference between a reflex and a voluntary 
movement. Moreover, volitions are not a predominant feature of case law and legislation, as 
opposed to notions such as control, which are more commonly referred to.124 As a result, the 
search for a definition must be expanded to address alternative notions.   
 
b. Intention  
I. Using intention as a way to conceptualise volitions  
Despite the issues associated with focusing on volitions, it could be possible to maintain the 
conceptualisation, but in the context of equating the notion with an alternative one. Within 
volitional theory, it is commonly argued that volitions are akin to intentions or desires.125 
According to Moore, volitions should be seen as a ‘species of intention’ or ‘bare intentions’, in 
the sense that they are ‘the last executors both of our more general intentions and of the 
background states of desires and belief that those general intentions themselves execute’.126 The 
reason for relating volitions to intentions was described by Moore as a way to counter the common 
objection that volitions are nothing more than ‘theoretical desperation’, with no purpose or 
character other than that of being a cause of action.127 By associating them with intention, a notion 
 
123 See Subsection 4.b.I 
124 See Chapter 2. 
125 See Section 4.a. 
126 Moore (n 9) 120-121. This view can be regarded as a refined version of Austin’s categorisation of 
volitions as desires. 
127 ibid 121.  
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that is widespread both within ordinary language and academic literature, it is intended to provide 
volitions with an additional, causal character, which is that of mediating between our motivations 
and our actions.128 This rationalisation of volitions is common within both classical and 
contemporary literature.129 Even where authors do not specifically equate volitions with 
intentions, they still view the former as a manifestation of the latter. For instance, the very reason 
why Ginet describes volitions as mental activities is that they resemble other mental states in their 
‘intentional content.’130  
At the same time, such a conceptualisation does not necessarily resolve any of problems identified 
previously. For example, theorists argued that a reliance on intention in explaining action would 
lead to an overly lax application of the notion of action, and whilst it is generally the case that 
intention can clarify how a movement comes about, this would not always be the case.131 One 
example that Odegard gives is that of a person who thinks that they are paralysed but, upon being 
asked to raise their arm, they realise that movement is nevertheless possible.132 Here, Odegard 
argues that such a person would be volitional but not intentional in that movement.133 This is 
because with the strong belief in the physical disability, there would be no intention to raise the 
arm, nor to fulfil the request.134 Other theorists have challenged the connection made between 
intention and volition on the basis that, whilst the former is merely a positive mental state towards 
the foreseen consequence of a movement, the latter enjoys a closer, immediate connection.135 
Applied to the legal context, such a categorisation is problematic. On the one hand, if intention is 
to be understood in its general sense, then talk of foreseen consequences is not explanatory for 
the voluntariness requirement, which is concerned with bodily movements. On the other hand, 
even if intention is to be understood differently than in the general sense, this might become too 
 
128 ibid 131. 
129 Goldman (n 20) 68. Here, Goldman cites classical authors who also regarded volition as a species of 
desire or intention, such as Locke, Hobbes, or Stuart Mill. 
130 Ginet (n 1) 31. 




135 Saunders (n 28) 454. 
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abstract of a rationalisation and could lead us to the same conceptual problems identified in the 
previous subsection.136  
 
II. Using intention as a standalone concept 
Rather than relying on volitions, either separately or understood as an intentional state, 
voluntariness could be understood through intention or choice as a standalone concept.137 Section 
2 of the present chapter has addressed the potential for basic actions to be described as 
intentionally basic, in the context of focusing on bodily movements as the target of voluntariness. 
There, it was accepted that there are valid concerns surrounding the argument that bodily 
movements are the most basic thing one can intend or choose to do, particularly in the context of 
skilled actions, where it is arguably harder to distinguish the bodily movement from the 
description.  
At the same time, when it comes to the way in which voluntariness should be defined, intention 
could nevertheless serve as a suitable concept. It will be remembered from Section 2 that one way 
to rationalise the relationship between basic and complex acts is one in which the latter are simply 
descriptions of the former. For example, Davidson argues that the only actions that can be 
attributable to us are basic ones, with the circumstances and results of those actions amounting to 
mere descriptions.138 What is more significant here is that the author placed a particular emphasis 
on intention. Starting from the argument that any action is essentially a basic one that can be 
described in multiple ways, or primitive (basic) ‘under some description’, for Davidson it follows 
that the action is also intentional ‘under some description’.139 For instance, in the case of someone 
driving – essentially moving their arms and feet, with the driving merely a description of the 
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primitive bodily movement – that person would not necessarily have to intend to drive, but instead 
intend to move their arms and feet. Such a conceptualisation might be able to alleviate some of 
the concerns related to skilled actions, as there is no specific requirement for the intention to apply 
to bodily movements solely. For example, in the case of someone talking, the agent would not 
necessarily have to intend those movements that help produce sounds.  
In addition, from a legal viewpoint, relying on intention or choice would fit within wider 
responsibility theories. For example, according to ‘choice’ theorists, criminal responsibility rests 
on a culpable choice made by the agent from ‘an acceptable range of choices’.140 In the case of 
involuntariness, what the agent lacks is an ability to make a free decision to move. This approach 
to attribution is focused on the autonomy and free will of the agent, and is one that is prevalent 
within legal theory.141 For instance, Moore argues that criminal law protects ‘the good that is 
choice’ by preventing sanctions being enforced where that choice is not freely made.142 This is 
also reflected within legislation, for instance in the MPC, which includes in its list of involuntary 
actions those bodily movements that are ‘not a product of the effort or determination of the 
actor’.143 Moreover, it relates to the utilitarian goal of liberal criminal law, which balances the 
prevention of crime against the promotion of free choice, to which Moore also refers.144 At the 
same time, given that retributive approaches to punishment aim to inflict on offenders the 
suffering they deserve for their behaviour, free will is central to the justification of retribution. In 
a liberal society dedicated to upholding people’s free will and moral responsibility, one cannot 
deem an agent as deserving of punishment unless they made that choice willingly.145 
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the importance of criminal responsibility theories 
for the purposes of voluntariness. While the requirement is concerned primarily with autonomy 
and agency in movement, its role is not that of assigning blame and characterising one as culpable 
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for the consequences or meaning of their movements. Criminal responsibility looks to the totality 
of voluntariness, actus reus and mens rea analyses, issuing moral judgements primarily in relation 
to the wider set of circumstances surrounding a proscribed situation or results. In contrast, 
focusing solely on whether an agent intended to move their body or not does not reveal as much 
in terms of their culpability. To a large extent, it is this confusion between voluntariness and other 
criminal responsibility considerations that has contributed to the categorisation of automatism as 
a defence, viewed in some way as an excuse to a person’s lack of choice or capacity to adhere to 
the law.146 Instead, viewed as an intentional choice to move one’s body – or not to move, in the 
case of omissions – a voluntary movement would not go further than reflecting freedom and 
autonomy to move in accordance with their intentions, desires etc.  
From a practical standpoint, relying on intention or choice to rationalise voluntariness is not 
necessarily too broad, considering that, as previously argued, the target of the voluntariness 
requirement is bodily movements, rather than circumstances or results. Therefore, as long as the 
agents intends to perform a bodily movement or makes a choice to move their body, the movement 
can be categorised as voluntary and subsequently assessed in accordance to the relevant offence 
criteria.147 However, there are certain disadvantages of adopting such a model, which can be 
traced back to the aforementioned normative considerations. 
The reliance on intention to describe voluntariness can introduce confusion within the criminal 
legal framework, especially if one follows Davidson’s description of action, according to which 
bodily movements are all the actions we ever do, as ‘the rest is up to nature’.148 Hence, it is not 
actions as such that we may concentrate on, but rather on descriptions of actions.149 As discussed 
in relation to the voluntariness requirement, we can focus on movements in order to understand 
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whether we could attribute them to an agent and describe them in certain way, e.g. an assault, a 
murder etc. For Davidson, the mark of agency rests in the intentionality of actions, ‘under some 
description’.150 That is, as long as intention applies to a description such as a consequence, a 
person can be categorised as an agent of an action. Certainly, such conceptualisation would match 
our normal view of action, for people generally move their bodies with a particular purpose or 
reason, with the physical movement not always the most important consideration, as opposed to 
what one may try to achieve.151 For instance, an agent may well not care whether they kill a victim 
by pressing the trigger, pouring poison in their drink etc. However, using this argument, saying 
that ‘the agent intended to kill the victim’ is the same as ‘the agent intended to press the trigger’ 
would certainly lead to a looser understanding of voluntariness and muddy the waters between 
voluntariness and wider mens rea considerations. Would the notion be understood in the same 
way as it is in the context of mens rea assessments? For example, would a distinction be made 
between direct and oblique intention, i.e. between those cases in which the consequence of one’s 
action is the agent’s aim and those in which the consequence is foreseen as a ‘virtual, practical or 
moral’ certainty?152 As intention constitutes an essential part of the mens rea of multiple offences, 
rationalising voluntariness using this terminology could lead us to difficulties and force us to 
create separate descriptions to be used in different cases, one when the voluntariness of the 
defendant is brought into question and one where the mental aspect is a determining aspect of 
criminal responsibility.  
In addition to conceptual confusion, adopting the view that agency is reflected through intention 
may be under-inclusive in the sense that not all voluntary actions are intentional. As Duff argued, 
whilst intended action is central to agency, it is not exhaustive of it.153 Despite most action being 
characterised by a ‘rich structure of intention’, there are some movements such as scratching one’s 
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nose or stretching one’s arm, which can be at best categorised as purposive.154 This 
counterargument is also acknowledged by Davidson, who states that ‘although intention implies 
agency, the converse does not hold.’155 That is, certain types of movements could nevertheless 
reflect one’s agency, despite the absence of intention. As such, viewing voluntary movement as 
intentional may not be appropriate for the purposes of producing a legal standard, as it would 
serve to unnecessarily narrow the definition of voluntariness.  
 
III. Conscious intentions  
Excluding intention due to its potential for being under-inclusive can also be attributed to the 
frequent coupling between intention and consciousness as a way to differentiate between 
voluntary movements and involuntary ones or pre-movement processes.156 Courts often use the 
notions of voluntariness and consciousness interchangeably, for instance referring to the 
requirement of ‘a conscious decision’ to make a specific bodily movement,157 or describing 
consciousness as ‘a sine qua non to criminal liability’.158 Rationalising voluntary movements as 
intentional could explain why consciousness is often used in cases featuring involuntariness, 
especially as the term is often coupled with intention within action theory. For instance, according 
to Davis, intentions rely on ‘a significant background of knowledge and self-consciousness’.159 
Moreover, it would be compatible with those theories within the philosophy of action which state 
that voluntariness is found through the conscious generation of intentional action.160  
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However, just as the case is with intentions as a standalone concept, to focus on conscious 
intention would discard certain types of movements that one could nevertheless be attributed to 
an agent. If we adopt the classifications of actions as ‘intentional under some description’, 
following Davidson, there would be no need to establish whether someone consciously intended 
every bodily movement. On one hand, this would allow us to escape the criticism related to skilled 
movement identified earlier in the chapter, as there would be no need for the agent to be aware of 
each movement performed in pursuance of a goal.161 That is, one would not need to be consciously 
aware of their fingers moving whilst tying shoe laces. On the other hand, some movements may 
be described as voluntary without necessarily being conscious. For instance, when it comes to 
habitual movements, which have been frequently deemed as voluntary within legal scholarship,162 
it is not clear whether they are conscious as well. For instance, Moore makes a distinction between 
the unconscious and the pre-conscious, where in the case of the latter, it would still be possible 
for some content to be ‘summoned into conscious awareness’.163 In other words, the agent could 
bring their awareness to the habitual movement. Examples may include idly tapping one’s foot to 
the beat of the music, only later realising that the movement is being produced. As such, those 
movements that we make ‘where our mind is somewhere else’ could be consciously intended, 
therefore voluntary.164  
At the same time, the presence of an ability to bring habitual movements into conscious awareness 
is not overwhelmingly supported and illustrated within criminal legislation. For instance, the US 
MPC makes a distinction between conscious and habitual movements, with both being 
categorised as voluntary.165 Within action theory, Shapira considers Moore’s approach to habitual 
actions ‘highly questionable’ from an empirical perspective, relying on the absence of sufficient 
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evidence to show that movement can be brought into conscious awareness.166 Others such as 
Marcel argue that there are various ways in which intentions are not conscious in nature, including 
habitual movements or those where one becomes temporarily unaware of a certain goal.167 In the 
latter case, this could be actions such as absentmindedly walking up the stairs to retrieve 
something but getting into bed instead.168 In the former case, examples of intentional habitual 
movement could include, as Mele and Moser argue, picking up the receiver of a desk-phone upon 
hearing it ring, as this ‘does not ordinarily include giving oneself a directive to answer the 
phone’.169 This can be associated to the discussion surrounding skilled movement, for it could be 
argued that once a movement is learned and produced consistently, movement such as picking up 
a phone could become habitual.  
Overall, whilst rationalising voluntariness based on intentions comes closer to the objective of 
preserving individuals’ autonomy, this approach does not necessarily go far enough in fully 
reflecting the agency of individuals. This is primarily the case, given that it may be under-
inclusive and thus exclude movements that the criminal law may nevertheless be interested in 
categorising as voluntary. Indeed, this may be viewed as a circular argument, for unless the law 
develops a definition of voluntariness, it is hard to ascertain by what standards would one 
categorise habitual movement as voluntary to begin with. However, regardless of normative 
considerations, a rationalisation of voluntariness as intentional movement may be inappropriate 
in practice, given the already existent focus on intention within mens rea assessments. In other 
words, it may lead to further conceptual issues rather than help us understand what it is about 
bodily movements that makes them voluntary. Whilst intentions could help us differentiate mere 
reflexes from physical movements, such terminology implies an assessment that goes beyond 
establishing the minimum condition for assigning criminal responsibility. Specifically, it could 
lead to considerations that relate more to circumstances and results, moving in the territory of 
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culpability and moral blameworthiness, rather than focusing on the voluntariness of bodily 
movements. In this context, the final subsection will address the potential for control to be utilised 
as the separating line between involuntary and voluntary movement. 
 
c. Control  
One way to tackle the descriptive challenges associated with using volitions and intentions as 
markers of voluntariness could be to use control as a guiding definition of the voluntariness 
requirement. Within the philosophy of action, control has often been linked to voluntariness in 
the conceptualisation of human action, going as far back as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and 
the emphasis on control as enabling us (not) to act in a particular way.170 A similar focus can be 
identified in modern theories of action. For example, Sellars argues that basic actions are ‘as 
securely under our voluntary control as anything could be’.171 Similarly, McCann argues that what 
makes the difference between a bodily action and a simple response is that it is ‘brought about 
through the voluntary control of the agent’.172 Here, it is not clear whether the reference to 
‘voluntary’ control implies that there is such a thing as involuntary control or whether ‘voluntary’ 
is to be understood loosely, as intentional, in the sense that an agent would exercise bodily control 
in the pursuance of an intention, goal etc. For present purposes, the analysis surrounding control 
will follow on the assumption that one’s exercise of control may reflect their voluntariness, i.e. 
that there is no such a concept as ‘involuntary’ control. In addition, within legal scholarship, 
associations between control and voluntariness are generally made on the assumption that 
voluntary movement is comparable to controlled movement.173  
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Some conceptualisations of control within action theory link it with the intentional quality of an 
action. In other words, whilst intentions may be viewed as the source of voluntary movement, 
executive control over movements is simply the physical mechanism whereby intentions are being 
implemented.174 Certainly, the majority of movements one makes are performed with a particular 
desire or intention, having made a conscious choice, and rely on motor control mechanisms to 
implement and monitor that particular movement. However, this does not automatically mean that 
the reverse applies, i.e. that control is not applicable to other movements that may not necessarily 
be intentional. For instance, control may actually be used to explain why movements such as those 
identified in the previous section may nevertheless be categorised as voluntary. According to 
Steward, control can clarify why some types of ‘sub-intentional’ or habitual actions ‘are’ 
nevertheless actions.175 When someone acts sub-intentionally, they exercise the power to change 
their bodies, that is, it is up to them whether or not that movement occurs.176 Following this, a 
voluntary movement is characterised by the exercise of bodily control so that depending on the 
context, the agent is physically able to either ‘bring about some particular movement of its body’ 
or ‘not to bring it about’.177 Adopting this view would alleviate some of the concerns identified 
previously in relation to the possibility that, understood as conscious intention, voluntariness may 
be under-inclusive.  
One of the main advantages of such a model is that it is also a strong candidate for ‘a minimal 
condition of agency’.178 This could be the case even in those ‘sub-intentional’ or habitual actions 
referred to by Steward for, according to her, the mark of agency does not necessarily lie in our 
fully intentional movements, but rather in our:  
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capacity to prevent altogether, stop in its tracks, reverse, alter, change the direction 
and speed of, or otherwise affect the motion in question, whether or not I actually 
chose to exercise it in a given case.179 
This argument suggests that, following a control model, agency may be exercised even in those 
cases involving habitual actions. Such a model would therefore cover those cases which the 
conceptualisation of voluntariness based on intention did not.  
From a normative perspective, a focus on control as promoting one’s agency in moving would 
contribute to enhancing the role of the voluntariness requirement, namely that of reflecting the 
autonomy and agency of individuals. For instance, Ginet argues that we ‘have freedom of action 
at a given moment if more than one alternative action is then open to me’.180 Such argument can 
be traced back to the oft-cited Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), according to which: 
a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done 
otherwise.181 
What intuitively grounds PAP is the idea that control is enhanced through alternate possibilities 
of action, and that such enhanced control is essential for free action and moral responsibility.182 
For the purposes of the voluntariness requirement, we are more interested here in one’s freedom 
of movement, rather than moral responsibility, in that the former should be seen as a pre-condition 
for the latter. Relying on an exercise of bodily control within the sphere of alternate possibilities 
would satisfy a libertarian view, based on the existence of freedom of action.183 In other words, 
free action rests on our agential control and the ability to follow a course of action out of many 
possible ones at any given moment.184 This stance rests on the libertarian focus on agent causation, 
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which, understood in the context of control, purports the idea that control facilitates the manner 
in which an agent’s ‘deliberative causal process’ produces an event.185 That is, an agent causes an 
event – a bodily movement, in the present context – by exercising control.  
PAP has produced wide disagreement within philosophical theories of action, contributing to 
extensive debates, particularly that between free will and determinism. Specifically, if our 
movements are pre-determined by ‘the laws of nature’ or events in the distant past, one cannot 
argue that the consequences of those laws or events, including our bodily movements, are up to 
us.186 That is, a challenge from determinism would mean that we do not move freely, 
autonomously. This is because, under this view, our physical movements should be viewed as 
‘part of an unalterable causal chain’, making no other course of action available to us.187 Taking 
the view of ‘hard determinists’, who claim that responsibility and determinism are not compatible, 
this would undermine any retrospective evaluation from criminal law, as a person could not be 
held to account for a movement they were inevitably going to do.188 Other incompatibilists defend 
the so-called ‘libertarian metaphysics’ position, according to which, notwithstanding the 
incompatibility between determinism and free will, we are nevertheless able to exercise a level of 
agency within the causal processes of the world.189 However, this has been criticised on the basis 
that it ‘makes us all gods in an otherwise unbroken chain of causal relations’,190 as well as the fact 
that it forces us ‘to adopt a panicky and exceptionally implausible metaphysics in a material 
universe’.191 
Alternatively, one can adopt a compatibilist approach, whereby regardless of whether 
determinism is true, we can assume that we possess those capacities needed to initiate movement 
freely.192 For instance, Wolf suggests that we can still be attributed with those actions that 
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originate from within ourselves, when we are the ones who initiate them.193 Here, however, Wolf 
acknowledges that whatever course of action we take, there are factors that shape our 
understanding of the world and our values, to the point that we cannot argue that we are fully 
autonomous.194 Therefore, as long as responsibility is not grounded in an ‘autonomous 
metaphysically independent chooser’, we can still be held accountable for our decisions.195 At the 
same time, autonomy within the criminal law does not necessarily have to mean autonomy from 
causal determinism, for the law already operates on an understanding that circumstances such as 
difficult personal histories or even disordered personalities are not sufficient to bar punishment. 
This can be attributed to more consequentialist interests, so that in order to protect society, the 
law ‘accepts the thesis that all men are invested with free will and capable of choosing between 
right and wrong’.196  
Such debates regarding the existence of free will have featured prominently across multiple 
disciplines, including law, philosophy and neuroscience. For present purposes, the discussion 
shows that, on one hand, there is a case to be made against the idea that we are completely free to 
move otherwise. On the other hand, however, until empirical evidence disproves the assumptions 
that the law makes, and considering that the criminal law remains grounded in the ideals of liberal 
democracy, it is argued that value must still be given to our autonomy and agency in moving. 
That is, this analysis operates on the premise that we are free to move otherwise, at least until it 
can be conclusively shown that determinism is true.  
From a criminal legal perspective, control has often been associated with capacity as the basis for 
criminal responsibility. The majority of legal cases in which involuntariness features are 
discussed under the heading of automatism,197 frequently categorised as an excusatory defence 
by courts and scholars alike.198 However, as argued so far, such classification is inappropriate 
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considering that a lack of voluntariness is not an excuse, but rather an illustration that an element 
of the offence has not been committed. Viewed as an excuse, the law has positioned automatism 
as an acknowledgement that a proscribed event or state of affairs occurred, but exclude the 
individual from liability because of the condition of being involuntary.199 Approaching one’s lack 
of voluntariness from the perspective of a defence has meant that the focus of the assessment has 
been on the agent’s culpability and moral responsibility overall, rather than solely on their agency 
and autonomy in moving. However, it is noteworthy that the criminal law has applied automatism 
based on the defendant’s lack of capacity to control themselves. The leading case on automatism 
in England and Wales, R v Coley, focuses on the ‘complete destruction of voluntary control’.200  
While not necessarily endorsing the emphasis on a total loss of control, the link between criminal 
responsibility and control is widespread within legal scholarship as well. The idea that an agent 
is not culpable where they had no ability or opportunity to control themselves, or could not have 
done otherwise as they did, is a primary justification for not punishing individuals.201 Leading 
scholars such as Glanville Williams or Hart have also referenced control as an important element 
of liability. For instance, according to Glanville Williams, people should not be held responsible 
for something outside their physical control and therefore, an act should not be deemed voluntary 
unless a person was able to control it.202 This is an acknowledgement of Hart’s older argument 
that as human beings, if we are to succeed in acting, we must have the capacity to control the 
physical movement of our bodies.203 
The focus on capacity to control has also been emphasised by the Law Commission in its report 
on the automatism and insanity ‘defences’. According to the Commission, no criminal 
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responsibility for acts or omissions should be attached where people lacked capacity to control 
their movement.204 The report focused on overhauling automatism and insanity, proposing to 
abolish the two and replace the latter with a new defence of ‘not criminally responsible by reason 
of a recognised medical condition’.205 In relation to insanity, the defence would apply where the 
agent was involuntary due to a medical condition – currently ‘insane’ automatism – but also where 
they did commit the elements of the offence, but they lacked capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of what they were doing due to a medical condition. The common law rules of the 
automatism ‘defence’ would no longer apply.206 Instead, defendants would be acquitted if they 
lacked the capacity to control themselves due to a reason other than a recognised medical 
condition.207 
The present thesis does not support the Commission’s categorisation as a ‘defence’ in those 
instances in which individuals lose voluntariness, whether that is attributable to a medical 
condition or not. With the exception of cases of insanity in which defendants were voluntary, but 
lacked the ability to comprehend the nature or wrongfulness of their behaviour, the examples 
referred to by the Commission reflect a denial of an offence, rather than a defence. A lack of 
voluntariness, in contrast with a lack of appreciation as to the meaning of one’s movement, is 
concerned with a physical ability and freedom to move, as opposed to moral culpability overall. 
To position both instances within the same category is conceptually problematic.208 However, 
beyond adequate labelling, the Commission stated that the new defence would apply where ‘the 
accused suffered a total loss of a relevant capacity’.209 Here, one of the available ‘limbs’ of the 
defence would be that of ‘capacity to control’, applicable where the defendant experienced a 
‘complete inability’ to control their actions due to a medical condition.210 The report briefly 
related the lack of control with the issue of ‘involuntary behaviour’, stating that the issue is 
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sometimes referred to as one of ‘volition’, and what is at stake is the fact that ‘“involuntary 
actions” that cannot be prevented’.211 That is, involuntariness should not attract responsibility due 
to the lack of ability to control oneself, described as the lack of ‘capacity to do otherwise’.212 
From a descriptive viewpoint, focusing on bodily control to rationalise voluntary movement 
would certainly be a more suitable concept than the ones discussed so far. Rather than focusing 
on one’s rationale and awareness of moving, which, it is argued, are matters for subsequent 
analyses from the criminal law, an emphasis on physical capacity would provide the minimum 
necessary in order for an agent to be attributed with that particular movement and be categorised 
as autonomous. However, in contrast with the notion of capacity present within criminal legal 
theory, capacity to control would relate here to the ability to regulate one’s movements, rather 
than circumstances, consequences etc. That is, we are not concerned with capacity as a theory of 
criminal responsibility, but rather as a physical ability. Moreover, given the abstract nature of 
concepts such as volition, focusing on control, which is presumably easier to identify, would be 
preferrable. Once the agent is established as the author of that specific movement, then the 
criminal law can add meaning to it, e.g. describe it as an assault, a criminal damage etc., and 
ascertain whether the defendant is culpable.  
At the same time, it is not specifically clear how the legal requirement should be defined in 
relation to control. The ability ‘to do otherwise’ has been frequently referenced in both legal and 
philosophical literature.213 Applied to the present context, the voluntariness requirement could 
focus on the presence of bodily control, understood through the ability to move otherwise. 
However, this does not automatically mean that all conceptual and practical uncertainties are 
resolved. One significant limitation is that the degree of control necessary to be able to move 
otherwise is not easily identifiable. For example, the draft Criminal Code proposed by the Law 
Commission in 1989 recommended a test of identifying involuntariness based on one’s lack of 
 
211 ibid para 4.35 
212 ibid para A.7. 
213 See above, pp 99-100. 
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‘effective control’,214 primarily in order to avoid cases such as that identified in Broome v 
Perkins,215 where the defendant’s movement appeared to be goal directed but he could not have 
moved otherwise as he did.216 This approach was explored by the Law Commission but found to 
be undesirable primarily because of the lack of certainty as to the meaning of ‘effective’ and the 
judgement of degree and value that would have to be implemented in the courts.217 In the 
Commission’s view, reliance on ‘effective control’ would provide courts with a ‘flexible 
standard’, such that ‘something close to total loss of control’ would be needed in driving cases.218 
Therefore, rather than engaging in time-consuming assessments regarding the meaning of 
‘effective’ or enforcing a definition that is not equally applicable to categories of involuntary 
movement, the report suggested that ‘a total loss of capacity to control his or her actions’ would 
be preferred.219 On the one hand, implementing a standard that relies on judgements of degree, to 
the point that categories of cases would be treated differently, could potentially lead to the same 
issues identified in the previous chapter, particularly when it comes to introducing culpability into 
this stage of the assessment. On the other hand, relying on a standard of ‘total loss of control’ 
effectively means conceptualising it similarly to case law.220 Therefore, this definition maintains 
some of the uncertainty identified in the present framework and does not necessarily bring us 
closer to the goal of identifying the essence of the voluntariness requirement.  
Beyond the conceptual difficulties mentioned above, the definitions presented by the Commission 
are not as useful when developing a definition of voluntariness, rather than involuntariness. In 
particular, a focus on a total loss of capacity to control as a way to identify involuntariness does 
not necessarily find a counterpart when conceptualising voluntariness. For example, a definition 
of voluntariness based on the agent exercising a complete ability to control themselves and move 
 
214 Law Commission, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Volume 1: Report and Draft 
Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) s. 33(1)(a). 
215 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321. 
216 Law Commission, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales. Volume 2: Commentary on 
Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) para 11.4. 
217 Law Commission (n 93) paras 5.116-7. 
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otherwise is unsuitable, for there is no reason to suggest that an agent requires total control in 
order to initiate movements or refrain from moving. Equally, a definition of voluntariness based 
on the exercise of effective control to move otherwise may not be as appropriate, given that the 
terminology of ‘effective’ could potentially invite assessments regarding the quality and meaning 
of the movement. This may include questions such as whether the movement is consistent with 
the agent’s goals etc. As argued throughout, such considerations should not be addressed at this 
initial stage.  
One potential concept focusing solely on physical abilities may be that of sufficiency, in the sense 
that voluntariness may be identified through the agent exercising sufficient control, to the effect 
that they are able to move otherwise. Certainly, replacing the notion of ‘effective’ with that of 
‘sufficient’ would still invite judgements regarding the quality and degree of the movement. 
However, these would be limited solely to the agent’s physical ability, rather than their ‘success’ 
in achieving a particular objective. At the same time, limitations could remain in that the threshold 
for retaining sufficient control may not be easily identifiable, considering individual differences. 
Whilst these should be acknowledged, it is argued that such an approach would still amount to an 
improvement from the current – and proposed – framework. In this context, a provisional 
definition of the voluntariness requirement could be the following:  
the exercise of sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can move otherwise 
Before moving on to assess the suitability of this definition from an empirical perspective, in 
Chapter 4, it is worth briefly acknowledging conceptual limitations of the proposed definition. As 
mentioned earlier, the focus on alternative movement can be traced back to the principle of 
alternate possibilities (PAP), a principle which has been widely debated within the philosophy of 
action. A common challenge to this principle is that alternatives are not relevant to the question 
of freedom of action, for one may exercise agency even in their absence. Take an example 
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provided by McKenna, that of a person jumping into the air because they wanted to.221 What if, 
unbeknownst to them, their brain had been implanted with a mechanism allowing a group of 
neurologists access to their bodily movements?222 Had the person formed an intention not to jump, 
the neurologists would have intervened and used the mechanism to cause the person to jump.223 
Following the control model of voluntariness, which is not concerned with intention, but with the 
ability to move otherwise, this person should be categorised as involuntary. Moreover, a finding 
of involuntariness would prevent subsequent assessments from taking place, such as those 
surrounding the circumstances and reasons behind moving in that way, whether the agent wanted 
to jump or not etc. However, this may be at odds with what we would expect criminal 
responsibility to attach for. Such example bears the question of whether we would expect 
voluntariness to rest on our impression of freedom to move otherwise, rather than actual capacity 
to exercise self-control.  
Other theorists such as Ginet or Kane have sought, however, to challenge such counterarguments 
to PAP, focusing on the timing of such ‘controller’ examples.224 For instance, a controller such 
as the neurologist in the jumping example would have no prior knowledge as to whether one will 
jump freely or not. That is, the neurologist may wait and see whether the movement is produced 
or not, only then intervening to activate the mechanism in the absence of a jump. At this stage, 
however, it would be too late for the neurologist to intervene, for the agent would have already 
initiated movement freely, in the presence of alternative possibilities. Alternatively, if the 
neurologist sought to avoid such a scenario, they would pre-emptively set up the mechanism so 
that the person jumps irrespectively of their intention to do so or not. Here, no alternative 
 
221 Michael S McKenna, ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy’ (1997) 
28 Journal of Social Philosophy 71, 72. Such examples are often referred to as Frankfurt-type examples, 
named after Harry Frankfurt, one of the biggest challengers of PAP. In launching his attack of PAP, a 
principle that Frankfurt himself has coined as such, Frankfurt has produced examples such as the present 
one that would supposedly show that moral responsibility does not rely on the freedom to do otherwise. 
See Harry G Frankfurt (n 181) 829, 831. 
222 McKenna (n 221) 72. 
223 ibid. 
224 See for example Carl Ginet, ‘In Defense of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find 
Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing’ (1996) 10 Philosophical Perspectives 403; and Robert Kane, Free Will 
and Value (SUNY Press 1985) 51 (ft 25); and Keith Wyma, ‘Moral Responsibility and the Leeway for 
Action’ (1997) 34 AmPhilQ 57. 
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possibility would exist, but the agent would not be responsible either, for they would merely be 
moving as a conduit of the neurologist’s activities. In other words, in a causally undetermined 
environment based on free movement, a controller cannot manipulate another person without 
intervening.225 A person would either be responsible for their undetermined, freely initiated 
movement – out of alternative ones – or the controller would be responsible for the movements 
that ensue by virtue of the mechanism.226  
The abovementioned argument need not be used to fully counter the potential for the ability to 
move otherwise to reflect agency. Beyond controller-type examples, one could imagine a scenario 
in which a person may act in accordance to their intentions, even though they may lack the 
physical ability to move. For instance, in the unlikely event that, unbeknownst to a person, they 
suddenly develop a condition which leaves them unable to move their bodies, willingly refraining 
to move may be cast as autonomous regardless of whether or not they can actually do so. In this 
respect, there is no time lag in between which a person may still exercise a freedom to move 
otherwise, as is the case with the controller example. For the purposes of the present thesis, this 
concern should be acknowledged.  
Equally, it should be restated that philosophical accounts of action need not be conflated with 
legal ones, for undue complexity would be introduced into the legal framework and leave it open 
to challenges from competing philosophical factions. From a philosophical viewpoint, the debate 
between proponents and challengers of PAP has ignited a sizeable literature, which goes beyond 
the focus on the freedom to do otherwise as a source of responsibility, to debates surrounding free 
will and determinism, and particularly the incompatibility between causal determinism and the 
freedom to do otherwise.227 What the discussion has shown so far is that, much like concepts such 
as volition, intention etc., there are descriptive and normative challenges to adopting a legal 
 
225 Kane (n 224) 51 (ft 25). 
226 Ibid. 
227 However, to discuss these aspects in greater detail is beyond the remit of the present thesis. For further 
information see Niels van Miltenburg and Dawa Ometto, ‘The Libertarian Predicament: A Plea for Action 
Theory’ (2019) 196 Synthese 161; Markus Ernst Schlosser, ‘Agent-Causation and Agential Control’ (2008) 
11 Philosophical Explorations 3.  
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definition of voluntariness based on control. The descriptive challenges relate to the difficulty in 
identifying the threshold at which an agent would no longer be able to move otherwise. Moreover, 
normatively, it may be that, in an extremely limited set of circumstances, one may be able to 
exercise agency and autonomy even in the absence of the freedom to do otherwise. Nonetheless, 
what makes a control-based model more suitable is that such challenges are less extensive and 
are easier to address in comparison with other concepts. For instance, one’s ability to exercise 
bodily control is objectively easier to ascertain in comparison with abstract notions such as 
volitions. Moreover, compared to intention or consciousness, control is preferrable as a minimum 
requirement of responsibility, given that this type of model would focus primarily on physical 
abilities, rather than rationale for moving, or appreciation of circumstances, results, and so on. 
Such concerns are certainly relevant for criminal responsibility, but they should be addressed by 
the criminal law once voluntariness is established. In addition, compared to previous concepts, a 
control model would encompass a wider array of cases in which agency may nevertheless be 
reflected, such as habitual movements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Having addressed both descriptive and normative aspects surrounding multiple 
conceptualisations of voluntariness, it is argued that, in contrast with volitions and intentions, the 
advantages of using a control model are the most persuasive. For instance, compared to a model 
based on conscious intention, a control model is more comprehensive in including movements 
that may nevertheless be reflective of one’s autonomy and agency. As such, it would not be under-
inclusive in its reach. This suggests that judicial conceptualisation of (in)voluntariness on the 
basis of loss consciousness, as is the case with PTSD or sleepwalking cases, may not be 
appropriate.228 At the same time, drawing from philosophical accounts of action, theoretical 
support can be identified for courts relating to one’s absence of voluntariness with that of a lack 
 
228 See Chapter 2, particularly sections 5-9.  
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of control. However, following the present discussion, it is argued that the lack of control need 
not be complete, as courts have required so far, but merely sufficient to render a person unable to 
move otherwise (including refraining from moving). Moreover, in contrast with legal scholarship, 
the view adopted in the present thesis is that the focus of the requirement should be placed on 
bodily movements, also categorised as basic action within philosophical accounts of action. That 
is, instead of focusing on the effects or circumstances of a particular movement, the law should 
only focus on the (lack of) bodily movement for the purposes of the voluntariness requirement. 
Only once the movement is deemed as voluntary should the law move on to assess whether a 
prohibited event or state of affairs stemmed from that movement, whether it was accompanied by 
the relevant mental state, and so on.  
Where a control-based model may face opposition is in the uncertainty surrounding the requisite 
degree of control needed to be able to move otherwise. The threshold at which one would no 
longer be able to move otherwise may differ from person to person, which could potentially lead 
to confusion or even risk courts creating alternative standards depending on the nature or 
consequences of a particular movement. In doing so, there is a risk of being faced with similar 
issues as those currently existing in relation to the application of the automatism ‘defence’. It is 
hoped that such concerns can potentially be alleviated, at least partially, by expanding from the 
present analysis and looking to empirical evidence that may produce some clarification, helping 
to refine and explore the control-based conceptualisation of voluntariness.  
In this context, a provisional definition of voluntariness for legal purposes could be the following: 
‘the exercise of sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can move otherwise’. Such a 
definition would naturally include the ability to refrain from moving, which is seemingly more 
relevant for the purposes of the criminal law. However, to provide additional strength and explore 
this argument empirically, it is argued that the analysis would be strengthened by the 
incorporation of neuroscientific evidence. Such an approach would enable us to reflect on the 
suitability of the provisional definition and, more widely, on the relevance and potential for 
neuroscience to influence legal decisions and/or develop standards of criminal responsibility. As 
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Duff argued, ‘our ordinary concepts must themselves be answerable to, and revisable in light of, 
“the insights of an advancing science”’.229 Similarly, Zhu states that philosophical assessments 
must be addressed alongside empirical evidence when exploring the nature of agency and 
action.230 Certainly, there are considerable limitations to incorporating neuroscientific evidence 
into a legal analysis, which will need to be acknowledged. However, such evidence can 
nevertheless help test assumptions made so far in the present thesis, as well as contribute to 
developing research relevant to the growing field of ‘neurolaw’, which seeks to utilise 
neuroscientific knowledge to inform legal debates. 
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UNDERSTANDING VOLUNTARINESS IN A NEUROSCIENTIFIC CONTEXT 
 
1. Introduction  
The previous chapter has addressed the concept of voluntariness from a philosophical perspective, 
provisionally concluding that a legal model based on control is best suited at rationalising the 
voluntariness requirement, both descriptively and normatively. Specifically, that focusing on 
one’s ability to move otherwise would be most appropriate in terms of categorising one as a 
voluntary agent. Moreover, the emphasis on the ability to move otherwise would meet the liberal 
goals of the criminal law to only punish those who move freely, as autonomous agents. To further 
enrich this hypothesis, it is argued that the analysis would benefit from the incorporation of 
neuroscientific evidence. Such evidence will contribute towards strengthening our understanding 
of voluntariness, namely through the empirical exploration of the processes relevant for the 
concepts used to conceptually define voluntariness. Examples include studies investigating the 
mechanisms involved in processing competing alternatives of action or those involved in 
inhibiting movement. Addressing studies focusing on such processes will enable us to reflect on 
the suitability of the legal test based on control, undertaking a review of the literature and 
extricating relevant themes from empirical evidence.  
From a methodological perspective, this investigation would contribute to the growing field of 
‘neurolaw’ which, as the name suggests, combines neuroscientific with legal studies to produce 
interdisciplinary research. Studies related to the workings of the human brain have been 
conducted for centuries, becoming more and more sophisticated from the nineteenth century 
onwards, for instance with the ability to observe nerve cells under the microscope, or the 
correlation between brain areas and specific functions, i.e. ‘brain localisation’.1 However, it was 
 
1 Bernard Baars and Nicole M Cage, Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness: Introduction to Cognitive 
Neuroscience (2nd edn, Elsevier 2010) 27. 
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not until the 1960s that neuroscience became recognised as a standalone life science dedicated to 
the study of the brain and the nervous system, with cognitive neuroscience later emerging as an 
area of research addressing the mechanisms of the mind, like motor function, consciousness, 
language etc.2 Given the focus on understanding, and eventually influencing behaviours both in 
criminal law and cognitive neuroscience, it is not surprising that the two disciplines eventually 
started exchanging knowledge. This happened particularly with the development of scientific 
techniques within cognitive neuroscience, as well as the use of such techniques within the 
courtroom. These include electroencephalography (EEG)3 in the mid-twentieth century and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)4 within the past few decades.5 In fact, according 
to Goodenough and Tucker, the ‘explosive spread of new knowledge’ coming from cognitive 
neuroscience is the one that made neurolaw an ‘inevitable’ development.6  
For present purposes, introducing neuroscientific evidence into our legal investigation is a natural 
fit, especially since the level of voluntariness and control that relates to movement is fundamental 
for both disciplines, in terms of ascribing criminal responsibility and understanding the biological 
mechanisms underlying human action. Analysing existing research on the nature of voluntary 
movement and the way in which we restrain or inhibit our movements adds an important empirical 
layer to our legal investigation, primarily in terms of our underlying physiology. This is done by 
providing new insights into those faculties or capacities which are not visible to the naked eye but 
nevertheless essential in initiating and regulating movement. At the same time, before going into 
detail on the potential for neuroscience to inform legal debates surrounding voluntariness, it is 
 
2 Deborah W Denno, ‘The Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S 
Pardo, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016) 73. 
3 EEGs record brain activity using electrodes attached to the scalp. These sensors pick up the electrical 
impulses produced when brain cells communicate with each other. 
4 An fMRI scan uses the same technology as an MRI scan, which is a non-invasive test that takes images 
of the brain using strong magnetic fields and radio waves. The difference is that whilst an MRI scan 
produces images of organs/tissue, an fMRI will also show the blood flow in the brain. Therefore, it is helpful 
in highlighting activation in specific brain areas, showing which parts are involved in mental processes. For 
more information on the use of neuroscience in the courtroom, see Darby Aono, Gideon Yaffe, and Hedy 
Kober, ‘Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review (2019) 4 Cognitive Research: Principles 
and Implications 40; and Stephen J Morse, ‘Brain Imaging in the Courtroom: The Quest for Legal 
Relevance’ (2014) 5 AJOB Neuroscience 24.  
5 See for example Francis X Shen, ‘The Overlooked History of Neurolaw’ (2016) 85 FordhamLR 667. 
6 Oliver R Goodenough and Micaela Tucker, ‘Law and Cognitive Neuroscience’ (2010) 6 Annu Rev Law 
Soc Sci 61, 62. 
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important to address overly optimistic claims as to the revolutionary power of scientific evidence 
for legal doctrine. Even more so, we must acknowledge the limitations of neurolaw as a field of 
research, especially in the context of voluntary action. This is because, notwithstanding the 
significant headway made within cognitive neuroscience in the past decades, the potential for 
scientific evidence to effect legal change and influence legal decisions is considerably limited.  
Some of the most enthusiastic neurolaw scholars are confident that neuroscience will 
revolutionise the way we think about law and particularly criminal responsibility. For example, 
Sapolsky argues that ‘we are now a century or two into readily dealing with the alternative view 
of, “it is not him, it is his disease”’.7 This claim relates to the potential for neuroscience to 
completely transform our understanding of agent causation and to attribute behaviour to brain 
mechanisms as opposed to a person’s free will. Moreover, it could be connected to the scientific 
rejection of the Cartesian separation between mind and body. ‘Mind-body dualism’, as it is also 
known as, is a theory that dates back to the seventeenth century, when Descartes posited that the 
mind and the body were two separate entities, each with its own mechanisms.8 The historical 
separation between mental and physical phenomena, or body and soul, has and continues to have 
an impact on the criminal law, for instance with the distinction between actus reus and mens rea.9 
However, even within legal studies, there is no longer a dispute that the body, including the brain, 
is the sole generator of movement.10 Where certain neurolaw scholars go further is in their 
conviction that neuroscience will prove that free will does not exist. In particular, looking into 
where cognition and movement is placed within brain structures will supposedly show that our 
actions are solely determined by the way in which our brain functions.11 Therefore, just like the 
 
7 Robert M Sapolsky, ‘The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System’ (2004) 359 Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences 1787, 1788. 
8 See for example Dov Fox and Alex Stein, ‘Dualism and Doctrine’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S 
Pardo (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016) 110; and Chapter 3.3. 
9 Keren Shapira-Ettinger, ’The Conundrum of Mental States: Substantive Rules and Evidence Combined’ 
(2007) 28 Cardozo Lrev 2577, 2580. 
10 See for example Lisa Claydon, ‘Law, Neuroscience, and Criminal Culpability’ in Michael Freeman, Law 
and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues Volume 13 (OUP 2011) 143: ‘In twenty-first-century legal 
reasoning there is little to suggest that the criminal law is dualist in the Cartesian sense of the word.’ 
11 Daniel A Martell, ‘Neuroscience and the Law: Philosophical Differences and Practical Constraints’ 
(2009) 27 BehavSci&L 123, 124. 
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physical world is determined, so would the brain be, to the point that our thoughts and actions 
would not be manifestations of our free will, but rather determined events.12 According to this 
determinist perspective, in its simplest form, we do not behave as an uncaused cause, i.e. as the 
one thing that starts the chain of action. Rather, forces outside our awareness or control intervene 
at a given point between the activation of neurons and movement, removing our free will to act.13  
This understanding of free will, or lack thereof, has implications on our perspective on criminal 
responsibility as well. For example, enthusiastic scholars like Greene and Cohen propose that 
cognitive neuroscience will provide ‘vivid new illustrations’ that will change our moral outlook 
and intuitions about responsibility.14 One of the most common arguments is that the focus on 
retribution does not have legitimacy, as it would be ‘pointless’ to punish those who are simply 
‘victims of neuronal circumstances’.15 To impose penalties and inflict suffering proportionate to 
the harm committed by offenders would become unjustifiable if these people did not actually have 
free will. Because of this, such scholars would only agree to criminal punishment from a 
consequentialist standpoint, to reduce harm and thus prevent society from any further harm.16  
Another area where neuro-enthusiasts are keen to praise the potential of neuroscience is in 
radically changing our perspective and understanding of ourselves and of human behaviour. For 
instance, in the context of the criminal law, scholars have put into question the continuing reliance 
on folk psychology, i.e. the emphasis on common sense explanations of behaviour, based on 
notions such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, or ‘intention’.17 Those in the camp of ‘eliminative materialism’ 
argue that our everyday understanding of psychological occurrences is ‘radically false’ and 
‘fundamentally defective’, such that it will eventually be completely replaced by neuroscience.18 
 
12 Nita A Farahany, ‘A Neurological Foundation for Freedom’ in Dennis Patterson and Michael S Pardo 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2016) 56. 
13 Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of the Mind and How to Reconcile Them (Basic 
Books 2002) 124. See also Chapter 3.4.c. 
14 Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, ‘For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything’ 
(2004) 359 Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 1775, 1775. 
15 Ibid 1781. 
16 Ibid 1783.  
17 Michael Lamport Commons and Patrice Marie Miller, ‘Folk Psychology and Criminal Law: Why We 
Need to Replace Folk Psychology with Behavioral Science (2011) 39 Jpsychiatry&L 493, 494. 
18 Paul M Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’ (1981) 78 The Journal of 
Philosophy 67, 67. 
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The word ‘materialism’ is used to portray the mind as a ‘biological manifestation’ that occurs in 
the brain, whereas the ‘eliminative’ broadly refers to the desire to do away or remove the emphasis 
on folk psychological phenomena that are reliant on ‘mental states’.19 One of the studies that is 
most commonly cited in support of determinism and eliminative materialism is that conducted by 
Libet and others in 1983, in which subjects were required to flex their fingers or wrists whenever 
they felt like doing so after watching a clock-like device complete a rotation, and subsequently 
report the time at which they decided to move.20 The results revealed brain activity that preceded 
the conscious intention to move one’s body, lasting on average 350 milliseconds.21 Libet’s study 
has often been put forward as evidence of the fact that we are not actually in conscious control of 
our movements, as it is brain processes that supposedly cause our actions.22 Therefore, reducing 
actions to brain activity as opposed to mental states like intention or desire would allegedly prove 
the fiction that is folk psychology. 
However, despite arguments made within the neurolaw community regarding the potential for 
neuroscience to revolutionise the law, it is argued that the evidence is nowhere near the point of 
conclusively proving that we are uncaused causers of our actions, nor is it transformative enough 
for us to shift away from the folk psychology that we have adopted to make sense of the world.23 
 
19 Andrew E Lelling, ‘Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law’ (1993) 141 UpaLRev 
1471, 1476. 
20 Benjamin Libet and others, ‘Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity 
(Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act’ (1983) 102 Brain 623, 625. 
The experiment sought to record the cerebral activity preceding a voluntary motor act, also known as 
‘readiness potential’. Subjects were connected to a brain scanner and asked to flex their fingers and/or right-
hand wrist at any point after watching the hour hand inside a clock-like device complete a rotation. 
However, it was highly subjective in that it relied on subjects to record the time when they made the decision 
to flex their fingers.  
21 Ibid 636. See also Michael Freeman, ‘Introduction: Law and the Brain’ in Michael Freeman, Law and 
Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues Volume 13 (OUP 2011) 6. 
22 See for example John-Dylan Haynes, ‘Beyond Libet: Long-Term Prediction of Free Choices from 
Neuroimaging Signals’ in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel (eds), Conscious will and 
Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet (OUP 2011) 85, 92: ‘our and Libet’s findings do address one 
specific intuition regarding free will, that is the naïve folk-psychological intuition that at the time when we 
make a decision the outcome of this decision is free and not fully determined by brain activity.’; and Erman 
Misirlisoy and Patrick Haggard, ‘A Neuroscientific Account of the Human Will’ in Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (ed), Moral Psychology (Vol. 4): Free Will and Moral Responsibility (MIT Press 2014). 
23 The literature challenging the relevance of Libet-style experiments for the denial of free will is extensive. 
See for example Josef Seifert, ‘In Defense of Free Will: A Critique of Benjamin Libet’ (2011) 65 The 
Review of Metaphysics 377; and Daniel N Robinson, ‘Determinism: Did Libet Make the Case?’ (2012) 87 
Philosophy 395. In fact, Libet himself acknowledged that his experiments do not exclude the existence of 
free will. See Benjamin Libet, ‘Do We Have Free Will?’ (1999) 6 Journal of Consciousness Studies 47.  
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Furthermore, in the context of the criminal law, whether we act as uncaused causers is not 
necessarily relevant, for irrespective of whether determinism is true or not, the criminal law 
already acknowledges the fact that we are not fully autonomous, independent, choosers.24 We are 
all products of multiple factors such as upbringing, life experiences etc., which shape our 
existence and lead us to act in one way or another, but that does not mean the criminal law will 
be influenced by this when assigning blame for a certain action. Until science categorically 
disproves the assumptions that the law makes, and considering that, at least in theory, the criminal 
law remains grounded in the ideals of liberal democracy, respect must still be given to our 
autonomous actions, or lack thereof.25 For something as significant as the criminal law to alter its 
framework on the basis of incomplete evidence, as well as ‘aggressive philosophising’, would be, 
as Lelling argues, ‘criminal’.26 At the same time, this does not mean that neuroscience is irrelevant 
for the law, for evidence surrounding our ability to control or inhibit bodily movements, the 
processes at play in performing habitual movements, and so on, can nevertheless influence our 
understanding of voluntariness and thus contribute to developing a well-rounded legal test.  
Perhaps those in the eliminative materialism camp have suffered from what Morse refers to as the 
‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome’, a ‘condition’ that manifests itself in overconfidence in the present 
status of neuroscience and its potential to impact the law.27 Situated at the other end of the 
spectrum from eliminative materialists, Morse is highly sceptical of neurolaw research and still 
supports the legal reliance of folk psychological requirements for responsibility. For instance, 
regardless of scientific evidence, he argues that the law ultimately seeks to regulate behaviour and 
as such, any type of actual behavioural evidence takes precedence over neuroscientific evidence, 
as it is more reflective of the law’s behavioural requirements.28 Morse gives the example of fMRI, 
one of the neuroscientific tests that has been cited most often in neurolaw. In this case, he claims 
 
24 For further detail, see Chapter 3.4.c. See also Susan Wolf, ‘Freedom Within Reason’ in James Stacey 
Taylor (ed), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral 
Philosophy (CUP 2005) 260. 
25 For further detail see Chapter 3.4.c. 
26 Lelling (n 19) 1520. 
27 Stephen J Morse, ‘Brain Overclaim Redux’ (2013) 31 Law & IneqJ 509, 511. 
28 Morse (n 4) 26. 
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that relying on brain imaging to link brain regions that show activation to specific movement is 
not as helpful from a legal viewpoint, as it is based on correlations that are not ‘virtually perfect’, 
i.e. they cannot conclusively show that the legally relevant movement was caused by the particular 
damage.29  
This criticism is best illustrated in cases in which people with seemingly ‘normal’ behaviour 
suddenly develop changes in personality and conduct. For instance, in the oft-cited case of 
Phineas Gage, a railroad worker who miraculously survived an iron rod going through his skull, 
but left him experiencing a severe behavioural change, such as using inappropriate language and 
acting irreverently.30 A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) reconstruction of his skull suggests 
that he suffered damage to his frontal lobes, an area associated with the self-regulation of 
movement, planning and decision making.31 In another case, this time one where the change in 
behaviour was correlated with a criminal offence, an individual who suddenly developed 
paedophiliac tendencies in his forties was convicted of sexually molesting his 12-year old 
stepdaughter.32 Later on, during an MRI scan, it was discovered that the man had been suffering 
from a large orbitofrontal tumour, the removal of which saw him with no sexual desires towards 
children.33 From a legal perspective, it has often been argued that such evidence should not be 
relied upon in court. This is concerned primarily with claims made by determinists, as well as 
those hopeful that neuroscience can create a causal link between damage to the brain and legally 
proscribed behaviour, the so-called ‘my brain made me do it’ claim.34  
Indeed, following Morse’s criticism, despite the strong correlation that could be made between 
certain injuries to the brain and changes in movements, this would not have legal consequences 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Malcolm Macmillan, An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage (MIT Press 2002) 93. 
31 Jamie Ward, The Student’s Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience (3rd edn, Psychology Press 2015) 349. 
32 Jeffrey M Burns, Russell H Swerdlow, ‘Right Orbitogrontal Tumor With Pedophilia Symptom and 
Constructional Apraxia Sign (2003) 60 Archives of Neurology 437, 437.  
33 For more information on this case, see Uri Maoz and Gideon Yaffe, ‘What Does Recent Neuroscience 
Tell Us About Criminal Responsibility?’ (2016) 3 JLB 120. The changes in movement associated with 
damage to the frontal lobes will be discussed later in the chapter. 
34 This is primarily linked to the issue of free will. See for instance Daniel C Dennet, ‘“My Brain Made Me 




in practice. That is, criminal responsibility would still be attached to the person suffering from 
brain damage. The reason is that such correlation cannot be equated with legal causation, 
considering that there may be cases in which damage to the brain does not lead to criminal 
behaviour.35 As Claydon argues, causation in law is different from causation in science.36 
However, cases such as that involving the brain tumour certainly show a correlation so strong that 
a causal connection can in all likelihood be made.37 Therefore, such evidence could nevertheless 
provide insights into our ability to inhibit our movements. This is relevant both in terms of our 
objective to develop a voluntariness requirement but also generally, sparking questions regarding 
the way in which we develop legal standards and ascribe criminal responsibility. In fact, even 
Morse acknowledges that in cases where the brain abnormality is well defined, as is the case with 
epilepsy for instance, evidence of this kind can be probative as to whether the movement amounts 
to a criminal ‘act’.38 Moreover, Morse argues that neuroscientific evidence could, in principle, 
shed light on certain legally significant capacities like control or rationality, which can be more 
‘temporally stable’ in general, such that inferences can be made about the offender’s capacities 
and their effects on movement.39 This acknowledgement of a role for neuroscience suggests that, 
even amongst sceptics, there is potential for such evidence to impact the criminal law. 
The remainder of this chapter will build from the investigation pursued in the previous chapter in 
order to assess the suitability of the legal test focused on our ability to control bodily movements. 
Specifically, the chapter will undertake a review of the literature and extract relevant themes from 
empirical evidence surrounding the regulation and inhibition of bodily movements. The chapter 
will also explore studies surrounding the mechanisms involved in the execution of habitual 
movements and discuss whether such movements are consciously intended or not. In turn, the 
 
35 Walter Glannon, ‘What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal Responsibility’ in 
Michael Freeman, Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues Volume 13 (OUP 2011) 18. 
36 Claydon (n 10) 158. 
37 Glannon (n 35) 18. 
38 Morse (n 4) 24. 
39 Morse (n 27) 533. For Morse, the capacity for rationality is the fundamental criterion for responsibility. 
Such concept is a normative one, which ‘can take on various meanings according to differing moral and 
political judgments about how society should govern itself.’ See Stephen J Morse, ‘Rationality and 
Responsibility’ (2000) 74 Southern California Law Review 251, 254. 
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analysis will assess whether bodily movement is best understood neuroscientifically as conscious 
intentional acts, or whether the research is more closely aligned with a definition of sufficient 
control to move otherwise. In this context, the main research questions that the present chapter 
seeks to answer are: What are the neurological mechanisms involved in controlling bodily 
movements? How does the neuroscience behind inhibiting movement influence our legal 
understanding of voluntariness? Does neuroscientific evidence challenge a conceptualisation of 
voluntariness based on control?  
2. Processes Underlying the Control of Bodily Movements 
a. Areas of the Brain Involved in Movement  
Prior to embarking on an analysis of the control model in its neuroscientific context, it is helpful 
to introduce relevant brain areas that will feature more prominently in the upcoming discussion, 
considering that most studies have tied these areas to inhibitory mechanisms, as well as 
mechanisms enabling the evaluation of alternative courses of action. Smaller constituent elements 
of the brain will also be addressed at a later stage, but it is important to first give a broad overview. 
Here, we are talking about the frontal lobes, with three primary divisions dealing with aspects 
relevant to acting, namely the primary motor cortex, the premotor cortex and the prefrontal cortex 
(Figure 1).40  
 
Figure 1. Human Motor Cortex. The primary divisions dealing with aspects relevant to acting are 
the primary motor cortex, the premotor cortex and the prefrontal cortex. (Amended from Cortex 
sensorimoteur1.jpg: Pancrat derivative work: Iamozy, 2014) CC BY-SA 3.0.   
 
40 Carl R Olson and Carol L Colby, Fundamental Neuroscience (4th edn, Academic Press 2013) 978. 
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According to Olson and Colby, the more anterior these divisions of the frontal lobes are, the more 
abstract the aspects of bodily control that they contribute to are.41 For example, the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) has a key role in creating objectives and devising action plans required to achieve 
them, selecting the skills needed to implement such goals and applying those skills in the right 
order.42 The PFC also allows individuals to make ‘harder’ choices, for instance in those cases 
where a quick reward is presented, but where the postponement of gratification will lead to an 
even bigger reward.43 Moreover, it can be linked to the ability to adhere to social rules, as studies 
have shown that damage to this area can create a deficit in the attainment of social and moral 
norms.44 For instance, the PFC has been associated with the suppression of impulsive movement, 
sending inhibitory signals into the region of the brain called amygdala, known for its heavy 
implication in aggressive behaviour (Figure 2).45   
 
Figure 2. Illustration of Brain Regions. The prefrontal cortex plays a role in the suppression of 
impulsive movement, sending inhibitory signals into the amygdala. (National Institute of Mental 
Health, National Institutes of Health, 2015) CC PDM 1.0.  
 
41 Ibid 979. 
42 Baars and Cage (n 1) 402. 
43 Sapolsky (n 7) 1790. 
44 Goodenough and Tucker (n 6) 78. 
45 Sapolsky (n 7) 1791. 
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The primary motor cortex (M1) is situated at the posterior side of the frontal lobes and plays a 
more specific function in terms of movement and action compared to the prefrontal cortex. 
Specifically, it has a fundamental role in the execution of bodily movements, being 
‘somatotopically organized’.46 That is, every area of the body is represented by different areas of 
the M1, with the extent of representation depending on the degree of specificity needed for 
movement control (Figure 3).47 For example, despite the small surface taken by the face and the 
hands, these regions have a large representation in the M1. Olson and Colby highlight that in 
those parts of the M1 areas associated with the relevant body areas, neurons receive signals from 
muscles and then send the output back to those muscles through pathways in the brainstem and 
the spinal cord.48 
 
Figure 3. The M1 contains specific areas dedicated to governing different parts of the body. 
(Figure 35 03 04, CNX OpenStax, 2016) CC BY 4.0  
While the PFC is involved in the selection of behaviour and its associated goals and the M1 is 
significant for the execution of movements, the premotor cortex deals with the preparation of 
actions.49 More specifically, the lateral areas of the premotor cortex are primarily concerned with 
external prompts, linking action with visual cues such as noises, lights etc., whereas the medial 
are, also known as the supplementary motor area (SMA)(Figure 1), is generally concerned with 
 
46 Ward (n 31) 168. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Olson and Colby (n 40) 979. 
49 Ward (n 31) 173.  
122 
 
well-learned movements that do not rely as much on monitoring the environment.50 It is this latter 
area of the premotor cortex that is more relevant here, as a number of studies suggest that prior to 
bodily movements, neurons are activated in the SMA.51 Probably the most ‘famous’ one is that 
of Libet, relating to electrical impulses that predate action. 52 The study was taken by many as 
‘evidence’ to suggest that free will is an illusion due to the neural mechanisms that precede our 
urge to move, but beyond conceptual implications, the study suggested that these mechanisms 
were situated in the SMA.53 These findings have also been confirmed more recently, with studies 
replicating Libet’s study and noting similar activity in the SMA.54 Equally relevant and important 
to mention is the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA)(Figure 4), which has been often been 
correlated to both the timing of an action (the ‘when’) and the ‘free selection of responses’, i.e. 
the choice between alternatives (the ‘what’).55 
 
Figure 4. Motor Areas in the Frontal Lobe. The SMA and pre-SMA have been linked to the 
initiation of action, but also the timing of the action and the free selection of responses. 
(Chouinard PA and Paus T, 2015) CC BY 3.0 
 
50 Ibid 171. See also Richard E Passingham, Sara L Bengtsson and Hakwan C Lau, ‘Medial Frontal Cortex: 
From Self-generated Action to Reflection on One’s Own Performance’ (2010) 14 Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 16, 16. 
51 Itzhak Fried and others, ‘Volition and Action in the Human Brain: Processes, Pathologies, and Reasons’ 
(2017) 37 The Journal of Neuroscience 10842, 10843. 
52 See Libet and others (n 20); and Benjamin Libet, Elwood W Wright, Jr., and Curtis A Gleason, 
‘Readiness-Potentials Preceding Unrestricted “Spontaneous” vs. Pre-Planned Voluntary Acts’ (1982) 54 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 322. See also Section 1.  
53 Libet and others (n 20) 636. 
54 See for example Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel and Gabriel Kreiman, ‘Internally Generated Preactivation 
of Single Neurons in Human Medial Frontal Cortex Predicts Volition’ (2011) 69 Neuron 548, 555. Here, 
the authors replicated the study, also observing ‘a preconscious event’ in the SMA prior to subjects’ 
perceived urge to move’, with a large proportion of neurons showing activation in the SMA.  
55 See for example Hakwan C Lau and others, ‘Willed Action and Attention to the Selection of Action’ 21 
Neuroimage 1407, 1413; and Veronika A Mueller and others, ‘The Role of the preSMA and the Rostral 
Cingulate Zone in Internally Selected Actions’ 37 Neuroimage 1354, 1355. 
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Having introduced the most relevant areas of the brain involved in the control of bodily 
movements, the next and most important step is to review the model used to describe the 
voluntariness requirement in law, that of control, from a neuroscientific perspective. As 
mentioned earlier, the focus is on the ability to refrain from acting, i.e. inhibiting movement, as 
well as the ability to select between competing alternatives of action.  
 
b. Go/No-Go/Stop 
When analysing voluntariness from a legal and philosophical perspective, it was argued that the 
voluntariness requirement is grounded in the capacity to control our bodily movements. That is, 
we should not be attributed with a movement if we did not have the ability to move otherwise. 
Because of this, it was provisionally concluded that the requirement should be described by 
reference to control, notwithstanding some conceptual uncertainty which, compared to other 
models such as conscious intention, was not as extensive.56 As such, the purpose of this section 
is to address the evidence surrounding our control of physical movements, particularly to identify 
the basis of the control model in a neuroscientific context and to review the evidence as it pertains 
to failures of the relevant mechanism. The focus here will be on inhibitory mechanisms and the 
capacity to select between alternative actions, following on from the provisional model presented 
in the previous chapter. This emphasis on inhibitory processes is also present in scientific 
discussions on the nature of control. For example, they are often categorised as ‘a key marker of 
voluntary self-control’, being able to reflect the ability to move otherwise, in the sense that if a 
person is able to refrain from moving their bodies, they will also be able to move otherwise when 
they do engage in movement.57 Similarly, Sumner and others categorise the availability of 
alternative possibilities of action as ‘the defining criterion for voluntary behaviour’, with 
 
56 This related primarily to the degree of self-control needed to be categorised as voluntary and, more 
profoundly, whether we need an actual freedom to do otherwise or whether it is enough to have an 
impression of freedom. 
57 Patrick Haggard, ‘The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition’ (2019) 70 Annual Review of 
Psychology 9, 10. 
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inhibitory mechanisms central in supressing those potential movements that are not wanted or 
necessary.58 Even Libet and others had to acknowledge within their famous study that there is an 
ability to ‘veto’ movement in the time between becoming aware of the desire to act and 
performing that act.59 Therefore, any discussion surrounding our control mechanisms must 
invariably start with one on our ability to refrain from moving. Here, the focus should be on the 
inhibition of movement, i.e. on the ‘intervention mechanism that “applies the brakes”’ and 
actively overrides impending movement’.60  
Before we engage in a deeper discussion on motor inhibition, it is worth noting that studies 
relating to inhibitory mechanisms may not be as conclusive as those involved in initiating 
movement. For example, Filevich and others draw attention to a number of methodological issues 
encountered by studies on inhibitory processes.61 First, some of these studies rely on mechanisms 
that show no behavioural output, therefore making correlations between internal processes and an 
absence of movement less conclusive.62 Second, where the inhibition is internally generated, e.g. 
resisting the temptation to eat chocolate etc., it is hard to make an accurate measurement without 
the ability to manipulate the external cue, as in the case with externally triggered ones (e.g. 
stopping at a red light etc.).63 Third, the absence of behavioural output also makes it hard to 
distinguish cases in which the agent would not have moved at all with those in which the 
movement was prepared but inhibited at the last minute.64 However, despite these methodological 
issues, such studies are central to evaluating the claim that control is key to voluntariness. This is 
particularly since courts place an emphasis on complete loss of control as evidence of 
 
58 Petroc Sumner and others, ‘Human Medial Frontal Cortex Mediates Unconscious Inhibition of Voluntary 
Action’ (2007) 54 Neuron 697, 697. 
59 Libet (n 23) 52. 
60 Jim Parkinson and Patrick Haggard, ‘Subliminal Priming of Intentional Inhibition’ (2014) 130 Cognition 
255, 255. 
61 Elisa Filevich, Simone Kühn, Patrick Haggard, ‘Intentional Inhibition in Human Action: The Power of 
‘No’ (2012) 36 Neuroscience and Behavioural Reviews 1107, 1108. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid 1109. 
64 ibid. However, it may still be possible to differentiate between ‘voluntary motor inhibition’ and the 
‘absence of positive voluntary motor commands’, each with their own specific neural function. See Arko 
Ghosh, John Rothwell and Patrick Haggard, ‘Using Voluntary Motor Commands to Inhibit Involuntary 
Arm Movements’ (2014) 281 Proceedings of the Royal Society 20141139, 1. 
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involuntariness, but it is not entirely clear whether this standard is justified, for it is possible that 
an agent loses the capacity to move otherwise even with some inhibitory control remaining.65 In 
testing this assumption, it is argued that Go/No-Go and ‘stop signal’ neuroscientific studies will 
prove most informative. 
Most studies in the area of inhibition relate to ‘action restraint’ (inhibiting an action before it is 
started) and ‘action cancellation’ (inhibiting an action during its execution).66 Specifically, 
Go/No-Go tasks evaluate the ability or inability to refrain from responding to a particular cue, by 
looking at the percentage of subjects initiating movement following the cue, whether there any 
false alarms etc.67 Stop-signal tasks are more concerned with the ability to inhibit a motor 
response during its execution, by looking at the reaction time and how long it takes for a subject 
to inhibit movement.68 As Eagle and others highlight, most studies in this area have not differed 
materially, with much of the literature using the Go/No-Go/Stop terminology interchangeably, as 
both types of research ultimately rely on some version of the ‘Go’ response.69 Such studies usually 
involve subjects (not) pressing a key, lever or touch-screen as a response to a visual stimulus in 
Go/No-Go, or to inhibit the performance of the ‘Go’ response period in the case of a visual or 
auditory ‘stop’ signal.70 The differences lie in the test measuring slightly different hypotheses, as 
mentioned above, as well as there being different types of brain activation observed.71 At the same 
time, rather than focusing on the specifics of these tests, it would be more helpful for our purposes 
to categorise these studies as simply researching the restraint and cancellation of the movement. 
 
65 For further details see Chapter 2. 
66 Russell Schachar and others, ‘Restraint and Cancellation: Multiple Inhibition Deficits in Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (2007) 35 J Abnorm Child Psychol 229, 229. 
67 Dawn M Eagle, Andrea Bari, Trevor W Robbins, ‘The Neuropsychopharmacology of Action Inhibition: 




71 For instance, in the case of Go/No-Go, it has been observed that the left hemisphere of the brain is 
activated to a greater extent: Katya Rubia, Tamara Russell, Stephan Overmeyer, Michael J Brammer, 
Edward T Bullmore, Tonmoy Sharma, Andrew Simmons, Steve C R Williams, Vincent Giampietro, Chris 
M Andrew, and Eric Taylor, ‘Mapping Motor Inhibition: Conjunctive Brain Activations across Different 
Versions of Go/No-Go and Stop Tasks’ (2001) 13 NeuroImage 250, 254, whereas in Stop-signal, the right 
one shows higher activation: Adam R Aron and Russell A Poldrack, ‘The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Response Inhibition: Relevance for Genetic Research in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder’ (2005) 
57 Society of Biological Psychiatry 1285, 1287. 
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Ultimately, what interests us is to explore the control model from a neuroscientific perspective 
and both types of studies are relevant in this respect. Moreover, focusing on these two aspects of 
motor inhibition is relevant from a legal perspective, as it replicates those scenarios that most 
interest us. In the case of refraining from acting, it is important that the agent has the capacity to 
abstain from performing a movement that the law may want to describe as an offence. Where 
omissions are concerned, it is equally important for agents to be able to refrain from moving. 
Similarly, where cancellation of movement is concerned, the agent must have the ability to alter 
their bodily movements, for instance in the course of performing a movement that may cause a 
proscribed circumstance or result, as well as in the absence of legally required movement (e.g. 
intervening to save someone’s life).   
The focus on the ability to select between alternative courses of action (e.g. pressing one of 
different keys, levers etc.), as well as to refrain from acting (e.g. withholding the pressing of the 
key, cancelling the response to the instruction given to the subject etc.) make Go/No-Go/Stop 
studies highly relevant in the context of our legal analysis. Analysing the way in which this 
mechanism functions would not only expand our knowledge of control as a marker of 
voluntariness, but also raise pertinent questions regarding the impact or potential for such 
evidence to impact legal decisions, for instance in shifting the focus away from a ‘complete’ loss 
of control as a measure of involuntariness. However, to do so, it is argued that studies on the 
Go/No-Go/Stop mechanism would be even more informative when analysing failures in said 
mechanisms, for example in cases of neurodevelopmental conditions or attention deficit 
disorders. As Filevich and others argue, failure of mechanisms serve to provide ‘a valuable 
existence proof for specific cognitive functions’.72 This is despite the limitations identified in the 
introduction to the chapter, relating primarily to correlations not being as convincing as direct 
measurements, both in the legal and neuroscientific context.   
It should be noted at this stage that, while informative for the criminal law more generally, we are 
not looking for evidence on every aspect that may relate to self-control, such as understanding 
 
72 Filevich, Kühn, and Haggard (n 61) 1110. 
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and adhering to norms, engaging in long-term goals etc. This is because the voluntariness 
requirement should be framed in terms of the ability to move one’s body otherwise, rather than 
simply to behave otherwise.73 In other words, the target of the requirement is bodily movements, 
rather than the consequences or circumstances of those movements. It is only once an agent has 
been attributed with a particular movement, i.e. has been deemed voluntary, that the law then 
moves on to make judgments regarding the consequences or significance of that behaviour; for 
instance whether the requisite mens rea was present or whether a defence can be invoked. Because 
of this, any discussion on control as it relates to the voluntariness requirement should be limited 
to a discussion on the ability to control bodily movements, as opposed to control consequences. 
For example, we are not interested as much in evidence more relevant for the application of partial 
defences such as diminished responsibility or loss of control, as these come into play once 
voluntariness has been established, together with the requisite actus reus and mens rea. These 
defences only apply once the law has already established that the defendant killed a person, but 
they operate to reduce liability from a charge of murder to one of manslaughter when self-control 
was not present, due to a medical condition or provocation for example. In addition, they speak 
more to the ability to control consequences, i.e. death, as opposed to control bodily movements. 
Naturally, the loss of control in some of these cases can be compared with some involuntary ones, 
for instance in the case of sudden impulses to act, which could invariably lead to uncontrollable 
bodily movements. However, it is important to note that our focus is on physical movement as 
opposed to wider action plans, adherence to norms, and so on. 
Looking at action restraint and cancellation studies in deficient mechanisms, research conducted 
with children suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) show clear 
deficits in the ability to restrain or cancel movement. For example, Schachar and others conducted 
a study with children undergoing a ‘Go’ and ‘Stop’ task, looking at both action restraint and 
cancellation.74 In the ‘Go’ task, participants were asked to respond to seeing the letters X or O by 
 
73 For further detail, see Chapter 3.2. 
74 Schachar and others (n 66) 232. 
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pressing either one of two keys on a response box as quickly as possible, each key representing 
one letter.75 In a quarter of the cases, the participants were also presented with an auditory signal 
that instructed them to withhold the response to press the key (the ‘Stop’ task), the timing of the 
stop signal depending on the type of inhibition measured.76 Specifically, in action restraint, the 
signal occurred concurrently with the ‘Go’ one, whereas in cancellation, the signal appeared 250 
ms later.77 Compared to control participants, i.e. subjects who did not have ADHD, the authors 
observed clear deficits in both restraint and cancellation tasks, with lower accuracy and longer 
reaction time in pressing the button on the ‘Go’ task response, as well as longer time taken to 
inhibit the task in both restraint and cancellation.78 In contrast, control subjects showed faster 
reaction times, this being correlated with a more efficient motor inhibition.79 Similar tasks with 
subjects suffering from ADHD have found delays in response and lower accuracy levels,80 as well 
as increased number of errors when the ADHD manifested itself in conjunction with other 
disorders.81  
Notwithstanding the fact that these studies suggests that there is a standalone control mechanism 
that is impaired by ADHD, there are also conceptual issues that they raise. If we make an analogy 
between the instructions given in the above studies and those given by the law to society, failures 
or impairments of the mechanism by which agents can inhibit their movements do lead to 
pertinent questions regarding the expectations that the law has from individuals. Is it fair to 
continue to categorise as involuntary only movements in which the loss of control is ‘complete’?  




77 ibid.  
78 ibid 233.  
79 ibid. 
80 See for example Aron and Poldrack (n 71); and Nanda NJ Rommelse and others, ‘Are Motor Inhibition 
and Cognitive Flexibility Dead Ends in ADHS?’ (2007) 35 J Abnorm Child Psychol 957. 
81 In a Go/No-Go task involving children suffering from ADHD and developmental coordination disorder, 
which manifests itself in considerable impairments in planning and motor coordination, it was observed 
that only those with co-occurring ADHD and DCD made significantly more errors that control subjects 
when performing the Go/No-Go task. This was occurring particularly with children performing the action 
despite the No-Go signal. See Siobhan Thornton and others, ‘Functional Brain Correlates of Motor 
Response Inhibition in Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder and Attention 




freely, despite not losing control completely? Naturally, the discussion above does not suggest 
that anyone suffering ADHD moves involuntarily. However, it does highlight the need for a 
flexible standard of voluntariness that acknowledges the potential for certain impairments to 
affect one’s ability to move otherwise. 
At the same time, it is accepted that certain limitations surrounding the application of ADHD 
studies to the legal analysis should be acknowledged. First, the conditions in which these studies 
are carried out do not find a perfect reflection in the law, so the analogy is not perfect by any 
means. For instance, the instructions that the law gives are more sweeping and are ingrained in us 
throughout the course of our lives, as opposed to the instruction to immediately move/not 
move/stop that is given in the neuroscience studies. Second, the studies themselves suffer from 
limitations. For instance, research on inhibitory processes has often been criticised for relying on 
results that could be attributed to factors other than deficient mechanisms, such as poor attention 
or memory issues.82 Indeed, some studies have attempted to identify a clear deficit of motor 
inhibition. For instance, Keute and others conducted a study involving children with ADHD who 
were required to indicate the direction of target arrows (either left or right) shown to them by 
pressing the left ‘control’ key on a computer keyboard with their left index finger and the ‘enter’ 
key with the right index finger.83 However, immediately prior to these tasks taking place, subjects 
were ‘subliminally primed’, i.e. they were presented with an arrow pointing in the correct or 
opposite direction to the one in the trial.84 What the authors observed suggested the existence of 
a mechanism whereby movements were automatically inhibited, without awareness of doing so, 
in the effort to ‘suppress premature motor responses’ to information that is ‘irrelevant or mere 
noise’ or that is overtaken in significance by new information.85 Compared to control subjects, 
 
82 The very name ADHD links the disorder to an attentional issue, and a number of studies looking at the 
relationship between the disorder and inhibitory processes have highlighted that delays or inaccuracies in 
performing the required tasks could be attributed to factors not directly related to motor inhibition. See for 
example, Marius Keute and others, ‘Intact Automatic Motor Inhibition in Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder’ (2018) 109 Cortex 215, 216; and F Xavier Castellanos and Rosemary Tannock, ‘Neuroscience 
of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: The Search for Endophenotypes’ (2002) 3 Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 607, 623 
83 Keute and others (n 82) 217.  
84 ibid. 
85 ibid 223. 
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the children with ADHD did not perform differently, suggesting that there is an automatic 
mechanism involved in the suppression of impulsive behaviour.86  
The study above highlights that it is not as straightforward to extricate a motor inhibition 
mechanism without acknowledging the impact of other factors such as attention or memory.87 For 
instance, the Go/No-Go/Stop paradigm in the context of ADHD allows for inattention to 
potentially impact the task on a larger scale, as it may affect subjects’ ability to inhibit movement 
(in No-Go or Stop). In contrast, the study conducted by Keute and others would minimise the 
effect of inattention on the task at it only requires the subjects to perform the movement of the 
fingers in accordance with the visual stimuli. However, this study also relies on the subjects’ 
attention in following the stimulus, which is the arrow on the screen. This conceptual difficulty 
illustrates a gap in evidence relevant to our legal inquiry, due to the fact that it does not pinpoint 
the threshold at which subjects would lose the ability to move otherwise. Regardless of the 
absence of irrefutable proof, these studies do challenge the reliance on a total inability to control 
movement which, as discussed above, at least questions the legal standard. This is because courts 
place an emphasis on a total inability to control oneself when the threshold for loss on inhibitory 
control might in fact be lower than that.88 For this reason, perhaps it would be more useful to 
explore other types of impairments to inhibitory mechanisms, such as those that we would 
intuitively categorise as lacking total control, as is the case with tics, reflexes, etc. These 
impairments are also potentially more revealing as they rely on more tangible evidence, such as 
that on damage to neural pathways and relevant brain areas, which, to a larger extent, could be 




87 It should be noted that it is beyond the parameters of the present thesis to discuss the way in which ADHD 
manifests itself, as well as the cognitive mechanisms impaired by the disorder. 
88 See Chapters 2.9 and 3.4.c. 
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c. Further Evidence of Impairments to the Control Mechanism 
Before embarking on a discussion on the legal impact of evidence surrounding damage to 
inhibitory mechanisms and the total loss of control, it is important to briefly mention a number of 
relevant brain areas other than the frontal lobes, which were discussed at the beginning of this 
section. Furthermore, it is important to briefly address connections made within neural circuitry 
which are essential in increasing or decreasing activity in the cortex and hence promoting or 
inhibiting movement.89 These regions and pathways are essential constituent elements in the 
preparation and execution of movements and, naturally, disorders manifesting themselves in 
impairments to the control mechanism will generally involve damage or deterioration of these 
elements. In terms of brain regions, the relevant ones are basal ganglia and the thalamus. The 
former represents a collection of brain nuclei that are found in each hemisphere and represent 
‘regions of subcortical gray matter involved in aspects of motor control and skill learning’ (Figure 
5).90 The thalamus acts as ‘the great traffic hubs of the brain’.91 Together with the M1, the basal 
ganglia and thalamus are essential for movement, and their functional inter-connectivity is 
complex, involving reciprocal inhibitory and excitatory projections.92 An inhibitory connection 
means that there is a greater activity in the originating brain structure than in the receiving one, 
the vice versa applying in the case of excitatory pathways.93 
 
Figure 5. Cortical Surface with an Overlay of the Basal Ganglia and Thalamus. The main 
components of the basal ganglia are the striatum, the globus pallidus external and the globus 
 
89 Baars and Cage (n 1) 127. 
90 Ward (n 31) 26. 
91 Baars and Cage (n 1) 135. 
92 Ward (n 31) 26-27. 
93 ibid 190. 
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pallidus internus, the ventral pallidum, the substantia nigra, and the subthalamic nucleus (Colder 
B, 2015) CC BY 4.0.  
For present purposes, neural pathways are important particularly in the case of the loops 
connecting the thalamus and basal ganglia, which form two corresponding routes and help directly 
increase and indirectly decrease activity in the cortex, i.e. they promote and inhibit movement 
respectively.94 In fact, the indirect pathway is always activated, allowing us to keep still when 
resting.95 The importance of these pathways is mostly showcased in the case of people suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease. Here, patients encounter lower levels of dopamine, a neurotransmitter 
in the substantia nigra, a large cluster of neurons located in the midsection of the brain, connecting 
with and projecting to the basal ganglia.96 Dopamine is important as it can both activate and 
inactivate pathways, but in those suffering from Parkinson’s, there is a dramatic deceleration of 
dopamine, leaving people with a tremor, the slowing of movement (bradykinesia), difficulty 
initiating movement (akinesia), muscular rigidity, and so on.97   
The important role of the basal ganglia and related structures in the initiation and/or control of 
movement can also be seen by looking at other clinical conditions. These conditions are marked 
by hyperkinetic symptoms, i.e. they lead to an excess of spontaneous movement, as opposed to 
Parkinson’s, which is a hypokinetic disease characterised by a shortage of spontaneous 
movement.98 These symptoms are perhaps more relevant here, as they usually manifest 
themselves in bodily movements typical of a claim of involuntariness in criminal law, such as 
mainly repetitive and excessive movements like motor tics. Particularly with children suffering 
from Tourette’s, the PFC shows greater activation than in non-affected children, potentially as a 
result of compensation to control the tics.99 That is, ‘compensatory changes in brain structure and 
 
94 ibid. See also Mahlon R DeLong, ‘Primate Models of Movement Disorders of Basal Ganglia Origin’ 
(1990) 13 Trends in Neuroscience 281, 281. 
95 Ward (n 31)190. 
96 ibid. 
97 DeLong (n 94) 281. 
98 Ward (n 31) 191. 
99 Stephen R Jackson and others, ‘Compensatory Neural Reorganisation in Tourette Syndrome’ 21 Current 
Biology 580, 584. 
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function’ do occur to take control over the symptoms.100 In addition, traditional models of 
movement disorders correlate the severity of the tics with ‘increased cortical excitability’, 
particularly in basal ganglia regions and the direct pathway.101 For instance, Smeets and others 
argue that abnormal basal ganglia output patterns are the primary explanation for the inability to 
inhibit bodily movements.102  
The correlation of the abovementioned brain areas and neural circuitry with motor control or, 
more specifically, the failure of the mechanisms underlying motor control, shows that are specific 
cognitive processes dedicated to the regulation of bodily movements. For example, conditions 
like Parkinson’s or Tourette’s reveal the barriers to exercising motor control when the neural 
pathways between the M1, basal ganglia and thalamus are affected. Going beyond simply arguing 
that the PFC, SMA or other subcortical regions are involved in this inhibitory process however, 
the studies are arguably more informative in the sense that they present more convincing evidence 
of the impact of impairments to our control mechanism. Specifically, they support the existence 
of a cognitive process at play in the control of bodily movements, shown not only through 
behavioural output, but also brain imaging. This is not to say that imaging evidence is more 
important, but it is perhaps more persuasive from a legal viewpoint, as courts have already made 
use of them in certain, albeit limited, circumstances.103  
At the same time, relying on this type of evidence has its obvious limitations and can raise 
potentially more questions than answers. The most evident challenge relates to the use of brain 
imaging, for such information would not necessarily speak to the capacity of the defendant at the 
time of the alleged movement. Any evidence regarding the overall structure of a person’s brain 
 
100 ibid. 
101 Ryan J Felling and Harvey S Singer, ‘Neurobiology of Tourette Syndrome: Current Status and Need for 
Further Investigation’ (2011) 31 The Journal of Neuroscience 12387, 12388. See also Ward (n 31) 192.  
102 Anouk Y J M Smeets and others, ‘The Role of the Basal Ganglia in Tourette Syndrome’ in New insights 
in Deep Brain Stimulation for Tourette Syndrome (Maastricht University Press 2018) 31. 
103 However, it is worth noting that these circumstances have related mostly in sentencing assessments 
rather than establishing criminal responsibility. Most often, they have been used in the United States to 
reduce severe punishments, for instance from the capital death sentence to life imprisonment. See for 
example Yu Du, ‘The Application of Neuroscience Evidence on Court Sentencing Decisions: Suggesting 
a Guideline for Neuro-Evidence’ (2020) 18 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 493, 500-501. 
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can only highlight potential impediments for agents to move according to standard 
expectations,104 tested against the movements of a ‘reasonable person’.105 This leads us then to 
further limitations. Notwithstanding that the ‘reasonable person’ standard has been a consistent 
topic of debate among legal scholars,106 even if one had a clear understanding of the type of 
movement expected from people, we would still be faced with an empirical conundrum. How 
would one establish that a person’s brain meets that standard? That is, how many ‘reasonable’ 
people’s brains would we have to look at first in order to establish a reliable baseline? Most 
importantly for our purposes, it still leaves a gap in evidence regarding the point at which an 
individual can no longer move otherwise, since movements such as tics and reflexes can easily 
be described as involuntary without much controversy. What is important to note here though is 
that the above evidence, supports the existence of a clear category of individuals with impairments 
to their control mechanisms. From a legal perspective, this confirms the assumptions made by 
legal scholars that some people should not be deemed voluntary by the criminal law due to their 
inability to move otherwise.  
 
3. Habitual Movements and Inhibition of Movement 
One area of research that could be more persuasive in terms of the relevance of neuroscientific 
research in the present context is that of habitual movements. This type of research is important 
to address not just to develop the legal standard of voluntariness or influence legal decisions. It 
can also be used to test the claim that control is an appropriate concept to describe voluntariness, 
as opposed to others such as consciousness or intention, which have been used by courts and 
 
104 This is a tentative argument for, as mentioned in the Introduction, correlation does not amount to 
causation.  
105 In law, the ‘reasonable person’ standard is a legal fiction mostly employed to assess the behaviour of 
the defendant against what a reasonable person would have done in those circumstances. It is applied in a 
wide array of claims, both civil and criminal, but mostly in cases of negligence.  
106 The main reason is that the standard ultimately requires extra-legal aspects to be incorporated in the 
assessment, especially in terms of what society deems as a reasonable person at any given time. Because 
of this, Gardner has categorised the standard as ‘a creative tension at the heart of legal life’. See John 
Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ in John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs (OUP 
2019) 273.  
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scholars alike. For instance, Chapter 2 of the present thesis has highlighted that courts refer to 
both consciousness and control to rationalising voluntariness, but without actually explaining 
what is about these concepts that make them relevant. Because of this, it is worth briefly exploring 
the concepts from a neuroscientific perspective, especially since they have been linked to 
voluntary movement across disciplines, before engaging with the aspect of habitual movements 
more specifically.  
At this stage, it should be mentioned that, despite various conceptual debates within neuroscience 
as to the meaning of consciousness, we are here taking that to mean awareness, even though it is 
acknowledged that consciousness cannot be restricted to one single state or level.107 However, 
from a legal viewpoint, this analogy is sufficient to discuss existing evidence on the voluntariness 
of movement. In addition, the discussion on awareness of bodily movements ties into one on 
intentional movement, for the concepts of consciousness and intention have often been discussed 
concurrently in the context of voluntariness. For example, Haggard agrees that to define 
‘volition’108 is notoriously difficult, but he argues that central characteristics would be the 
outcome or goal-directed nature of the movement, together with awareness of one’s intentions.109 
In other words, the greater the degree of awareness of one’s reasons for acting, the ‘stronger’ the 
‘volition’ is.110  
Looking specifically at consciousness and intention, it should be noted that the former has been 
one of the most difficult and elusive areas of neuroscientific investigation. This is particularly the 
case in terms of the connection between ‘the subjective qualities of any sensory experience’,111 
or qualia, as these are called in philosophy, and the brain. Many philosophers and scientists alike 
 
107 Benjamin Wallace and Leslie E Fisher, Consciousness and Behaviour (3rd edn, Allyn and Bacon 1991) 
13. 
108 I would contrast the notion of volition as described in the previous chapter with what Haggard here 
describes as features of voluntariness instead.  
109 Haggard (n 57) 11. 
110 ibid 13. Haggard is one of the researchers who has focused most on the neurological bases of voluntary 
actions, one of his main experimental paradigms for exploring intentional action being that of ‘intentional 
binding’, i.e. a putative measure of the sense of agency; see also Manos Tsakiris and Patrick Haggard, 
‘Awareness of Somatic Events Associated with a Voluntary Action’ (2003) 149 Experimental Brain 
Research 439, 440. 
111 Susan Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness (OUP 2006) 266. 
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have tried to locate consciousness within a specific area of the brain, with one of the earliest 
endeavours seen with Descartes in the seventeenth century, who attributed it to the pineal gland, 
situated at the base of the brain.112 However, consciousness cannot be reduced to one specific area 
in the brain, as there are a variety of functions that are performed whilst conscious, which range 
from visual and auditory, to emotional, cognitive, and so on, each with an unconscious element 
to it.113 As such, neuroscientific research has focused on the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’, 
i.e. the minimum neuronal conditions necessary for any one conscious sensation.114  
More successful and, most certainly, more relevant in the present context have been studies 
looking at sensations experienced by subjects exposed to cortical stimulation. For instance, some 
experiments have followed Libet’s formula, looking at the relationship between the generation of 
action and its associated awareness of intention, in the context of direct cortical stimulation prior 
to surgery for epilepsy. Here, the preSMA was found to play an important role, as direct 
stimulation within this region was accompanied by the subjects’ awareness of an ‘immediate 
intention’ to move, that is, a short-term awareness of impending action, which preceded bodily 
movement.115 Other studies have looked at ‘prospective intention’ which, as the name suggests, 
relates to future-oriented cognition and action planning, in contrast to the ‘immediate’ type of 
intention.116 Here, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), i.e. the lower central part of the 
PFC, which has an essential role in our ability to simulate what it could feel like to experience an 
event in the future, was found to be relevant.117 This is consistent with other studies that have 
focused on the VMPFC, which showed that damage to the region impairs the capacity to ‘travel 
 
112 Wallace and Fisher (n 107) 30. 
113 Baars and Cage (n 1) 242. 
114 ibid 241. 
115 Elisabeth Pacherie and Patrick Haggard, ‘What Are Intentions?’ in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn 
Nadel (eds), Conscious Will and Responsibility (OUP 2011) 72. Relevant here are also the cingulate motor 
areas (CMA), situated in the medial (midline) parts of the cortex. According to Pacherie and Haggard, these 
areas have been linked to compulsive or automatic actions, and their direct stimulation has been associated 
with compulsive behaviour such as smoking or eating. That is, once the areas were no longer stimulated, 
subjects were able to inhibit their bodily movements.  
116 ibid 78. 
117 Roland G Benoit, Karl K Szpunar and Daniel L Schacter, ‘Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Supports 
Affective Future Simulation by Integrating Distributed Knowledge’ (2014) 111 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 16550, 16553. Specifically, the region contributes to the integration of knowledge 
structures, i.e. associations that we make with aspects such as places we have been to, people that we have 
met, and so on, in order to construct predictions of how the eventual behaviour will occur. 
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in time’, due to the inability of this area to access the memory and ‘manipulate it imaginatively 
in the service of goal directed behaviour’.118 
For present purposes, the ‘immediate’ or ‘urge to move’ intention is most relevant, as it relates to 
specific motor responses that occur shortly before the onset of bodily movements.119 This is also 
because intention in the context of voluntariness should be taken as the intention to move one’s 
body, as opposed to intention to achieve a certain goal.120 Indeed, prospective intention does not 
necessarily have to relate to wider action plans.121 However, it is the immediacy of movement 
that is more relevant here, considering that the focus of the voluntariness requirement is on bodily 
movements. Most importantly, having empirical evidence regarding the separation between these 
types of intentions could potentially counteract the criticism related to the conceptual confusion 
of using intention to describe voluntariness. It will be remembered that one of the primary reasons 
behind not supporting this model related to the semantic confusion it would bring into the law.122 
This is because the intention to achieve a certain goal already plays a central part in the criminal 
law, namely in mens rea assessments. Therefore, if we started to use intention for both a finding 
of voluntariness and one of mens rea, this could create confusion and lead to practical difficulties. 
However, if these types of intention were shown to be represented by separate neural processes, 
that could justify a corresponding separation in law. 
At the same time, while a focus on conscious intention in law does find empirical support, it is 
argued that control is still an essential and, one would argue, constituent element of movement. 
Specifically, there are various brain processes involved in the planning of movement, for instance 
in terms of simulating future events, which helps us deliberate between potential actions and 
ultimately choose one over the other.123 To some extent, it may even serve to fill in some gaps 
 
118 Philip Gerrans, ‘Mental Time Travel, Somatic Markers and “Myopia for the Future”’ (2007) 159 
Synthese 459, 472. 
119 Michel Desmurget and Angela Sirigu, ‘Conscious Motor Intention Emerges in the Inferior Parietal 
Lobule (2012) 22 Current Opinion in Neurobiology 1004, 1009. 
120 See Chapter 3.4.b. 
121 These could also be described as complex actions. See Chapter 3.2.a. 
122 For further information see Chapter 3.4.b. 
123 See earlier discussion in this Section.  
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that a control model leaves, such as regarding the necessary threshold to be deemed in control and 
therefore voluntary. But equally, it would expose itself to assessment over the necessary degree 
of awareness over a certain movement, intensity of the urge to act, etc. Moreover, a focus on 
consciously made decisions and intended movements may not cover certain actions that could be 
unconscious but nevertheless voluntary. These movements relate primarily to habitual ones.124  
Habitual movements have mostly been categorised as voluntary in the legal and philosophical 
literature,125 but it has not generally been clear whether they are consciously intended or not. 
However, research in habitual movement does reveal a difference between such movements and 
those that are goal-directed. A key difference lies in the level of attention needed to perform a 
certain movement. For instance, habitual movement requires a lower level of attention on the 
subject’s part, as attention is needed on a much larger scale when the person is engaged in novel 
movement in order to perform it accurately.126 Indeed, all habits arise from learning a particular 
movement, so there was goal-directedness to begin with, but the movement becomes more 
automated through repetition and is not as dependant on the outcome.127 Most tasks we do are 
characterised by predictability, for instance in the case of driving; but when something 
unpredictable disrupts the movement, e.g. a pedestrian in the middle of the road, an immediate 
switch from habitual to goal-directed control occurs.128 From a more neuroscientific perspective, 
studies suggest that these types of movements are also different in terms of the activation of 
different areas of the brain. For instance, O’Hare and others note that the maintenance of habit 
relies of the dorsolateral striatum (DLS), a section of the basal ganglia.129 In particular, the way 
 
124 See Chapter 3.4.b. 
125 Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism. A Discussion Paper (2013) A.48. See 
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in which the DLS processes incoming cortical activity to generate the firing of neurons can be 
correlated with habitual movement.130  
The distinction between goal-directed and habitual movement is potentially more evident if we 
look at inhibition of movement, a constituent element of the control mechanism. According to 
Jahanshahi and others, there are two types of inhibition, namely ‘goal-directed’, which is 
intentional, and ‘habitual’, which is usually developed through practice and learning, and is 
largely automatic.131 These can also be called ‘proactive’, in the pursuit of a goal, for instance, 
avoiding high-calorie foods to lose weight, or ‘reactive’, responding to a stimulus such as a red 
light.132 When it comes to the inhibition of habitual movement, O’Hare and others have identified 
a specific pathway within the DLS that can be correlated with the suppression of habitual 
movement.133 Most importantly, these pathways seem to be distinct than those that suppress goal-
directed movement,134 which studies have correlated with the dorsomedial striatum,135 even 
though they are all located within the basal ganglia. At the same time, there is a relationship 
between the pathways that help inhibit both types of movement. Patients suffering from 
Parkinson’s offer a good example of the interaction between these pathways. For instance, 
Redgrave and others note that low levels of dopamine could lead to a major deficit in the control 
of habitual movements, but that the dysfunctionality in the neural circuit could also impact the 
‘expression of residual goal-directed responses’.136 This is because even though they are distinct, 
both habitual and goal-directed control circuits converge on a common motor pathway.137 
However, the distinction that can be made in terms of habitual and goal-directed movement 
suggests that the former is not necessarily intentional or even conscious. In the context of the 
voluntariness requirement, we are interested in consciousness as reflecting awareness of one’s 
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movement, and it cannot be argued that every habitual movement is made under full awareness. 
This is linked to the argument that certain types of movement, whilst voluntary, cannot be 
categorised as intentional.138 Therefore, even from a scientific viewpoint, to rely on intention as 
a defining characteristic of voluntariness may be under-inclusive. Alternatively, we could take 
Haggard’s view that habitual movement is not ‘volitional’,139 but our ultimate purpose here is to 
inform legal debates, rather than choose one neuroscientific correlation over another. As Morse 
argues, the law is based on ‘normative behavioral criteria’,140 which do include habits within the 
remit of voluntariness. As such, what is argued here is that the studies referred to above suggest 
that distinguishing habitual from intentional movement would not be conceptually wrong, based 
on specific neural pathways and brain areas dedicated to each type of movement. This would also 
provide empirical support for our avoidance of ‘consciousness’ or ‘intention’ to describe 
voluntariness, despite the reference to these concepts in both case law and legal scholarship, 
specifically due to the potential under-inclusiveness brought by the approach, namely the 
exclusion of habitual bodily movements. In addition, the above discussion sheds further light into 
inhibitory mechanisms, identifying neural pathways and regions that are involved in the control 
of bodily movements, providing further empirical evidence into the workings of the system and, 
implicitly, into its existence.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the way in which the control model manifests itself in the 
neuroscientific perspective, in order to explore whether such model is best suited at rationalising 
the voluntariness requirement in law. Having reviewed studies and evidence surrounding the 
ability to regulate our movements, as well as the relevance of awareness and intention in findings 
of voluntariness, it is argued that there is empirical evidence to support a continued reliance on a 
 
138 See Chapter 3.4.b.  
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control model. This is notwithstanding certain limitations that apply to any attempt to incorporate 
neuroscience into the law, such as the inability to conclusively rely on correlations, for instance, 
in linking a cognitive process to a certain behavioural output. 
Going beyond the identification of different areas of the brain involved in a range of cognitive 
processes related to the generation and inhibition of movement, sense of self etc., the evidence 
reviewed so far supports the view that there is an identifiable ability to move otherwise, largely 
based on our capacity to inhibit our movement. For instance, performance measurements 
analysing the way in which we refrain from acting or stop moving, as well as studies looking at 
failures of the mechanisms underlying motor control, suggest that there are specific cognitive 
processes involved in the regulation of movement. At the same time, the chapter also addressed 
neuroscientific evidence surrounding intentional movement, considering that the previous chapter 
has provisionally argued against it as a yardstick for identifying voluntariness. Here, it was argued 
that the existence of specific neural pathways and brain areas dedicated to habitual and intentional 
movement support our previous separation between the two types of movement. This approach 
does not mean that intention is irrelevant for voluntariness, as there are a multitude of processes 
and brain regions associated with goal-directedness and awareness that may well play a part in 
voluntary movement. However, the reason why a control model is to be preferred is that it is more 
comprehensive in terms of including every type of voluntary movement, as opposed to an 
intention model, which may be under inclusive.  
In this context, the next step in the present analysis will focus on exploring the practical 
implication of adopting a control model based on the exercise of sufficient bodily control. To this 
effect, the following chapter will produce a case study focusing on hypnotic movements and their 
status in law if the proposed standard of voluntariness in law were to be adopted. Such movements 
are often categorised by courts as involuntary, but it is not exactly clear on what basis such 
categorisation is made.141 As such, exploring this category of cases will allow us to showcase the 
value and impact of having a definition of voluntariness in law and, most importantly, to identify 
 
141 For further detail see Chapter 2. 
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whether the new model would effectively lead to different legal outcomes. In addition, given the 
extensive availability of scientific research and literature on hypnotic movements, the analysis 




CASE STUDY: HYPNOSIS AND THE VOLUNTARINESS REQUIREMENT  
 
1. Introduction  
So far, this thesis has sought to explore different rationalisations of the concept of voluntariness, 
identifying the most appropriate model to implement in the criminal law; one that is adequate 
from both a descriptive and normative standpoint. Having settled on a model based on control 
and the capacity to move otherwise, the following chapter aims at investigating the practical 
implications of adopting this definition in law. To do so, the chapter revisits one of the scenarios 
of alleged involuntary movement examined in the second chapter of the thesis. Specifically, 
exploring one of the categories discussed by courts will allow us to showcase the value and impact 
of having a definition of voluntariness in law and, most importantly, to identify whether the new 
model would effectively lead to different legal outcomes. In this context, the present chapter will 
focus on exploring the relationship between hypnosis and involuntary movement, analysing 
whether hypnotised individuals are voluntary, i.e. whether they can exercise sufficient bodily 
control to the effect that they can move otherwise or refrain from moving.     
Out of the categories discussed in the second chapter, hypnotic movement is a suitable case study 
due to the extensive availability of empirical evidence on the topic. Moreover, it is arguably one 
of the categories of movement that courts and law-making bodies have least engaged with from 
a theoretical and empirical standpoint. This is the case despite there being continuous references 
to hypnotic movements as involuntary within case law, statutes, as well as proposals for reform.1 
Therefore, bridging the gap in evidence and analysing the approach taken by courts from a 
scientific perspective provides an excellent opportunity to apply the control definition of 
voluntariness and to explore its legal impact. In addition, carrying on from the previous chapter, 
this examination further incorporates neuroscientific data into our legal assessment, providing an 
 
1 See Chapter 2.7. 
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empirical footing to legal assumptions and thus contributing to the development of additional 
neurolaw research.  
When addressing the way in which courts and law-makers alike have presented hypnosis in the 
context of the voluntariness requirement, there seems to be little more than a categorisation of 
hypnosis as enabling subjects to move involuntarily. Courts generally describe hypnotic influence 
as an external factor that would warrant a claim of automatism, but without explaining why that 
is the case.2 On one hand, this could be attributed to the limited encounters with such claims. For 
instance, courts in England and Wales have only made this categorisation in obiter, when 
addressing other claims of automatism, but have not had the opportunity to explore the 
relationship between hypnosis and automatism in more depth.3 On the other hand, in jurisdictions 
such as Canada or the United States, where the courts have faced claims of hypnotic movement, 
there has been an equally minimal discussion on the topic. In Book,4 judges accepted the argument 
that, following unsuccessful attempts to ‘de-hypnotise’ a hypnotised man, the defendant later 
experienced ‘total amnesia’, ‘a deep trance’ and ‘a robot-like state of automatism’ whilst driving 
erratically.5 Nevertheless, in deciding that the prosecution had not proved that the defendant had 
acted voluntarily, no further clarification was given as to why that categorisation was made.  
A similar lack of clarification can be found in statutes and official documents. For example, the 
Law Commission has cited hypnotic influence as one of the few instances in which its redefined 
automatism ‘defence’ would still apply.6 Equally, the US Model Penal Code (MPC) states that 
‘conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion’ does not amount to a voluntary 
act needed to fulfil the voluntariness requirement.7 This approach is also seen in the Montana 
Code Annotated 2019, which follows the definition in the MPC and includes this example in its 
 
2 See Chapter 2.7.  
3 See for example R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 923, where Lawton LJ argued that hypnotic influence amounts 
to an external factor that warrants a finding of automatism; and R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [22], 
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5 R v Book [1999] ABPC 149, [12].  
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list of involuntary movements.8 However, none of the aforementioned accompanies the 
categorisation with an explanation as to why hypnotic movement is involuntary. 
The limited analysis of the issue leaves one to assume that the conceptualisation of hypnosis is 
consistent with a popular image of hypnotic participants as experiencing trance-like states, 
behaving outside their own powers.9 Starting with the introduction of the concept of ‘animal 
magnetism’ (also known as mesmerism) by German doctor Franz Mesmer during the 18th 
Century,10 people have been fascinated with the possibility of an occult force being used to 
compel people to behave in a way that contradicts their character. With the advent of 
cinematography and later television, popular media has consistently propagated negative 
stereotypes of the practice, using imagery such as that of hypnotists inducing subjects through 
twirling spiral discs, swinging watches etc.11 Applications of hypnosis to cultural outputs have 
included young women surrendering to sexual advances, seemingly upstanding citizens being 
compelled to harm themselves or others, committing gruesome murders, etc. A similar focus on 
the misuse of hypnosis can be seen with stage hypnosis, a form of entertainment that has grown 
in popularity over the past few centuries, in which participants undergo hypnosis in front of a live 
audience. For instance, according to Heap, common assumptions surrounding these events relate 
to the ability of the hypnotist to compel anyone into entering ‘a deep trance’, regardless of their 
level of suggestibility.12 More important here is the preconception that in the absence of a proper 
‘release’ from a trance, participants could carry on behaving contrary to their will.13  
The abovementioned stereotypes do not necessarily mean that the majority of the population 
adheres to this view. In fact, many of the myths surrounding the occult or supernatural character 
 
8 Montana Code Annotated 2019 45-2-101, s.33 (c).  
9 See for example Graham F Wagstaff, ‘Hypnosis and the Law: Examining the Stereotypes’ (2008) 35 
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Hypnosis: A Brief History (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 12.   
11 For a review of hypnosis in popular media, see Deirdre Barrett, ‘Hypnosis in Popular Media’ in Deirdre 
Barrett (ed), Hypnosis and Hypnotherapy (Praeger 2010) 77-96.   
12 Michael Heap, ‘The Alleged Dangers of Stage Hypnosis’ (2000) 17 Contemporary Hypnosis 117, 120. 
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of hypnosis have now been debunked, to the point that the practice is now a commonly used form 
of therapy to improve mental health or to relinquish bad habits such as smoking.14 However, to 
this day, representations of hypnosis within the media continue to perpetuate a view of hypnosis 
as that of a mystical, somewhat paranormal process, in which the hypnotised subject becomes 
helpless in the face of a powerful hypnotist seeking to manipulate them.15 Against this backdrop, 
it would not be unreasonable to presume that some of these preconceptions may have impacted 
the approach taken by courts, the Crime Prosecution Service, or law-making bodies. Certainly, 
given the lack of detail within statutes and case law and the fact that courts have rarely been faced 
with this claim, there is not much judicial analysis to confirm that judges and law-makers adhere 
to this view. However, the mere lack of engagement with the topic could easily be linked to a 
presumption about hypnotic movement so ingrained in public consciousness that would make it 
redundant to even explain why hypnotised individuals should not be deemed voluntary.   
In order to shed light on the nature of hypnosis and the way this should be understood in the 
context of the voluntariness requirement, the following chapter focuses on addressing common 
rationalisations of hypnosis, including theoretical and empirical research surrounding the nature 
of the process. In particular, the analysis will seek to identify whether there is any evidence to 
indicate that hypnotised subjects suffer a significant impairment to control functions and/or are 
unable to resist suggestions from hypnotists. This is particularly important considering the 
argument made by Hughes LJ in Coley that hypnosis would be an appropriate example of a 
‘complete’ destruction of control needed to secure a finding of automatism.16 Therefore, the 
analysis will enable us not only to apply the proposed model of voluntariness based on ‘sufficient’ 
control, but also ascertain whether courts are justified in categorising hypnotic movements as 
involuntary under the current approach.  
 
14 For example, hypnotherapy is acknowledged by the National Health Service (NHS) as a valid form of 
treatment. See NHS, ‘Hypnotherapy’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/hypnotherapy/> accessed 05 
October 2020. 
15 John F Kihlstrom, ‘The Doman of Hypnosis, Revisited’ in Michael R Nash and Amanda J Barnier (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory Research and Practice (OUP 2008) 23. 
16 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233, [22] (Hughes LJ).  
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2. Hypnosis and Control Functions  
a. Can Hypnotised Subjects Move Otherwise? 
One of the researchers who has studied the impact of hypnosis on control functions is Hilgard. 
Hilgard is mostly associated with the ‘neodissociation’ theory of hypnosis, which builds on from 
dissociation theories that had previously focused on paralysis, amnesia, depersonalisation due to 
sleepwalking, multiple personality disorders etc.17 Specifically, Hilgard argues that, similar to 
these phenomena, hypnosis interferes with processes of association such as recalling memories 
or coordinating bodily movements.18 Moreover, it impacts the planning and initiation of action, 
as subjects, or at least part of the executive system, cannot ‘independently undertake new lines of 
thought or action’.19 Equally, Hilgard argues that hypnosis affects the ability of executive 
functions to connect with monitoring functions in that the subject would still be able to observe 
but not fully account for and perceive the information coming in.20 In other words, it involves the 
‘splitting off of certain mental processes from […] consciousness’.21  
For the purposes of the voluntariness requirement, the idea that subjects may lose consciousness 
and dissociate is not as important unless the dissociation significantly impairs control 
mechanisms, which would make finding a subject voluntary more challenging. In other words, 
considering that the model proposed in the present thesis is solely concerned with one’s ability to 
experience sufficient control over their movements, rather than an awareness of those movements, 
a loss of consciousness of processes by parts of a person does not raise questions on its own. As 
mentioned above, for Hilgard, hypnosis impacts subjects’ ability to fully perceive and engage 
with their surroundings, at least by one part of the executive system.22 However, even if 
 
17 Dissociation theories are mainly associated with Pierre Janet, an early 20th Century psychologist. For a 
summary of Janet’s concept of dissociation, see Erik Z Woody and Pamela Sadler, ‘The Development of 
Dissociation Theories of Hypnosis’ in Nash and Barnier (n 15) 82-83. 
18 Ernest R Hilgard, ‘A Neodissociation Interpretation of Hypnosis’ in Steven J Lynn and Judith W Rhue 
(eds), Theories of Hypnosis: Current Models and Perspectives (Guildford Press 1991) 84-85. 
19 Ernest R Hilgard, ‘Dissociation and Theories of Hypnosis’ in Erika Fromm and Michael R Nash (eds), 
Contemporary Hypnosis Research (Guilford Press 1992) 50. 
20 ibid 50-51.  
21 ibid 69. 
22 ibid 50-51. 
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dissociation fragments one’s ability to fully comprehend the context in which a movement ensues, 
this does not mean that control is affected in terms of executing alternative bodily movements. 
For the purposes of the voluntariness requirement, which is solely concerned with the ability to 
retain sufficient bodily control, rather than the capacity to comprehend the context or 
consequences of an action, this is not necessarily challenging. Specifically, the ability of the 
executive system to function, even if dissociated, can still enable one to perform alternative bodily 
movements and thus exercise control over movements. Thus, even in the absence of an awareness 
of physical movements or intentions, the subject may still be voluntary for legal purposes.23 
Certainly, evidence of one’s inability to understand what they were doing may be probative in 
respect of a lack of mens rea or the application of a defence.24  
Earlier in his research, Hilgard had argued that successful hypnotic suggestions ‘take much of the 
normal control away from the subject’,25 with hypnosis leading to a loss of ‘voluntary control’.26 
Moreover, he had stated that alterations in control systems were usually more apparent than any 
fundamental change in our interpretation of reality.27 However, in later works, Hilgard seems to 
depart from his earlier ideas. In fact, much of Hilgard’s work has focused on the ‘fractioning’ of 
monitoring functions and the reduction in ‘critical scanning’, i.e. in one’s ability to perceive and 
take into account what is happening in their surroundings.28 When referencing control being 
relinquished, Hilgard has been mainly concerned with dissociation between systems, rather than 
the effect on the systems themselves. For instance, he acknowledges that parts of the executive 
function are very much intact during hypnosis and only some dissociate, i.e. are concealed from 
awareness.29 Most significantly, Hilgard states that hypnotised people retain ‘a considerable 
 
23 Following the discussion in Chapters 3.4.b-c and 4.3, consciousness is not relevant for a finding of 
voluntariness, given the potential for such concept to be under-inclusive. That is, while conscious bodily 
movement is generally voluntary, not all unconsciously produced movements are involuntary. The most 
common case is that of habitual actions.  
24 For a discussion of the relevance of such evidence for the criminal law, see Section 5.  
25 Hilgard (n 18) 98.  
26 ibid 84. 
27 Ernest R Hilgard, ‘Divided Consciousness in Hypnosis’ in Erika Fromm and Ronald E Shor (eds), 
Hypnosis: Developments in Research and New Perspectives (2nd edn, AldineTransaction 2009) 45. 
28 Hilgard (n 19) 96. 
29 Hilgard (n 19) 99. Certainly, any type of physical movement originating from the body would reflect the 
involvement of the executive system. 
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portion’ of executive functions, acknowledging that subjects may refuse or accept hypnotists’ 
requests to move around or engage in certain activities.30 Even when a suggestion is completely 
followed, one part of the executive system controls and monitors what is going on. Thus, under 
this theory, subjects retain their ability to retain some control, at least a sufficient level to engage 
in alternative bodily movements. 
At the same time, in contrast with Hilgard, other dissociation theorists such as Woody and Bowers 
have adopted the view that hypnosis leads to a genuine loss of control, as opposed to simply a 
perception of losing control.  That is, a genuine alteration of control functions would occur.31 
According to the authors, a hypnotised subject would perceive a movement as involuntary 
because the movement would effectively be executed automatically, without cognitive control.32 
Whereas Hilgard focuses more on the division of consciousness, ‘dissociated control’ focuses on 
the dissociation from executive control, likening hypnotic responding to movements performed 
by patients suffering from impairments to frontal lobes.33 Moreover, the two theories differ in the 
amount of cognitive effort involved whilst hypnotised. Compared to neodissociation theory, 
which may involve ‘strategic efforts’ such as that involved in altering one’s perception of pain, 
Bowers argues that ‘lower cognitive costs’ are involved in ‘dissociated control’.34 Beyond 
conceptual differences, the theory’s relevance for the legal analysis of voluntariness is that it 
would cast doubt on the argument that hypnotised individuals are in control of their bodily 
movements. A genuine alteration to self-control, as opposed to merely the perception of it, could 
effectively render subjects unable to move their bodies otherwise.  
From an empirical perspective, dissociation theories have been tested by comparing the extent to 
which hypnosis interferes with subjects’ ability to carry out tasks and the level of cognitive effort 
 
30 ibid 94. The potential for subjects to resist suggestions will be addressed in the following section.  
31 Erik Z Woody and Kenneth S Bowers, ‘A Frontal Assault on Dissociated Control’ in Steven J Lynn and 
Judith W Rhue (eds), Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives (Guildford Press 1994) 63. 
32 ibid.  
33 See also Irving Kirsch and Steven Jay Lynn, ‘Dissociation Theories of Hypnosis’ (1998) 123 
Psychological Bulletin 100, 103. 
34 Kenneth S Bowers ‘Imagination and Dissociation in Hypnotic Responding’ (1992) 40 International 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 253, 265.   
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involved in the process.35 For instance, in a study by Stevenson, subjects were divided into two 
groups, one with highly hypnotisable participants and another with participants simulating 
hypnosis.36 The purpose of the experiment was to measure the effect of hypnotic dissociation in 
increasing or decreasing the performance of simultaneous tasks, where one of the tasks is 
performed subconsciously.37 These tasks related to consciously naming colours presented on a 
piece of cardboard, as well as counting and adding numbers in writing (both consciously and 
unconsciously).38 In support of Hilgard’s theory, Stevenson recorded that, compared to control 
participants, highly hypnotisable individuals appeared to form high levels of cognitive effort to 
maintain a task outside their awareness.39 This effort increased proportionate to the demands of 
the tasks, with the highest effort being produced in the most complex scenario, which involved 
simultaneously naming colours and subconsciously adding numbers.40 A similar result was also 
observed in a study by Knox and others, which involved the tasks of colour naming and key 
pressing at various levels of awareness.41 Here, the authors argued that the increased cognitive 
effort could be attributed to either the attempt to simultaneously perform the two tasks or to that 
of keeping a task outside one’s awareness.42  
One could argue that the above studies do not necessarily disprove dissociated control theory, as 
it relates to mechanisms. This is because it may technically be possible for cognitive effort to be 
aimed at keeping a task outside awareness, whilst still being impacted in terms of the ability to 
perform alternative movements. However, it would seem highly unlikely that a subject could 
actively engage in endeavours to create and maintain a lack of awareness over their movements 
 
35 For example, Kirsch and Lynn argue that given the ‘diametrically opposite predictions’ regarding task 
interference, they can be directly tested against one another. See Kirsch and Lynn (n 33) 106.  
36 James H Stevenson, ‘Effect of Posthypnotic Dissociation on the Performance of Interfering Tasks’ (1976) 
85 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 398, 399. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid 400. The subconscious condition entailed subjects’ hands being placed in a box, concealed from 
their view. 
39 ibid 405. See also Hilgard (n 19) 73. 
40 James H Stevenson, ‘Effect of Posthypnotic Dissociation on the Performance of Interfering Tasks’ (1976) 
85 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 398, 404. 
41 Jane Knox, Lila Crutchfield, and Ernest R Hilgard, ‘The Nature of Task Interference in Hypnotic 
Dissociation: An Investigation of Hypnotic Behavior’ (1975) 23 International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis 305. 
42 ibid 320. 
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without an ability to control those movements. Moreover, the expenditure of cognitive effort 
would have to come about with no involvement from those mechanisms dedicated to action 
planning and error correction, which are important for engaging in more novel or complex 
behaviour.43 Woody and Bowers have argued that control is impacted during hypnosis due to such 
mechanisms being directly bypassed during hypnosis, activating instead those processes 
associated with habitual or routine activities, which do not rely on a person’s attention to supervise 
them.44 However, tasks as complex as adding numbers are unlikely to be produced solely through 
the input of those mechanisms involved in habitual movements, as they rely on the person’s 
attention. As Stevenson noted, engaging in simultaneous tasks such as those involved in his 
research would effectively divide attention between those tasks of naming colours and adding 
numbers.45 This challenges Woody and Bowers’ theory. In fact, hypnotised subjects’ ability to 
engage in novel movement has been recorded in multiple studies, which also contribute to the 
argument that subjects are able to move alternatively.46 
Within the past few decades, hypnosis theorists have focused more specifically on the level of 
control maintained by subjects, but while recognising the centrality of subjective experience. 
Dissociation theories have often been criticised for ignoring the socio-cultural context in which 
hypnosis arises, playing undue emphasis on cognitive changes and neurophysiological data.47 
 
43 This system is often referred to as the ‘supervisory attentional system’, which normally operates at a high 
cognitive level, by monitoring activity at the contention scheduling level (action selection) and activating 
or inhibiting action schemata. For further information, see Donald Arthur Norman and Tim Shallice, 
‘Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behaviour’ in R J Davidson, G E Schwartz, and D 
Shapiro (eds), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol 4 (Plenum Press 1986) 3. 
44 Woody and Bowers (n 31) 60. See also Erik Woody and Peter Farvolden, ‘Dissociation in Hypnosis and 
Frontal Executive Function’ (1998) 40 American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 206, 209. Woody and 
Bowers relied on a hierarchal layout of control functions developed by Norman and Shallice, which 
operates based on two complementary processes, those of ‘contention scheduling’ and ‘supervisory 
attentional system’. For further information see Norman and Shallice (n 43) 3.  
45 Stevenson (n 36) 406. 
46 See for example Lorne D Bertrand and Nicholas P Spanos, ‘The Organization of Recall During Hypnotic 
Suggestions for Complete and Selective Amnesia’ (1985) 4 Imagination, Cognition and Personality 249. 
Here, subjects were asked to selectively forget words, which would suggest that executive functioning at 
play for that suppression.  
47 See for example Steven Jay Lynn, Irving Kirsch and Michael N Hallquist, ‘Social Cognitive Theories of 
Hypnosis’ in Nash and Barnier (n 15) 112; and Graham F Wagstaff, ‘The Semantics and Physiology of 
Hypnosis as an Altered State: Towards a Definition of Hypnosis’ (1998) 15 Contemporary Hypnosis 149, 




However, theories such as that ‘cold control’, developed by Dienes and Perner, have adopted a 
more middle ground approach. Specifically, according to the theory, hypnotised individuals can 
successfully respond to suggestions by forming an intention to perform whatever the hypnotists 
asks them to perform, but without forming ‘higher order thoughts’ of intending the movement 
itself.48 That is, mental states such as intentions can be unconscious in the absence of a higher-
order thought about being in that state, e.g. intending to do something.49 During hypnosis, subjects 
can successfully respond to suggestions by developing an intention to adhere to the instructions 
of the hypnotist, but without developing thoughts about intending the required movements 
themselves.50 What is significant is that, regardless of the degree of awareness over one’s 
intentions, control over bodily movements is retained.51 In this sense, ‘cold control’ is ‘cold’ 
because there is a preservation of executive control, but with a loss of awareness of intentions.52 
From a legal perspective, ‘cold control’ theory is relevant for the proposed model of voluntariness 
because it claims that cognitive control is maintained during hypnosis, irrespective of changes to 
consciousness. Therefore, it justifies a legal categorisation of hypnotic movement as voluntary. 
Theoretically, ‘cold control’ is similar to neodissociation theory in that it acknowledges that 
hypnosis has an impact on executive functions, with physiological modifications and the presence 
 
48 Zoltan Dienes and Josef Perner, ‘The Cold Control Theory of Hypnosis’ in Graham Jamieson (ed), 
Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective (OUP 2007) 293. Here, when 
referring to ‘higher order thoughts’, the authors drew on Rosenthal’s theory of consciousness, according to 
which mental states are conscious when people have a higher-order thought to the effect that they are in 
that particular state. These thoughts are not necessarily conscious themselves, but they relate to the 
‘informational content’ or ‘sensory quality’ of the respective state. For example, when we have someone’s 
name on ‘the tip of our tongues’ but are not able to recall it, Rosenthal argues that we are conscious of 
being in some state that contains the relevant information, but not conscious of the state ‘in respect of that 
information itself’. See David M Rosenthal, ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’ (1986) 49 Philosophical 
Studies 329, 336; and David M Rosenthal, ‘Consciousness, Content and Metacognitive Judgements’ (2000) 
9 Consciousness and Cognition 203, 205. 
49 David M Rosenthal, ‘V. Consciousness, Interpretation and Higher-Order Thought’ (2005) 717 Verlag 
der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 119, 133. See also Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, and 
Bence Palfi, ‘Controlling Phenomenology by Being Unaware of Intentions’ in Josh Weisberg (ed) 
Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the philosophy of David Rosenthal (CUP) (forthcoming) 3; and 
Amanda J Barnier, Zoltan Dienes and Chris J Mitchell, ‘How Hypnosis Happens: New Cognitive Theories 
of Hypnotic Responding’ in Nash and Barnier (n 15) 150. 
50 Dienes and Perner (n 48) 296; and Barnier, Dienes and Mitchell (n 49) 150. 
51 Dienes and Perner (n 48) 303. 
52 Zoltan Dienes, ‘Is Hypnotic Responding the Strategic Relinquishment of Metacognition?’ in Michael J 
Beran and others (eds), Foundations of Metacognition (OUP 2012) 267. 
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of distinct neural processes.53 Particularly, it recognises the role of the executive system, given 
primarily the ability to perform novel movements and the preservation of the ability to overcome 
or inhibit strong responses, which require high-level cognitive control processes.54 Examples 
include the ability to skip numbers when counting in a sequence or even, in limited circumstances, 
supressing the habit of reading.55 This is consistent with the earlier discussion on ‘dissociated 
control’, in which it was highlighted that many hypnotised individuals can engage in novel 
movements, in contrast with the hypothesis proposed by Woody and Bowers, that hypnosis entails 
subjects bypassing those mechanisms involved in complex movements.56  
For the purposes of the voluntariness requirement, the research discussed above is more 
persuasive in terms of the argument that bodily control is retained during hypnosis, despite 
alterations in consciousness. That is, losing consciousness over one’s movement does not 
necessarily eliminate its voluntariness. The fact that subjects can expend cognitive efforts towards 
performing novel or more complex actions suggests that impairments to control mechanisms do 
not occur during hypnosis. At the same time, the theories discussed so far do not necessarily 
provide an explanatory framework that is comprehensive enough to adopt for legal purposes. For 
instance, despite Hilgard’s reference to the relatively low impact to executive functions, and the 
fact that subjects can refuse requests to perform specific activities, he also argued that as part of 
the ‘hypnotic contract’, subjects may turn over some of their functions to hypnotists.57 This 
includes the possibility that a participant may ‘lose control of his or her movements if this is 
indicated’.58 Thus, a counterargument to the theory relates to the potential for a hypnotist’s 
instruction to be so powerful that it could impact one’s ability to move in opposition to the said 
 
53 Dienes and Perner (n 48) 307.  
54 Dienes, Lush and Palfi (n 49) 7. See also Tobias Egner and Amir Raz, ‘Cognitive Control Processes and 
Hypnosis’ in Graham Jamieson (ed), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience 
Perspective (OUP 2007) 30. 
55 See for example and F J Evans, ‘Posthypnotic Amnesia’ in G D Burrows and L Dennerstein (eds), 
Handbook of Hypnosis and Psychosomatic Medicine 85; and A Raz and others, ‘Hypnotic Suggestion and 
the Modulation of Stroop Interference’ (2002) 59 Archives of General Psychiatry 1155; and Barnier, 
Dienes, and Mitchell (n 49) 153. 
56 Woody and Bowers (n 31) 63.  




instruction. If hypnosis affected subjects’ capacity to initiate alternative movements, this would 
certainly constitute a significant impairment to control function and therefore render movements 
involuntary. To address this possibility, empirical evidence surrounding the ability to resist 
suggestions within hypnosis is essential.  
 
b. Can Hypnotised Subjects Resist Suggestions?   
Rather than focusing solely on the effect of hypnosis on cognitive mechanisms, another way to 
ascertain whether subjects can retain control over their movements is to explore research 
surrounding their ability to resist suggestions. In other words, rather than focusing on brain 
functions, behavioural output can be just as informative in terms of our underlying capacity to 
move otherwise. In fact, a large part of hypnosis theory disagrees with the idea that hypnosis can 
truly lead to changes in executive functions, instead promoting instead the view the process is 
merely a response to a request for ‘imaginative experiences’.59 That is, much like other types of 
social behaviour, hypnosis does not have to be explained as a special process, but simply as a 
response to a ‘persuasive communication’ from the hypnotist.60 Understood in this way, hypnotic 
responding is regarded as an ability to experience the world according to the instruction of the 
hypnotist and, in the case of the most suggestible, to observe no change in the external 
environment.61 
One central argument surrounding the conceptualisation of the hypnotic process relates to the 
‘role’ undertaken by subjects and their expectations surrounding what they will experience during 
hypnosis. For example, Spanos argues that responses to hypnotic suggestions involve subjects 
negotiating their surroundings, interacting with the hypnotist through ‘mutually negotiated self-
 
59 Steven Jay Lynn, Irving Kirsch and Michael N Hallquist, ‘Social Cognitive Theories of Hypnosis’ in 
Nash and Barnier (n 15) 112. Some of these theories are also referred to as sociocogntive theories, as not 
all authors reject the idea that physiological markers of hypnosis do not exist or that these markers do not 
matter. The consensus though is that neurological data does not solve the debate surrounding the existence 
of an altered state of consciousness. 
60 Nicholas P Spanos ‘Hypnotic Behaviour: A Social-Psychological Interpretation of Amnesia, Analgesia, 
and “Trance Logic”’ (1986) 9 The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 449, 449.   
61 Lynn, Kirsch and Hallquist (n 59) 113.  
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presentations and reciprocal role validation’.62 Specifically, people undergoing hypnosis assume 
the hypnotic ‘role’ and adjust their movement according to what they consider appropriate for 
that context.63 Spanos built from Sarbin’s ‘role theory’ of hypnosis, which sees hypnosis as ‘role-
taking’, i.e. ‘a social psychological behavior’ in which subjects strive to take on the role of the 
hypnotised individual, the success of which depends on the motivation, prior experience and 
aptitude of the subject.64 Here, the relationship between the subject and the hypnotist is regarded 
as a ‘transaction’ in which both parties assume reciprocal roles in order to meet the requirements 
of their own agendas.65  
In contrast with neodissociation, theorists such as Spanos have sought to empirically challenge 
the over-reliance on physiological markers as an indicator of hypnosis, seeking to explain 
hypnotic processes in light of the situational cues and expectations that a subject has regarding 
what they are about to experience. Here, the emphasis is largely on the context and impact of the 
hypnotic suggestion, focusing on behavioural rather than physiological indicators of change. For 
instance, under this view, dissociation is attributed to the demand characteristics of an experiment, 
i.e. the effect of the participants’ behavioural change in order to meet the perceived purpose of 
the study, as well as their general attitudes, beliefs, expectations etc.66 By explaining the 
characteristics of splits from awareness and presenting detailed instructions, subjects can proceed 
to play ‘the role of the “dissociated subject”’, with experiments becoming more like ‘“recipes” 
for teaching the […] enactment of a social role’.67 However, despite significant conceptual 
 
62 Nicholas P Spanos, ‘A Sociocognitive Approach to Hypnosis’ in Lynn and Rhue (n 18) 326. 
63 ibid. 
64 Theodore R Sarbin, ‘Contributions to Role-Taking Theory: I. Hypnotic Behavior’ (1950) 57 The 
Psychological Review 255, 259. Sarbin’s own theory builds on from the work of Robert W White, one of 
the first contemporary social psychological theorists of hypnosis to reject ‘mechanistic approaches’ to 
understanding hypnosis. For further information see Nicholas P Spanos and William C Coe, ‘A Social-
Psychological Approach to Hypnosis’ in Fromm and Nash (n 19).  
65 William C Coe and Theodore R Sarbin, ‘Role Theory: Hypnosis from a Dramaturgical and Narrational 
Perspective’ in Lynn and Rhue (n 18) 304. 
66 Nicholas P Spanos, Maxwell Gwynn and Henderikus J Stam, ‘Instructional Demands and Ratings of 
Overt and Hidden Pain During Hypnotic Analgesia (1983) 92 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 479, 485. 
67 Nicholas P Spanos and Erin C Hewitt, ‘The Hidden Observer in Hypnotic Analgesia: Discovery or 
Experimental Creation?’ (1980) 39 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1201, 1203. 
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disagreements among so-called ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ theorists,68 these theories are broadly in 
agreement as to the idea that control is effectively retained throughout the process. That is, even 
though subjects may perceive their movements as involuntary, they do retain control.  
From an empirical viewpoint, evidence surrounding people’s capacity to resist suggestions is 
most relevant as to whether hypnotised individuals lose control over their bodily movements. If 
subjects can refrain from moving in accordance with one’s instructions, that would demonstrate 
that the ability to move otherwise is not significantly impaired, at least for legal purposes. Existing 
studies addressing this issue indicate that this capacity is not affected. For instance, in a study by 
Lynn and others, the authors conducted an experiment with two sets of subjects.69 One group of 
participants was told that successful responses to hypnotic inductions involved people resisting 
suggestions to move and continuing to experience their reactions to suggestions as being within 
their control.70 The other group was informed of the contrary, i.e. that good responses to 
inductions lead to an inability to resist suggestion and little or no control.71 When each group of 
participants was instructed to resist the subsequent hypnotic suggestion presented to them, 
subjects proceeded to act in line with the expectations they had created regarding successful 
responses to hypnosis.72 That is, those who were told that good responses to suggestions left one 
unable to resist them complied with them and moved according to the requests of the hypnotist.73 
In the group that was told that successful participants were able to resist suggestions, subjects 
proceeded to resist them.74  
 
68 In its simplest form, traditional scholarship surrounding hypnosis has been divided along the question of 
whether or not hypnosis causes physical changes in cognitive mechanisms and can be associated with 
altered states of consciousness or brain function. Whereas dissociation theories are usually regarded as 
‘state’ theories, Sarbin and other theorists who describe hypnosis as a social behaviour would fit into the 
‘non-state’ camp. For further information see Steven Jay Lynn, Oliver Fassler and Joshua Knox, ‘Hypnosis 
and the Altered State Debate: Something More or Nothing More?’ (2005) 22 Contemporary Hypnosis 39. 
69 Steven Jay Lynn and others, ‘Nonvolition, Expectancies, and Hypnotic Responding (1984) 93 Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology 295. 
70 ibid 297. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid 298. 




The fact that in the study by Lynn and others, one group of highly hypnotisable subjects was able 
to resist suggestions indicates that, at least cognitively, participants can act against the demands 
of the hypnotist and (refrain to) move otherwise. A similar study was also conducted by Spanos 
and others, where the authors recorded that even highly hypnotisable individuals are able to easily 
resist suggestion.75 One group of subjects was told that ‘deep hypnosis’ is reflected by the ability 
to successfully resist suggestions.76 Another one was informed that the inability to resist 
suggestions reflects a deep state of hypnosis.77 Consistent with the study by Lynn and others, 
following a procedure of hypnotic induction, the participants either resisted the suggestions or 
failed to resist them, in line with their expectations regarding what a successful hypnotic response 
is.78 This suggests that even highly hypnotisable individuals retain control over their movements 
and responses. According to Spanos and others, participants guide their conduct according to the 
shifting requirements that signify a self-presentation as deeply hypnotised.79 That is, subjects 
engage in ‘strategic role enactment’ to comply with the social demands that participants perceive 
to exist in the hypnotic context.80 Convincing oneself that their movements are involuntary or 
uncontrollable is distinct from actually losing control.  
The impact of expectations on hypnotic responding has been extensively researched within the 
literature, to the point that there is general agreement of the fact that perceptual experience is 
shaped by participants’ expectations of what they are about to undergo.81 If subjects create the 
expectation that their movements under hypnosis will be involuntary, then this plays a significant 
role in those subjects interpreting their movements as such.82 Furthermore, even studies which 
seem to challenge the idea that highly hypnotisable individuals can resist suggestion, 
 
75 Nicholas P Spanos, Pamela C Cobb, and Donald R Gorassini, ‘Failing to Resist Hypnotic Test 
Suggestions: A Strategy for Self-presenting as Deeply Hypnotised’ (1985) 48 Psychiatry 282. 
76 ibid 285. 
77 ibid 284. 
78 ibid 290. 
79 ibid 291. 
80 ibid. 
81 See for example Irving Kirsch and Steven Jay Lynn, ‘Hypnotic Involuntariness and the Automaticity of 
Everyday Life (1997) 40 American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 329, 338; and Irving Kirsch, ‘Response 
Expectancy Theory and Application: A Decennial Review’ (1997) 6 Applied and Preventive Psychology 
69, 76. 
82 Lynn and others (n 69) 300. 
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acknowledge that expectations and situational demands affect the results of an induction. For 
instance, in a study conducted by Levitt and others, participants were told by a ‘resistance 
instructor’, i.e. a colleague other than the hypnotist, that they would be offered an incentive of 
$100 if they successfully resisted the suggestion.83 When hypnotised, subjects were only able to 
resist in 50% of cases, despite having reported similar positive impressions of the hypnotist.84 
Interestingly, half of those who did not resist reported a negative impression of the instructor, 
compared to none with resisters.85 One possibility for the negative impression is that subjects may 
have taken the ‘bribe’ as a request to trick or betray the hypnotist in some way, which had been 
the case in an earlier experiment conducted by Levitt and Baker.86 Thus, rather than hypnosis 
compelling them to follow suggestions, it is possible that subjects may have taken the financial 
incentive as a request to go against the situational demands of the experiments and hence act 
against what they perceived to be the objectives of hypnotist. In fact, Levitt and others 
acknowledged non-resisters may well be able to resist in future studies, thanks to modifications 
in ‘cognitive expectations, perceptions of the experimenters, or dimensions of social context’.87 
Therefore, such findings do not disprove the argument that situational demands are likely to drive 
hypnotic movement. Highly hypnotisable people strive to be good hypnotic subjects and that may 
entail creating the experience of being unable to resist the hypnotist, when that is called for by 
situational demands that the subject wishes to satisfy. In turn, this supports the assertion that 
participants retain sufficient control, at least in their capacity to move alternatively or refrain from 
moving. 
Expectations have also played a role in developing theories of hypnosis such as that of ‘cold 
control’, discussed in the previous section. Specifically, when coining the concept of ‘cold 
control’, Dienes and Perner recognised people’s capacity to control subjective experiences so as 
 
83 Eugene E Levitt, Elgan L Baker Jr., and Ronald C Fish, ‘Some Conditions of Compliance and Resistance 
among Hypnotic Subjects’ (1990) 32 American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 225, 232. 
84 ibid.  
85 ibid 233. 
86 Eugene E Levitt and Elgan L Baker, ‘The Hypnotic Relationship - Another Look at Coercion, 
Compliance and Resistance: A Brief Communication’ (1983) 31 International Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis 125, 128. 
87 Levitt and others (n 83) ibid 235. 
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to comply with situational demands, expectations, and/or intentions, describing it as 
‘phenomenological control’.88 Significantly, the ability to shape experience in order to meet 
demand characteristics does not necessarily apply to hypnosis only. For instance, it may play a 
role in cases such as the rubber hand illusion, in which participants’ expectations as to what they 
are about to undergo help shape their perceptions and lead them to claim ownership over an 
artificial hand.89 Similarly, the ability to shape subjective experience can also play a role in cases 
where participants observe people suffering physical pain or simply being touched and then report 
feeling pain (‘vicarious pain’) or experiencing tactile sensation (‘mirror touch synaesthesia’) as if 
it were genuine.90 According to Dienes and others, evidence to this effect is indicative of the fact 
that a subject’s ability to be hypnotised is but one of various contexts in which people can exercise 
phenomenological control.91 For instance, those people who experience vicarious pain or report 
sensations in an artificial hand have been shown to score high on hypnotisability scales, which is 
suggestive of a personal ability to alter one’s perceptions, regardless of whether a hypnotic 
induction is administered or not.92 Therefore, to an extent, hypnosis is not more different than any 
other instance in which someone engages in imaginative experiences and loses the awareness over 
an intention. However, much like dissociative theorists like Hilgard had previously argued, 
regardless of perception, control is maintained.  
From a legal viewpoint, the fact that subjects appear to be influenced much more by situational 
cues rather than the induction itself challenges assumptions such as those surrounding the 
potential for hypnosis to compel individuals to follow instructions blindly. Most importantly for 
the current analysis, the ability to resist suggestions, as shown by the studies discussed so far, 
indicates that there are plenty of circumstances in which subjects can move otherwise, depending 
 
88 Dienes, Lush, and Palfi (n 49) 4. 
89 See Peter Lush, ‘Demand Characteristics Confound the Rubber Hand Illusion’ (2020) 5 Collabra: 
Psychology 22. This well-studied illusion entails subjects observing the rubber hand being stroked with a 
paintbrush at the same time as the real, hidden, hand is stroked, with participants eventually experiencing 
it as if the rubber hand was their real one. For further information, see Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan 
Cohen, ‘Rubber Hands ‘Feel’ Touch that Eyes See’ (1998) 391 Nature 756. 
90 See for example Zoltan Dienes and others, ‘Phenomenological Control as Cold Control: Hypnosis and 
Beyond’ (2020) Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice (forthcoming).   




on what satisfies the experimenter’s objectives as perceived by a subject wishing to satisfy them. 
This is particularly relevant considering that the ability to move otherwise is central to the 
voluntariness model presented in the current analysis. Specifically, that the evidence supports the 
idea that, under a definition of voluntariness as ‘sufficient bodily control’, hypnotic movement 
would be classed as voluntary.  
This idea that hypnotised subjects do not lose control also seems to be supported by research into 
the ability to resist suggestions to perform antisocial or illegal acts, which may go against one’ 
moral code. For instance, Coe and others set out to test whether highly hypnotisable university 
students could be induced to engage in dealing heroin.93 To do so, one experimenter first carried 
out inductions in experimental settings, introducing the suggestion that the participant would enter 
hypnosis upon hearing the verbal cue ‘Go to sleep’.94 Upon completing four sessions, subjects 
were informed that the experiment had finished and they would soon be sent the results of the 
evaluation.95 However, the study had not actually concluded. Unbeknownst to subjects, the 
experimenter and a colleague continued interactions with participants via ‘chance’ meetings on 
the university campus, at which point a request to assist with dealing heroin was presented. While 
one group of highly hypnotisable subjects was not hypnotised, another group was administered 
the ‘Go to sleep’ cue before presenting the request.96 The results showed that six out of fourteen 
non-hypnotised participants and three out of twelve hypnotised ones proceed to sell heroin, thus 
revealing no significant distinction between the two groups.97 Beyond evident ethical concerns 
regarding the conditions in which the study was carried out, the results led the authors to 
 
93 William C Coe, Ken Kobayashi, and Mark L Howard, ‘Experimental and Ethical Problems of Evaluating 
the Influence of Hypnosis in Antisocial Conduct’ (1973) 3 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 476. An earlier 
study by Orne and Evans had shown that hypnotisable subjects could be induced to throw acid in someone’s 
face. See Martin T Orne and Frederick J Evans, ‘Social Control in the Psychological Experiment: Antisocial 
Behavior and Hypnosis’ (1965) 1 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 189.  
94 William C Coe, Ken Kobayashi, and Mark L Howard, ‘Experimental and Ethical Problems of Evaluating 
the Influence of Hypnosis in Antisocial Conduct’ (1973) 3 Journal of Abnormal Psychology 476, 477. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid. In a manner that would certainly fail any ethical approval in present days, the experimenter made 
use of class schedules that had been provided by the participants before embarking on the study. With this 
information, they proceeded to wait around classroom to approach students as if they had accidentally 
bumped into each other.  
97 ibid 479. 
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hypothesise that whether a person engages in antisocial acts depends more on their moral position, 
e.g. their attitudes towards drugs, and potentially on the hypnotist’s exerted influence over the 
subject.98  
For the current analysis, the experiment by Coe and others is relevant in showing that not only 
does hypnosis not compel all participants to commit an offence, but out of those who do, it is 
highly likely that they would have assisted the experimenter regardless of the hypnotic induction. 
Together with the studies discussed so far, this evidence supports a finding of hypnotic movement 
as voluntary under the proposed model of ‘sufficient’ control. In addition, such evidence is also 
relevant as it contradicts the assumptions upon which the law on hypnotic movement operates 
currently. This is because, at the very least, it casts substantial doubt on the blanket categorisation 
of hypnotic movement as involuntary. For instance, even if one took a finding that 50% of 
individuals may not be able to resist a suggestion, as per a literal and non-sceptical reading of 
Levitt and others (contrast Coe and others where the motivations are clearer), this would still 
challenge courts’ and law-makers’ rationalisation of hypnotic movements as involuntary. 
Considering that in Coley, the Court of Appeal adopted the strictest approach to date, limiting 
involuntariness solely to those cases in which control had been completely lost, it is surprising 
that the court cited hypnosis as an example of involuntary movement. This is even more so 
considering that the past few decades have seen a consistent restriction of the application of the 
‘defence’, reducing the doctrine to situations in which the defendant would effectively have to be 
unconscious or moving due to spams or reflexes.99 This stems from the scepticism judges manifest 
when faced with claims of automatism, which can be attributed primarily to the categorisation of 
automatism as a defence, as it puts the onus on the defendant to prove that the movement had 
been voluntary. Surprisingly, the same approach is not applied in the context of hypnosis, even 
though the movements performed whilst hypnotised would fall into a much more ambiguous 
category than some of those addressed by the courts.  
 
98 ibid 480. 
99 See Chapter 1.1.b. 
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3. The Relevance of Hypnotisability 
The literature reviewed in the present case study, particularly that surrounding control and the 
extent to which individuals retain it during hypnosis, has often referenced subjects’ high level of 
hypnotisability. This is because the capacity of the general population to respond to hypnotic 
inductions varies between extremes and can be influenced by aspects such as age, inherited 
abilities, expectations etc.100 Given such differences in population, it is natural that research on 
hypnosis would also address the impact of hypnotisability on responses to suggestions, including 
the extent to which highly hypnotisable subjects differ in their ability to retain executive control 
over their movements.  
However, for present purposes, it is worth noting that the case study need not engage with this 
aspect in further detail. Had the analysis identified compelling evidence for the claim that 
hypnosis does impact subjects’ control, then it would have been problematic for the investigation 
to solely rely on those studies. The reason is that the evidence could not have been extrapolated 
to the average person claiming loss of voluntariness due to hypnosis, in the sense that some people 
may nevertheless retain control during hypnosis. However, considering that the chapter supports 
the argument that even highly hypnotisable individuals retain their capacity to control their 
movements, it is argued that, naturally, lower levels of hypnotisability would not contradict a 
finding of continuing control during hypnosis amongst higher levels.  
 
4. General Implications for the Current Legal Framework 
Whilst the effect of hypnosis on consciousness is not directly relevant to the issue of the 
voluntariness, the legal relevance of hypnosis involving alterations to consciousness may impact 
considerations other than voluntariness. For example, the theories and studies relating to subjects 
potentially losing awareness of moving or intending to move their bodies, or even experiencing a 
 
100 See for example James E Horton and Helen J Crawford, ‘Neurophysiological and Genetic Determinants 
of High Hypnotizability’ in Michael Heap, Richard J Brown and David A Oakley (eds), The Highly 
Hypnotizable Person: Theoretical, Experimental, and Clinical Issues (Routledge 2004)133. 
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feeling of losing control may impact mens rea assessments or the application of defences. For 
instance, despite the initial awareness and intention to follow instructions, ‘cold control’ (and the 
theories of Hilgard, Spanos, and Lynn) acknowledges that a subject may lose awareness of their 
intentions to perform the hypnotic movements.101 This raises questions regarding a subject’s 
capacity to comprehend the circumstances or foresee the consequences of an action. However, it 
is worth mentioning that even though technically, one may claim that a loss of being conscious 
(of an intention or other mental state or movement) due to hypnosis prevented them from 
appreciating what they were doing, it is highly unlikely that this would happen in practice. 
Following studies such as that by Coe and others,102 it appears that even when hypnotised, subjects 
will not act against their character or moral code. More likely is that a person may use hypnosis 
as a pretext to act out behaviours that one would perform regardless.103 To an extent, it could be 
argued that hypnosis shares some similarities with alcohol. For instance, as much as alcohol may 
make one lose their inhibitions, which some may say hypnosis could potentially do, this does not 
mean that a person acts out of character. For instance, much like Dutch courage in criminal law, 
i.e. drinking in order to give oneself courage to commit an offence,104 hypnosis would not bar an 
attribution of blame in this respect.105  
Equally, the evidence explored so far challenges assumptions made by courts in respect of the 
current application of the automatism ‘defence’. Within case law, there are frequent references to 
a lack of consciousness or control as a marker of automatism.106 Drawing from the theories and 
 
101 Dienes and Perner (n 48) 303.  
102 Coe and others (n 93).  
103 The empirical evidence suggests that subjects undergoing hypnosis do not act out of character and are 
still able to process the instructions given by the hypnotist. See for example Michael Nash and Robert 
Nadon, On the impact of the empirical evidence to the legal sphere see James J Lippard, ‘Hypnosis, 
Voluntary Action, and the Law’ (2009) SSRN 1867824, < https://ssrn.com/abstract=1867824> 5 accessed 
02 September 2020; and H B Gibson, ‘Can Hypnosis Compel People to Commit Harmful, Immoral and 
Criminal Acts?: A Review of the Literature’ (1991) 8 Contemporary Hypnosis 129.   
104 Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349. 
105 See Claire Finkelstein, ‘Involuntary Crimes, Voluntarily Committed’ in Stephen Shute and Andrew 
Simester (eds), Criminal Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (OUP 2005) 169. However, one could 
argue that, when it comes to unintentional or unforeseeable offences, while the dangers of drinking alcohol 
are documented and applying prior fault rules is justified, the same could not be said about those who offend 
whilst hypnotised. In other words, while one could foresee that drinking might incapacitate them or make 
them lose inhibitions, the same cannot be said of hypnosis. 
106 See Chapter 2, particularly sections 5 and 6. 
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studies explored in this chapter, it is apparent that a blanket rationalisation of hypnotic movement 
as involuntary is inappropriate, even under models that focused on the awareness or intention to 
move. Whilst the perception of involuntariness is a commonly acknowledged effect of hypnosis, 
as accepted across all theories and research of hypnosis, this does not automatically mean that it 
accompanies every hypnotic experience. For instance, the study by Lynn and others, sought to 
show that expectations on the subjects’ part that their movements will be involuntary are a factor 
in individuals interpreting them as such.107 As much as some subjects may effectively lose 
awareness of their bodily movements (if the suggestion calls for it, such as automatic writing), 
the fact that some do not do so suggests that courts should not blanketly categorise hypnotic 
movement as involuntary, even if rationalising voluntariness by way of consciousness.  
Likewise, in terms of the intentionality of movement in hypnosis, the fact that one is unaware of 
intentions to move does not mean that the movement is not intentional, as least in the way courts 
have referred to goal-directed movement in the context of automatism in driving offences.108 
Here, we could contrast movement like the one addressed in Broome v Perkins,109 which involved 
the defendant driving erratically due to hypoglycaemia, with the one in Book,110 where the 
defendant claimed that he had experienced ‘total amnesia’ and entered ‘a deep trance’ whilst 
driving erratically, still under the hypnotic suggestion.111 Whilst in the former case, the court 
found that the movement had been voluntary due to the defendant moving in a goal-directed 
manner, the latter was found to be involuntary, despite a similarly goal-directed movement.112 
This is not to say that goal-directed movement is relevant for a finding of voluntariness according 
to the control model promoted in the present thesis. However, it is worth noting that even under 
the current approach, if one followed the case law and categorised as voluntary those movements 
 
107 Lynn and others (n 69) 300. 
108 See Chapter 1.1.b, page 12, and Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 9. For further information on intentionality in 
hypnosis, see Dienes and Perner (n 48). 
109 Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321. 
110 R v Book [1999] ABPC 149. 
111 ibid [12]. 
112 It is worth noting that the case of Book was decided in Canada, as opposed to England and Wales. 
However, judging from Coley, the same approach would be taken by courts in England and Wales if faced 
with the issue. 
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appearing to be goal-directed, or performed ‘with skill’,113 this would be hard to reconcile with 
the courts’ categorisation of hypnotic movement as involuntary.  
 
5. Implications for the Proposed Model of Voluntariness 
So far, the present chapter has sought to identify whether people who undergo hypnosis are able 
to retain sufficient control over their bodily movements to the effect that they can move otherwise, 
in line with the proposed model of voluntariness. Despite the varied conceptualisations of 
hypnosis and the continued debate surrounding its nature, the empirical evidence is consistent in 
supporting the argument that subjects can move alternatively. In other words, control is retained 
during hypnosis. Whether hypnosis can be associated with altered states of consciousness, or 
simply relates to behavioural changes designed to fulfil the role of a good hypnotic responder, 
those who undergo hypnosis do not experience any impairment to control functions, as they retain 
control over their bodily movements. Even in the case of the most hypnotisable individuals, the 
perception of involuntariness does not entail an actual lack of voluntariness. For example, subjects 
can even resist the suggestions of the hypnotist when this suits the context, such as when, prior to 
being hypnotised, they are instructed that a successful response to suggestions entails resisting to 
them. From a legal standpoint, this capacity to move otherwise challenges assumptions made by 
courts as to the involuntariness of hypnotic movements. When a sceptical approach has been 
consistently taken as to different types of allegedly involuntary movement such as that under 
hypoglycaemia, the categorisation of hypnotic movements as involuntary is even more surprising. 
The contradictory approach that courts adopt should not be viewed in light of hypnosis research 
only. Certainly, empirical evidence surrounding the nature of hypnosis, as well as a better 
understanding from the public surrounding the meaning of it, should act as a first indication that 
hypnotic movements do not fit within categories of movements as straightforward as spasms or 
reflexes. At the same time, the present case study should serve as a further reminder of why it is 
 
113 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, 287 (Pearson J). 
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important to implement a clear definition of voluntariness. Having decided that a control model 
is best suited to reflecting the essence of voluntary movement in law, it is then easier to assess 
different types of movements against this yardstick, be it hypnotic movements, hypoglycaemia 
etc. Adopting a consistent approach across types of movements would ensure a fair application 
of the law and remove the need for arbitrary categorisations based on stereotypes and myths.  
At the same time, the fact that no impairments to control mechanisms occur during hypnosis does 
not bring us any closer to resolving the fundamental limitation to adopting a ‘sufficient control’ 
model of voluntariness. This is because the evidence points at a full retention of control during 
hypnosis, thereby removing ambiguity in terms of the threshold at which any potential impairment 
is sufficient to render a person unable to move otherwise. Equally, even in the case of Woody and 
Bowers’ model of ‘dissociated control’, which did argue that alterations to control occurred 
during hypnosis, the evidence is inconclusive in terms of the relevant threshold at which control 
is lost. Whilst this model would have hypnosis rendering individuals unable to engage in new or 
complex movements, this does not mean that all routine or habitual movement performed whilst 
hypnotised lacks control.114 As such, the discussion so far does not necessarily help fill in the gap 
regarding the appropriate threshold for one losing sufficient control.  
Likewise, it is worth acknowledging a reasonable counterargument to the categorisation of 
hypnotised individuals as voluntary, specifically in terms of the fairness of doing so in the absence 
of a perception of self-control. This is a valid concern, which could easily be extrapolated to the 
control model overall, considering the relinquishing of the role of consciousness or intention 
within the voluntariness requirement. However, as argued throughout the thesis, the legal 
requirement operates as a prerequisite for an agent to be subjected to relevant actus reus or mens 
rea assessments and is not concerned with a person’s ability to assess circumstances or potential 
effects. That is, whilst fundamental to criminalising individuals for harmful actions, it is only 
once a person has been attributed with a particular bodily movement and been deemed voluntary 
 




that the law should then move on to assess the circumstances or effects of the movement and the 
accompanying mental state. When a subject acts under a state of hypnosis, a lack of awareness or 
intention on the agent’s behalf could well produce evidence for a lack of mens rea, thus allowing 
the criminal law to make adjustments and avoid a potential injustice being committed. However, 
for a finding of voluntariness, which is the focus of the present thesis, it is argued that this aspect 
does not pose a challenge. The same would also apply to claims that a person might have been 
induced to commit a crime, which would not pose a challenge to a finding of voluntariness, but 
simply provide an excuse of duress (an authority pressing one to perform an act can be influential 
quite apart from whether the situation is hypnotic).  
 
6. Conclusion  
The present chapter has analysed evidence surrounding the extent to which individuals 
undergoing hypnosis retain control over their bodily movements, in order to apply the control 
model of voluntariness promoted in the present thesis to hypnotic movement. Whilst the case 
study is limited in its ability to produce a comprehensive analysis of all existing theories and 
empirical evidence on hypnosis, it is argued that there is sufficient support for a categorisation of 
hypnotic movements as voluntary. Specifically, by addressing evidence from competing factions 
of hypnosis research, it is apparent that despite fundamental distinctions in the rationalisation of 
hypnosis, there is a consensus surrounding the fact that the process does not impair control 
functions, with subjects fully retaining their ability to move otherwise. Therefore, the evidence 
strongly suggests that, following the proposed voluntariness model based on exercising sufficient 
bodily control to move otherwise, hypnotic movements should be legally categorised as 
voluntary.  
Equally, the rejection of hypnotic movements as involuntary challenges the approach taken by 
courts and law-making bodies in multiple common law jurisdictions, i.e. that of describing them 
as involuntary. This could be attributed to wider societal preconceptions surrounding the nature 
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of hypnosis but may also potentially rest on judges’ use of consciousness as a way to describe the 
voluntariness requirement. However, as analysed throughout the chapter, hypnosis does not lead 
to a loss of control and should not be categorised as involuntary. Moreover, regardless of the 
effects on consciousness and perception, in the unlikely event that someone would be hypnotically 
induced to commit a crime or would lose awareness over their bodily movements, this would not 
matter for an assessment of voluntariness. At best, such factors might contribute to provide an 





1. Significance of Study  
The present thesis began with the following question: ‘How should voluntariness be defined in 
the context of criminal responsibility?’. Starting from the premise that the way in which the law 
has addressed the issue of voluntariness has been conceptually and practically problematic, the 
analysis has focused on proposing a standard of voluntariness that should be applied first in all 
assessments of criminal responsibility. That is, rather than disengaging from the issue or arguing 
that ‘the answer is far from simple’,1 the thesis has addressed the complexities of the notion of 
voluntariness and has sought to develop a working definition of voluntariness in law. This 
definition would precede any actus reus and mens rea analysis relevant to each offence, as well 
as potential defence considerations. In this way, this study has argued against tackling issues 
relating to defendants’ voluntariness using doctrines such as automatism or insanity. Instead, any 
assessment should start by asking whether the defendant was voluntary to begin with, before being 
attributed with an offence. This approach would reflect the essential role of voluntariness as the 
minimum requirement of criminal responsibility, promoting the autonomy and agency of the 
actor. Moreover, it would ensure consistency within criminal law and enhance legal certainty. 
Drawing from philosophical theories of action and neuroscientific research, the thesis has 
identified bodily movements, as opposed to wider consequences or circumstances, as the target 
of the requirement of voluntariness. Exploring alternative conceptualisations, it has been argued 
that the most suitable standard of voluntariness would be one framed in terms of bodily control, 
that is, as the exercise of sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can move otherwise.   
This thesis supports the view that that the doctrine of automatism should be abolished, with the 
law instead introducing a definition of voluntariness based on control. However, the study does 
 
1 Ryan [1967] HCA 2, [18] (Windeyer J). 
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not claim to promote a model that is perfect in every respect, as normative and descriptive 
challenges remain. At the same time, the analysis is significant in producing an original definition 
of voluntariness that does not relate the concept back to examples or descriptions of involuntary, 
rather than voluntary movement. Instead of arguing that a spasm, reflex, etc. is not voluntary, the 
thesis has produced a comprehensive definition applicable to any movement or lack of movement2 
that the criminal law should take interest in. In this respect, the thesis has sought to address the 
problematic issues prompted by the voluntariness requirement’s lack of legal definition. The 
current absence of conceptualisation within the criminal legal framework risks negatively 
impacting legal certainty and fairness, with a potential for over-criminalisation in the absence of 
adequately enshrined standards, applicable to all categories of cases. Respect for agency and 
autonomy should take precedence over any apprehension from courts that defendants may abuse 
the system or introduce ‘imaginary’ claims. Such concerns do not warrant addressing the issue of 
voluntariness under the remit of excusatory defences, when what is lacking is a definitional 
element.  
Beyond the legal significance of the study, which is that of promoting clarity and consistency 
within the framework, the contribution of the study also extends to methodological 
considerations. Specifically, the analysis has sought to connect traditional methods of legal 
research with theoretical insights, methods and techniques from the disciplines of philosophy and 
neuroscience. Integrating elements from the philosophy of action and cognitive neuroscience, a 
primary objective has been that of positioning the recommended model on a strong theoretical 
and empirical footing. That is, broadening the scope of the analysis has allowed for the issue of 
voluntariness to be explored within a wider conceptual framework, engaging with combinations 
of disciplinary perspectives, thus enabling the better identification of the most appropriate answer 
to the primary research question. Such an extension of the analysis has not only facilitated the 
development of a strong argument, but has also served to showcase the advantages and impact of 
conducting multi and interdisciplinary legal research. For instance, exploring multiple 
 
2 In the case of omissions.  
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conceptualisations of action within philosophy has opened up questions which the criminal law 
should engage with further. Such questions relate to the basis for criminal responsibility, for 
instance, whether it would be enough to criminalise people on the basis of their impression of 
freedom as opposed to their actual freedom, the challenge of determinism for the concept of agent 
causation, and so on.  
Engaging with empirical research from the field of cognitive neuroscience, the thesis has also 
contributed to the development of research within the growing field of ‘neurolaw’ research, which 
explores the effects of discoveries in neuroscience on legal rules.3 Certain limitations apply in 
respect to any attempt to incorporate neuroscience into the law, such as the inability to 
conclusively rely on correlations, for instance in linking a cognitive process to a certain 
behavioural output.4 However, for the purposes of testing assumptions and gaining insight into 
those faculties or capacities which are not visible to the naked eye, but nevertheless essential in 
initiating and regulating movement, neuroscientific evidence has proved significant. The level of 
voluntariness and control that relates to movement has been fundamental for both disciplines of 
law and neuroscience, for instance in terms of ascribing criminal responsibility and understanding 
the biological mechanisms underlying human action. Analysing existing research on the nature 
of voluntary movement and the way in which we restrain or inhibit our movements has added an 
important empirical layer to the legal investigation, primarily in terms of our underlying 
cognition.  
Equally, developing a case study based on hypnosis theory and studies has further contributed to 
showcasing the potential for incorporating research from disciplines other than law. This has been 
the case particularly in the context of the lack of engagement with the nature of hypnotic 
movements within legal literature. Exploring the status of such movements from this external 
perspective has provided an additional empirical footing to legal assumptions, filling a gap in 
knowledge, and developing further neurolaw research. Most importantly, relying on existing 
 
3 For further information on neurolaw research, see Arian Petoft, ‘Neurolaw: A Brief Introduction’ (2015) 
14 Iran J Neurol 53.  
4 For further detail, see Section 4 of this chapter.  
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hypnosis research has facilitated the application of the proposed model within a practical setting, 
fully exploring the implications and benefits of implementing the recommended definition. 
Having addressed the significance of the present thesis, it is important to explore the practical 
implications of the proposed model, before summarising the findings and acknowledging their 
limitations, as well as making recommendations to law-making bodies.  
 
2. Practical Implications of the Proposed Model   
a. The Impact of a Statutory Definition of Voluntariness on the Existing Case 
Law 
The present thesis has focused on developing a statutory definition of voluntariness that should 
be applied as the first stage in any criminal assessment, as a pre-condition of criminal 
responsibility. In this respect, the thesis argues for the abolition of the automatism and insanity 
(as it relates to voluntariness) ‘defences’ and the introduction of a legal definition of voluntariness, 
to be applied in criminal responsibility assessments, as an element of an offence. As emphasised 
throughout the analysis, the classification of (in)sane automatism as a ‘defence’ is conceptually 
inappropriate, as it implies that the elements of an offence have been fulfilled, but that the 
defendant should be excused for a seeming lack of capacity. However, a lack of voluntariness 
goes beyond mere impairments to one’s capacity to act rationally or to understand the 
circumstances or consequences of their actions. Instead, it denies a basic element of an offence 
and bars any attribution from occurring in the first place. In the case of involuntariness, the agent, 
‘the only intelligible object of act attribution’, is dropped out of the assessment and the resulting 
harm is categorised as caused by the specific type of involuntariness, such as 
hypo/hyperglycaemia, a seizure etc., rather than the agent themselves.5 As criminal responsibility 
is attached to the relevant agent causing a particular harm or set of circumstances, then no liability 
can arise. Therefore, in contrast with excusatory defences, where the defendant generally admits 
 
5 Jeffrie G Murphy, ‘Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability’ (1971) 81 Ethics 332, 341. See also Ian P 
Farrell and Justin F Marceau, ‘Taking Voluntariness Seriously’ (2013) BCLRev 1545, 1569. 
173 
 
that ‘they got it wrong’ and that they were unable to exercise the capacity for ‘rational 
deliberation’,6 a lack of voluntariness shows that there is nothing to get wrong to begin with, for 
there is no (lack of) movement to attribute to the defendant. 
While the doctrines of automatism and insanity would be abolished, with a statutory definition of 
voluntariness being introduced to occupy the role that these ‘defences’ had had, one could argue 
that it may still be possible to rely on existing case law. That is, in order to interpret the statutory 
definition of voluntariness based on the ability to move otherwise, it may be possible to rely on 
existing case law associating involuntariness with a lack of control. For instance, courts could 
resort to guidance provided in cases such as Coley, which defined automatism as a ‘complete 
destruction of voluntary control’.7 This would be similar to the approach taken in relation to other 
statutory definitions, such as consent. While the definition of consent is enshrined in s.74 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA),8 pre-SOA law can still prove persuasive when it comes to 
exploring the meaning of concepts such as ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and ‘capacity’.9 However, this is 
not the approach that should be taken in the case of a statutory definition of voluntariness. This is 
because, under the proposed model, it would be possible for a person to lose voluntariness even 
where control had not been completely destroyed, in contradiction with Coley. Moreover, the 
primary justification for developing a definition of voluntariness has been to produce a uniform 
standard and address issues caused by existing case law. These range from the varying approach 
taken depending on trigger leading to involuntariness and the lack of clarification as to the 
meaning and significance of voluntariness, to the undue emphasis on the moral blameworthiness 
of the defendant. To allow courts to rely on existing case law to interpret the definition would go 
against the purpose of introducing a statutory definition. Naturally, while clarity and consistency 
is to be sought, it is acknowledged that the proposed definition runs the risk of being incomplete, 
 
6 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
287. 
7 R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233.  
8 ‘For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity 




like any statutory instrument,10 thus requiring courts to develop a body of law that interprets the 
said legislation. For instance, the thesis has identified a number of limitations surrounding the 
proposed definition, such as the fact that the threshold at which one can no longer exercise 
sufficient control is unique to every individual, thus leading to potential issues in ascertaining 
voluntariness.11 However, it is argued that any interpretation of the definition should be carried 
out independently of previous case law, but instead look to align with the meaning of 
voluntariness, as explored in the present study.12 
 
b. The Impact of a Statutory Definition of Voluntariness on the Burden of 
Proof  
From an evidential perspective, it could be argued that the most appropriate way of establishing 
voluntariness under the proposed statutory definition would be to demand that the prosecution 
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt in any criminal trial. In other words, given that voluntariness 
is a precondition to criminal responsibility, it should always be the prosecution’s task to 
demonstrate it. To do otherwise and require the defendant to raise the issue, even if only to satisfy 
an evidential burden, would mean that, once again, the focus would be placed on the 
involuntariness of the defendant, rather than their voluntariness. Moreover, it could invite policy 
considerations into the assessment, continuing to place an emphasis on the defendant’s moral 
culpability or the need to defend against false claims.13 
At the same time, from a practical standpoint, putting the onus on the prosecution to establish 
voluntariness in every criminal responsibility assessment may be too burdensome and lead to a 
 
10 Eben Moglen and Richard J Pierce, Jr., ‘Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory 
Interpretation’ (1990) 57 The University of Chicago Law Review 1203, 1205: ‘incompleteness is an 
essential feature of any system of statutory construction’. 
11 See Chapter 4. 
12 Explanatory Notes would also assist courts with interpreting the statute.  
13 For further information on evidential rules and the need to protect against false claims, see Chapter 1.1.b. 
Naturally, prior fault would have to be considered, but not in the decision as to whether the defendant was 




disproportionately high impact on the prosecution’s resources. In this context, it is worth briefly 
considering issues of evidence and proof attached to voluntariness and the way in which the 
statutory definition would be applied in practice. While the present thesis has focused primarily 
on developing a definition of voluntariness, rather than on the operation of the definition, this 
aspect should be explored, in light of the present study’s recommendation to abolish the 
automatism and insanity (as it relates to voluntariness) rules. 
Under the current rules, the defendant bears an evidential burden to raise the issue of 
involuntariness in cases of automatism, and a legal burden to prove involuntariness on the balance 
of probabilities, in cases of insanity.14 Practically, asking the defendant to produce ‘some’ 
evidence as to their involuntariness is not necessarily contentious,15 as long as it is acknowledged 
that the ultimate burden of proving voluntariness rests of the prosecution. This would make it 
more feasible and efficient for prosecutions to take place, given that, in the vast majority of cases, 
it can reasonably be inferred that the defendant had the physical ability to move otherwise. 
However, such a burden should be imposed in relation to a lack of voluntariness as a definitional 
element, as opposed to a claim of automatism, in light of the ‘defence’ being abolished. This 
would remove existing concerns surrounding the co-existence of the requirement of voluntariness 
and the ‘defence’ of automatism, including potential issues regarding the prosecution having to 
prove different levels of voluntariness according to the claim in question.16 Compared to the 
current automatism and insanity rules, this approach would ensure that the movement in question 
is assessed against a uniform standard of voluntariness, irrespective of the trigger leading to a 
potential lack of voluntariness, which would contribute to legal consistency. 
Equally, in contrast with the current burden of proof of insanity on the defendant, it is argued that 
there should be no legal burden of proof placed on defendants, at least where this concerns the 
 
14 For further information see Chapter 1.1.b. 
15 According to Allen, Taylor and Nairs, evidential burdens are seen as rules of ‘common sense’, 
according to which ‘there must be some evidence in existence for a particular issue to become worthy of 
consideration by a jury or other tribunal of fact’ (emphasis in text) See Christopher Allen, Chris Taylor, 
and Janice Nairns, Practical Guide to Evidence (5th edn, Routledge 2016) 142. 
16 For further information see Chapter 1.1.b. 
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issue of voluntariness. The fact that defendants are presently required to prove, albeit on the 
balance of probabilities, that they were ‘insane’, despite the absence of voluntariness, is 
inappropriate. This is because it should be up to the prosecution to prove the elements of the 
offence, in line with the presumption of innocence.17 In as much as a claim of insanity concerns 
a lack of voluntariness, there should be no expectation on the defendant to prove a definitional 
element of an offence. Whether someone was not able to tell right from wrong, to understand their 
actions, or to form rational decisions goes beyond satisfying the elements of an offence. It implies 
that the offence can be attributed to the defendant, but that it may nevertheless not be just to 
criminalise that person or to cast blame upon them. In contrast, when it comes to voluntariness, it 
should not be up to the defendant to prove their lack of ability to move otherwise, but for the 
prosecution to show that defendant moved voluntarily. 
In this context, the thesis acknowledges that, while an evidential burden could be imposed on the 
defendant,18 the prosecution should ultimately bear a legal burden of proving voluntariness as an 
element of the offence, applying the proposed definition. That is, once the defence submits 
evidence of a potential impairment to control mechanisms, which a judge may deem worthy of 
consideration by the jury, it should be up to the prosecution to establish that the defendant had 
moved voluntarily. Such an approach may alleviate some concerns surrounding ‘false claims’, 
while still reducing the potential for over-criminalisation, given the application of a consistent 
standard that should be applied irrespective of the moral culpability of the defendant. Moreover, 
it should be noted that, in contrast with the existing rules on automatism and insanity, the 
presumption to be rebutted should be one of voluntariness, as opposed to one of mental capacity 
 
17 The present discussion relates primarily to insane automatism, as opposed to insanity as a whole, for 
insanity also applies to the category of cases in which defendants were voluntary and committed the actus 
reus and mens rea of the offence, but should be excused to their condition. However, criticism of the reverse 
burden of proof could be extended to the entirety of the insanity rules, primarily in light of the presumption 
of innocence. See Chapter 1.1.b. 
18 The Law Commission has proposed an ‘elevated’ evidential burden of proof in its reformulated defence 
of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of recognised medical condition’, according to which ‘the accused 
must adduce evidence from two experts’, with the prosecution being required to disprove the defence one 
raised. This thesis argues against this approach, considering that it would put a burden akin to that of 
insanity on the defendant. This would go against the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the 
prosecution prove all element of an offence. See law Commission (n ) para 8.50. 
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or sanity.19 While considerations surrounding one’s capacity to tell right from wrong or to 
understand what they are doing are relevant, these should relate to findings of mens rea or the 
application of a defence, rather than a finding of voluntariness. Since the statutory definition 
proposed in this thesis is based around one’s physical ability to move otherwise or refrain from 
moving, such associations should be avoided and the presumption to be applied should be one of 
voluntariness.  
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that, even with a presumption of voluntariness in 
place, as well as an evidential burden on the defendant, the prosecution may be faced with an 
onerous task in proving the voluntariness of the defendant. One such example relates to those 
borderline cases in which movements may appear to be executed freely, but could not actually 
have been produced any differently. This could be a person having a hypoglycaemia fit behind 
the wheel, like the defendant in Broome v Perkins.20 This is a limitation that has been 
acknowledged in this study, for the dividing line between voluntariness and involuntariness may 
well differ from person to person.21 Moreover, where such conditions are transient, it may not be 
possible to definitively show whether a person was voluntary or not at a previous point in time.22 
Therefore, it may not always be immediately clear whether one had lost the ability to move 
otherwise or not. However, it is argued that some of the limitations identified would be alleviated 
by consulting expert evidence surrounding impairments to control mechanisms.23 Given the focus 
of the requirement of voluntariness on the physical ability to move otherwise, evidence sought 
from expert witnesses would not need to relate solely to the impact of certain medical conditions. 
 
19 See Chapter 1.1.b. 
20 Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321. Here, the defendant had been driving erratically, but was 
found not to be automatic as they were still able to move in a ‘goal-directed’ manner.  
21 See Chapter 4.2.b, page 139. 
22 However, this limitation is already present within the current framework, considering that under 
automatism and insanity rules, it is equally difficult to ascertain whether the defendant had been involuntary 
at the time of the alleged offence. In this respect, the proposed model is not any more limited than the 
current one. 
23 For a history of the role of expert knowledge in criminal law, as well as the conflict between such 
evidence and ‘lay’ knowledge, see Arlie Loughnan and Tony Ward, ‘Emergent Authority and Expert 
Knowledge: Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility in the UK’ (2014) 37 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry 25; and Jennifer Mnookin, ‘Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History 
of Expert Evidence (2007) 52 Villanova Law Review 101. 
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External triggers that have currently been addressed under the rules of ‘sane’ automatism could 
also be subjected to scrutiny in respect to their ability to impair control mechanisms.24 Moreover, 
in contrast to present rules, expert knowledge may be more informative given that the proposed 
model relies solely on the physical ability to move otherwise, which is objectively easier to 
ascertain compared to impairments to consciousness, ability to reason etc. 
 
c. The Use of Disposal Powers in Cases of Involuntary Movement 
Under the current framework, defendants suffering from involuntariness due to a physical or 
mental condition are subjected to the insanity rules, with restrictions being imposed on such 
defendants, in accordance with the level of danger they may pose to society.25 This thesis argues 
that the implementation of the proposed definition of voluntariness would abolish the insanity 
rules as they relate to an absence of voluntariness. In turn, some may argue that the public would 
be put at risk, given that the abolition of the rules would affect the application of disposal powers 
that would normally follow a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.26  However, this need 
not be the case. The rules on insanity, as they currently stand, have already been subjected to 
extensive criticism within the legal literature, both for their outdated language and illogical 
distinctions.27 That is, regardless of the application of the proposed definition, the insanity rules 
are already in urgent need of revision and modernisation. In this respect, the present analysis does 
not challenge the Law Commission’s proposal to reform the insanity rules. In as much as the issue 
 
24 The oft-cited example is that of a swarm of bees entering one’s car and causing them to swerve whilst 
driving. See Kay v Butterworth (1945) 61 TLR 452. 
25 See Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s.5. Such restrictions range from an absolute discharge to 
being detained in a hospital. 
26 Concern with dangerousness is a long-standing theme within the doctrine of insanity. According to 
Loughnan, the construction of those pleading insanity as dangerous has been ‘a driving force for most of 
the developments regarding the insanity doctrine’, from the creation of disposal powers to the reliance on 
expert witnesses and the separation between automatism and insanity. See Loughnan (n 7) 104; and Arlie 
Loughnan, ‘Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law’ (2012) 15 New Criminal Law Review 1, 18; 
and Arlie Loughnan, ‘“Manifest Madness”: Towards a New Understanding of the Insanity Defence’ (2007) 
70 MLR 379, 399.  
27 For a comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding the insanity rules, see Law Commission (n 12) 
1.30 – 1.69. See also R D Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (OUP 1995) Chapter 




of insanity arises where a defendant moved voluntarily, but could not fully appreciate the 
circumstances or consequences of their movements due to a medical condition, be it physical or 
mental, the thesis supports a reformed defence of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of 
recognised medical condition’.28 In such instances, disposal powers already available to courts 
under present rules would continue to apply.29 At the same time, this analysis disagrees with the 
application of such a ‘defence’ in cases where a medical condition leads to involuntariness, as 
opposed to a misappreciation of one’s surrounding, consequences of actions etc.30 This is because, 
with voluntariness, there are no elements of the offence that have been committed to begin with 
and no attribution should attach to the defendant.  
Nonetheless, from a public protection standpoint, whether a particular harmful event or set of 
circumstances was caused by an involuntary movement may be considered immaterial if the 
public is put at risk. As such, it would be expected that the disposal powers currently applicable 
in the case of insanity would continue to be available where a medical condition causes 
involuntariness. Such powers include an absolute discharge, i.e. release, a supervision order or a 
hospital order.31 The thesis does not challenge such an approach and supports the view that 
disposal powers would also be available where the requirement of voluntariness is not met, as 
opposed to an outright acquittal. In this respect, an amendment to s. 5(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity) Act 1964 should be made to extend the application of disposal powers to those cases in 
 
28 For a full discussion on how the defence would be implemented, See Law Commission (n 12) Chapter 3. 
One scenario in which a non-medical condition may lead to similar effects is hypnosis, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. Here, it could be argued that while voluntary, such movements are not triggered 
by a medical condition the defendant may be excluded from the defence. However, as stated by the Law 
Commission, what will be regarded as a ‘recognised medical condition’ is a question of law, rather than 
medicine. Such a concept is ‘a term of art’ which must be interpreted by the court. While intoxication and 
personality disorders have been excluded by the Commission, it is argued that hypnosis leading to 
impairments to consciousness could be included within the remit of the proposed defence. As noted in 
previous chapter however, it is extremely unlikely that hypnotised individuals will ever act against their 
moral character and would commit an offence regardless of whether they are hypnotised. See Law 
Commission (n 12) para 1.88; and Chapter 4.4 of this thesis. 
29 Law Commission (n 12) para 3.23.  
30 The same argument can be made in relation to a lack of mens rea and not just a lack of voluntariness. 
Guidance provided by the Crime Prosecution Service has made clear that insanity does not signify an 
absence of mens rea. See Crown Prosecution Service, Mental Health Conditions and Disorders: Draft 
Prosecution Guidance (March 2019). Available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/mental-health-
conditions-and-disorders-draft-prosecution-guidance (accessed 23.02.2021).  
31 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s.5. For further information on the various disposals following 
the special verdict, see Law Commission (n 12) paras 4.144- 4.157. 
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which a person’s lack of voluntariness is at risk of reoccurring.32 However, what is important is 
that a clear distinction is made between a loss of voluntariness and an impairment to one’s ability 
to act rationally, appreciate the wrongfulness of their behaviour etc. Whereas one reflects a 
missing element of an offence, the other excuses or exempts the defendant for an act that can be 
otherwise attributed to them.  
Such an approach would also provide further reassurance that removing the existing distinction 
between internal and external triggers leading to involuntariness would not pose a risk to the wider 
society. Where the relevant impairment to control mechanisms is dangerous and/or is likely to 
reoccur, courts would be able to impose disposal powers, without the need to stretch legal 
concepts and categorise cases into either automatism or insanity. The possibility of imposing such 
powers would also allow for a more consistent application of the definition of voluntariness, for 
there would be no need to take policy considerations into account when the initial finding of 
voluntariness is made. Moreover, given oft-cited arguments relating to the need to protect against 
‘bogus claims’,33 it could be argued that the potential for disposal powers to be imposed may 
serve to prevent defendants from claiming that they had been involuntary at the time of the alleged 
offence.  
 
d. The Role of Prior Fault  
One important role to consider is that of prior fault and the blameworthiness of a defendant when 
they lack voluntariness, for courts often adjust the stringency of their approach to issues of 
voluntariness according to the perceived culpability of the defendant.34 The inconsistency in 
approaches has contributed to much confusion surrounding the status and conceptualisation of 
voluntariness in law. This has been a primary reason behind promoting the application of the same 
 
32 Currently, s. 5(1) states that disposal apply where ‘(a) a special verdict is returned that the accused is not 
guilty by reason of insanity; or (b) findings have been made that the accused is under a disability and that 
he did the act or made the omission charged against him.’ It is argued that a lack of voluntariness should 
also be included in this section. 
33 Loughnan (n ) 163. 
34 See Chapter 2, Sections 4, 9, and 10, on trigger slips, dangerous and non-dangerous intoxicants.  
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definition of voluntariness in all criminal assessments. However, when it comes to prior fault, 
culpably causing the conditions for one’s loss of voluntariness should nevertheless continue to 
play a part in the framework. Specifically, just as the rules of prior fault intoxication currently 
operate to construct liability in the absence of mens rea, the same can apply in the case of a 
missing element of voluntariness.  
At the same time, it is worth highlighting the conceptual challenges that are currently present 
within the legal framework surrounding prior fault, in order to better emphasise how the proposed 
model should be applied where the defendant is to blame for their loss of voluntariness. Currently, 
there are a number of issues surrounding the application of prior fault automatism, which  relate 
primarily to the requisite level of foresight from the defendant that a loss of voluntariness may 
ensue.35 Whereas with alcohol or other dangerous drugs, it may be expected that the dangers of 
ingesting such substances are well known, this is not necessarily the case with non-dangerous 
drugs that may give rise to a loss of bodily control. Under the current rules of automatism, courts 
have not been sufficiently clear on the approach to take, referring to a requirement of both 
objective and subjective foresight. Following Quick, the prior fault rules would apply where the 
loss of voluntariness ‘could have reasonably been foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting 
to do something’.36 Equally, following Bailey, it is only if there had been awareness of a potential 
risk, but the defendant had deliberately disregarded it, that prior fault rules would apply.37 This 
problematic aspect of the law has been subjected to extensive criticism within the literature, 
including from the Law Commission in its report on automatism and insanity.38 At the very least, 
a defendant who lacked voluntariness due to unforeseen effects of certain prescription drugs or 
medical conditions should not be placed in a worse position that those who are consume alcohol 
or illegal drugs, the effects of which are widely known. In this respect, the analysis agrees that a 
 
35 See Chapter 2.9-10.  
36 R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 922 (Lawton LJ).  
37 R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760, 765 (Griffiths LJ). Here, Griffiths LJ highlighted that, in contrast with 
alcohol or drug 
38 Law Commission (n 12) paras 6. See also Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability: Law 
Com No 314 (2009); and R D Mackay, ‘Intoxication as a Factor in Automatism’ [1982] CrimLR 146. 
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subjective level of foresight should be expected from defendants in relation to a potential 
impairment to bodily control mechanisms.     
Nevertheless, implementing the proposed model does not necessarily alleviate existing issues 
with the current prior fault ‘automatism’ rules. This is because such issues have also been 
amplified by the debate as to whether the distinction between basic and specific intent offences 
made in prior fault intoxication is to be applied in prior fault involuntariness as well. That is, it is 
not clear whether the substitution can only happen in relation to basic intent offences, which 
generally require recklessness as a mens rea element, in contrast with specific intent offences, 
which primarily involve intention or knowledge.39 As Mackay emphasises, if a defendant like 
Quick is prosecuted for a specific intent offence, they could be found at fault for not following 
their doctor’s instruction, whereas their ‘intoxicated counterpart’ would only be prosecuted for a 
crime of basic intent.40 Naturally, a clearer and most likely fairer approach would be to limit prior 
fault involuntariness to basic intent offences as well.41 At the very least, a culpable loss of 
voluntariness should not be used to construct the missing element of voluntariness in specific 
intent offences, with the requisite level of foresight of loss of voluntariness being a subjective 
one.  
However, one scenario of prior fault involuntariness which is worth discussing briefly relates to 
cases in which the loss of voluntariness would be premeditated at T1 and instigated with a view 
to move involuntarily at T2 and achieve a particular set of circumstances or results. Take the 
following far-fetched example. A person may be aware that they become violent in their sleep 
 
39 See Lipman [1970] 1 QB and DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 in relation to voluntary conduct and 
intoxication, respectively. The distinction has been extensively criticised for the lack of specificity and 
confusion caused as to what counts as a basic and specific intent offence.  
40 Mackay (n 37) 155. The defendant in Quick forgot to eat after taking insulin and subsequently 
experienced a hypoglycaemic episode behind the wheel. For further information, see Chapter 2.9. 
41 One may argue that the distinction between basic and specific intent offences should be abolished 
altogether, considering the confusion it can give rise to. This is particularly relevant with a loss of 
voluntariness, for what is lacking is not mens rea necessarily, but voluntariness, which is a separate concern 
that, the present thesis has argued, must precede any actus reus or mens rea assessments. See also Law 
Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability: Law Com No 314 (2009) para 1.28: ‘this distinction is 
ambiguous, misleading and confusing, and [that] it should be abandoned’. For a more general critique of 
prior fault rules, see J J Child, ‘Prior Fault: Blocking Defences or Constructing Crimes’ in Alan Reed and 
Michael Bohlander (eds), General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives 
(Ashgate 2014) 46. 
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and take advantage of this propensity by placing a blunt instrument under their bed, in the hope 
that they kill their partner in their sleep.42 This scenario should not raise questions in regards to 
the defendant’s liability for murder, regardless of whether such offence is a basic or specific intent 
one, or whether the loss of voluntariness is caused by an intoxicant or not. In this respect, prior 
fault operates to construct an offence, in the absence of the requisite element of voluntariness.43 
Such an example resembles that of ‘Dutch courage’ under prior fault intoxication, whereby 
inducing a state of intoxication, in order to facilitate committing an offence, would not constitute 
a ‘defence’ to specific intention offences.44 The thesis promotes the extension of the principle to 
issues of voluntariness, in the sense that an agent who deliberately causes the conditions of their 
involuntariness should be liable for the full offence.  
 
3. Summary of Findings 
Having emphasised the importance and practical application of the proposed model, it is 
important to reiterate the main findings of the present thesis, before acknowledging the limitations 
of the thesis and issuing recommendations to law-making bodies. Analysing the implications of 
addressing one’s voluntariness solely when this is challenged, the first chapter disagreed with 
legal frameworks concentrating on the issue of involuntariness, rather than voluntariness. 
Specifically, the Introduction highlighted that it is inappropriate for an alleged lack of 
voluntariness to be analysed in the context of a defence. In other words, automatism and insanity 
(as it relates to the issue of voluntariness) are not defences, but rather a reflection of a case in 
which an element of liability has not been fulfilled. Beyond the importance of adequate labelling, 
it was argued that addressing the issue of voluntariness in the context of a defence worsens the 
legal confusion and lack of clarity surrounding the meaning and application of the requirement. 
 
42 A similar example is explored by Finkelstein. See Claire Finkelstein, ‘Involuntary Crimes, Voluntarily 
Committed’ in Stephen Shute and Andrew Simester (eds), Criminal Theory: Doctrines of the General Part 
(OUP 2005) 143. 
43 Child (n 40) 39. 
44 See Attorney General of Northern Ireland v Gallagher (Patrick) [1963] AC 349 (Lord Denning). 
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No person should be held criminally responsible unless the law is sufficiently clear and certain to 
allow them to ascertain what conduct is forbidden before they engage in it.45 As the minimum 
ingredient of criminal responsibility, it is imperative that the voluntariness requirement is 
accurately enshrined in law and defined, for the purposes of clarity and consistency. Equally 
concerning is that in the absence of definition, such an approach risks over-criminalisation, in the 
context of courts attempting to limit potential abuses from morally blameworthy individuals. 
Instead, care should be taken to ensure that an element of the offence has been completed. Against 
this background, the Introduction emphasised the urgent need for the criminal law to employ a 
legal definition of voluntariness.  
Addressing categories of cases in which the issue of voluntariness has been analysed by courts 
and law-making bodies, the second chapter sought to identify whether there any noticeable rules 
that could be identified in relation to the meaning of the concept. Here, the analysis looked to 
situations pertaining to either the voluntariness requirement or the automatism and insanity 
‘defences’. Addressing statutory instruments, case law, and proposals for reform from law-
making bodies, the chapter noted that there is avoidance in conceptualising voluntariness, due to 
a perceived complexity of the notion, as well as philosophical intricacies associated with it. 
However, it was emphasised that the lack of rationalisation of voluntariness has contributed to 
the development of different standards, according to the type of trigger or circumstance in which 
involuntariness arises. In most cases, the standard is reliant on the level of moral blameworthiness 
the defendant is deemed to have had, rather than their actual voluntariness.  The chapter also noted 
that, often, courts simply associate automatism with a loss of consciousness or control, but without 
clarifying whether or not that should be taken to define involuntariness. In other words, alternative 
language is used, without explaining whether or not it should be used as a standard to identify 
voluntariness.  
In light of the aforementioned issues, the third chapter sought to develop a provisional definition 
of voluntariness, focusing on the theoretical foundations of the requirements. Exploring 
 
45 R v Rimmington; R v Goldstein [2006] 1 AC 459, 482 (Lord Bingham). 
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philosophical conceptualisations of action and voluntariness, two main lines of inquiry were 
adopted. The first one focused on discerning what the target of the requirement should be, that is, 
identifying where the criminal law should look to in order to ascertain voluntariness. Here, the 
chapter concentrated on the way in which action has been defined in philosophy, addressing 
distinctions between so-called ‘basic’ and ‘complex’ actions.46 Specifically, it was argued that, in 
order to ascertain voluntariness, the law should focus on bodily movements, as opposed to action 
descriptions. Such an approach would see the requirement of voluntariness as a gateway to further 
assessments of liability.47 That is, once a movement – a basic action – is deemed voluntary, this 
would enable the law to carry out actus reus and mens rea assessments relevant to each offence, 
in the sense that more complex descriptions could be imposed on the movement.  
Once the chapter established the focus of the requirement on bodily movement, the second part 
of the chapter engaged in an exploration of multiple conceptualisations of voluntariness. 
Specifically, the analysis focused on three main concepts that could be used to describe 
voluntariness, namely ‘volition’, ‘intention’ and ‘control’, examining them from both 
philosophical and legal perspectives. First, it was highlighted that a reliance on volitions would 
maintain the conceptual issues currently affecting the voluntariness requirement, for it would 
serve to replace an abstract concept with an equally abstract one. Second, the chapter noted 
important drawbacks to such a conceptualisation of voluntariness based on intentions. Viewed as 
a standalone concept, intention could introduce uncertainty within the legal framework, given that 
it is already used as a constituent element of the mens rea of multiple offences. Equally, under a  
‘conscious intention’ model, the requirement would be under-inclusive, for it may exclude 
movements such as habitual ones, which have been frequently deemed as voluntary within legal 
scholarship and may nevertheless reflect a person’s agency.48 In this context, the inquiry 
 
46 Chapter 3.2.a. 
47 Chapter 3.3.  
48 Law Commission (n 12) para A.48. See also Jeremy Horder, ‘Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity’ 
(1993) 52 CLJ 298, 302; and J J Child, ‘Defence of a Basic Voluntary Act Requirement in Criminal Law 
from Philosophies of Action’ (2021) 24 New Criminal Law Review, 11. See however Gideon Yaffe, ‘The 
Voluntary Act Requirement’ in Andrei Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 
(Routledge 2012) 176: ‘We treat habitual bodily movements, that is, as though they were voluntary acts in 
the legal sense, even though we have no idea if they are in fact’. 
186 
 
concentrated on the model of voluntariness promoted in the present thesis, based on the control 
of bodily movement. Specifically, the chapter explored connections made within the philosophy 
of action as to the relevance of control for voluntariness. Here, it was argued that such a focus on 
control would alleviate concerns regarding habitual movements, as well as better promote one’s 
freedom and agency in moving, particularly in the context of the principle of alternate possibilities 
(PAP). Exploring multiple references to control within legal frameworks, the chapter proposed a 
model based on the agent’s sufficient retention of bodily control, in as much as they would still 
have the physical capacity to move otherwise – including refraining to move. Despite limitations 
surrounding the effective identification of the necessary threshold, the investigation established 
that a control model would be the most suitable model to adopt as a definition of voluntariness. 
In this context, the chapter concluded by provisionally proposing a definition of voluntariness as 
‘the exercise of sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can move otherwise’.   
To provide additional strength and to explore the model from an empirical perspective, the fourth 
chapter reflected on the suitability of the provisional definition by incorporating neuroscientific 
evidence into the assessment. Here, areas of the brain involved in executing bodily movements 
were identified, with a view to highlight the effect of potential impairments to such areas on the 
exercise of self-control. In addition, the chapter focused on inhibitory mechanisms, given their 
central role in enabling agents to refrain from moving their bodies, as well as empirical evidence 
showing which cognitive processes are at play in the control of bodily movements and what would 
impairments to those processes entail. Equally, addressing research on the nature of habitual 
movements, the chapter highlighted that such movements are not necessarily intentional, nor 
conscious. Specifically, the chapter discussed evidence to the effect that there are separate neural 
pathways dedicated to inhibiting habitual and goal-directed movements, which supports the 
presumption that even though they are both within our bodily control, such movements are 
distinct.  
Lastly, chapter five engaged in an application of the proposed model of voluntariness to the 
context of hypnotic movement. Beyond exploring the practical implications of adopting a control-
187 
 
based model, this analysis also sought to provide further clarification surrounding the status of 
hypnotic movements. Such movements have been categorised as involuntary by courts in multiple 
jurisdictions, but without providing full clarification as to why that is the case.49 Exploring 
theoretical and empirical evidence surrounding the nature of hypnotic movements, the chapter 
argued that agents do retain sufficient control when undergoing hypnosis. In other words, the 
capacity to inhibit or move alternatively is retained, indicating that under a control-based of 
voluntariness, hypnotised individuals move voluntarily. This finding challenged the approach 
taken by courts and law-making bodies to date, i.e. that of categorising such movements as 
involuntary. 
 
4. Limitations  
This study promotes a definition of voluntariness based on control, which, it is argued, is most 
appropriate from a practical and normative viewpoint, and seeks to bring clarity and consistency 
to the criminal legal framework. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge and highlight the 
limitations of the present study, for the thesis does not claim that the proposed definition is perfect,  
either descriptively or normatively. These issues should be underlined, for they may serve as the 
basis for further research and help improve the application of the requirement. From a descriptive 
perspective, a limitation surrounding the proposed model is represented by the still uncertain 
threshold at which one is no longer able to exercise bodily control. This threshold may well vary 
from person to person and as such, may be difficult to fully implement within a legal framework.50 
For example, one medical condition may manifest itself differently and not everyone suffering 
from it may experience a loss of inhibitory control. Evidence such as brain imagining may provide 
some indication, but that may not go beyond a mere correlation.51 Moreover, it would be 
 
49 See R v Coley [2013] EWCA Crim 233. 
50 See Chapter 4.2.c. 
51 Morse has been one of the biggest critics in this respect, stressing that correlation in neuroscience cannot 
amount to causation in law. See Stephen J Morse, ‘Brain Imaging in the Courtroom: The Quest for Legal 
Relevance’ (2014) 5 AJOB Neuroscience 24; Walter Glannon, ‘What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell 
Us about Criminal Responsibility’ in Michael Freeman, Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues 
Volume 13 (OUP 2011). 
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inefficient, not to mention financially and time consuming, if this type of evidence would be relied 
upon in every case in which the capacity to exercise would not be easily discernible. Equally, the 
standard against which such evidence should be assessed is uncertain. What would be the 
baseline, i.e. the neurological benchmark, for inhibitory capacity? Should the law concern itself 
with promoting a standard of a ‘normally’ functioning brain and inhibitory mechanism? These 
questions should be explored further.  
Following from the abovementioned issues, it must be reiterated that neuroscientific and 
empirical evidence surrounding our execution and inhibition of bodily movement cannot be fully 
relied upon to effect legal change or radically alter the legal standard.52 Beyond debates 
surrounding the potential for neuroscience to challenge the law’s reliance on free will, legal 
frameworks are ultimately liable to change according to normative considerations and social 
constructs.53 Decisions surrounding appropriate legal definition can well be influenced by 
empirical evidence but ultimately, they will be reflected within the framework through folk 
psychological criteria such as control, intention, etc. Neuroscience can help insofar as it may 
adjudicate certain individual cases and can help support certain assumptions such as those made 
in the present analysis. However, this will generally be related back to a folk psychological 
process, in the present case, i.e. that of controlling one’s bodily movements. The question of how 
much control one may need in order to be voluntary will always be a normative one.  
At the same time, one fundamental question that the law should seek to answer is whether, as a 
reflection of one’s agency, it is appropriate to focus on one’s capacity to move freely, as opposed 
to the impression of moving freely. Throughout the analysis, it has been argued that a control-
based model is the most suitable to apply, casting the reach of the requirement wide, including on 
 
52 For a discussion on the limitations of neuroscientific research in legal assessments, see Chapter 4.1. 
53 For instance, the past few decades have seen the criminalisation and decriminalisation of certain 
activities, in accordance with changes in public attitudes and shifts in societal standards. Such shifts have 
not relied on empirical evidence necessarily, but by the normative evolution within the legal framework. 
Even in relation to defences such as diminished responsibility or insanity, the focus has not been on the 
neural correlates of certain impairments, but on their behavioural application to folk psychological criteria. 
For further information, see Stephen J Morse, ‘Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience’, 
in Michael Freeman (ed), Law and Neuroscience (OUP 2011). 
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types of movements that are intuitively reflective of our agency and autonomy, such as habitual 
movements.54 However, a conceptual counterargument to such categorisation exists, which has 
been discussed in Chapter 3. This relates to the issue of reconciling the proposed model with those 
cases in which an agent lacks capacity to move otherwise, but their movements are nevertheless 
consistent with their desired goals.55 This counterargument is one of the commonly cited ones 
when it comes to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, upon which the proposed definition has 
been modelled.56 Certainly, philosophical accounts of action should not necessarily be conflated 
with legal ones. However, the criminal law should nevertheless consider whether one’s freedom 
of movement is to be found in genuine alternatives for movement or in one’s impression of having 
that ability. This is a question that cannot be easily answered, and which can be related, more 
widely, with that of whether the law should be concerned with the potential truth of determinism.  
Normatively, it should also be acknowledged that, while the primary basis for this thesis has been 
to recommend a statutory definition that would contribute to legal certainty and consistency 
within the legal framework, it is unlikely that such aims will ever be achieved in full. While a 
legal definition would surely contribute towards these objectives, the fact that such a definition 
will ultimately be interpreted by courts means that there are limits to the application of the 
definition in a clear and certain way. While the idea that like cases should be treated alike is a 
guiding principle of the common law, the risk of variability in the approach taken will remain. 
This is even more relevant in the present case, as the thesis argues for the abolition of the current 
law and the imposition of a new definition that should not be interpreted in light of previous case 
law on automatism and insanity. Thus, a new body of case law dedicated towards interpreting the 
definition would naturally develop. However, this would occur gradually and in a reactive 
manner, as courts will primarily issue guidance on the matter in light of individual cases that are 
 
54 This is notwithstanding the arguments as to whether the law should be concerned with habitual actions 
in the first place. For further information, see Yafee (n 47) 176-178.   
55 For further detail, see Chapter 3.c. 
56 For further information on PAP, see Frankfurt (n 48). 
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brought before them. This is a limitation of the common law as a whole and should be 
acknowledged here as well.  
Finally, the proposed definition of voluntariness may have to be revised in the future, in light of 
the nascent field of brain-computer interfaces. These allow people to use electrical signals from 
brain activity to provide commands to a computer.57 Currently, brain-computer interfaces are 
being experimented with in the context of people suffering from neuromuscular disorders such as 
cerebral palsy, or people with spinal cord injury. However, given the focus of the voluntariness 
requirement on bodily movements, the definition may have to be amended, in order to capture the 
capability of these systems as and when they develop. This could involve extending the definition 
to include bodily or ‘equivalent proxy’ control. Such an addition would not add unnecessary 
complexity to the requirement. This is because courts should find cases less troublesome to assess, 
due to the ability of computers to leave an evidential trail, as well as the fact that they operate 
based on well-defined triggers.  
 
5. Recommendations to Law-Making Bodies  
Throughout the thesis, the analysis has focused on demonstrating that maintaining a 
categorisation of automatism as a defence is conceptually inappropriate, potentially leading to 
over-criminalisation. Addressing philosophical and neuroscientific research with a view to 
produce a definition of voluntariness that is theoretically and empirically appropriate, the thesis 
has settled on a model based on control. In this context, it is important to emphasise a number of 
recommendations that the study seeks to make to law-making bodies. The aspects that courts or 
legislature should consider and act upon are the following:  
 
 
57 For further information, see Jerry J Shih, Dean J Krusienski, and Jonathan R Wolpawc, ‘Brain-
Computer Interfaces in Medicine’ (2012) 87 Mayo Clinic Proceedings 268. 
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• The automatism rules should not be categorised as a defence. 
Categorising automatism (and insanity, where a lack of voluntariness is concerned) as an 
excusatory defence is conceptually inaccurate, as an instance of automatism merely reflects that 
an essential element of liability has not been fulfilled.58 Defences operate on the assumption that 
the elements of an offence have been committed, but that there are strong reasons to excuse or 
justify the defendant’s actions. With involuntariness, there is nothing to excuse the defendant for, 
as no movement can be attributed to an autonomous agent in the first place. A lack of 
voluntariness is not concerned with the exercise of ‘capacities for rational deliberation and action’ 
in the way that excusatory defences are.59 
• The automatism rules should be abolished. 
As an essential ingredient of criminal responsibility, it is difficult to justify the co-existence of a 
requirement of voluntariness with that of automatism, even where there is a recognition that the 
latter does not amount to a defence. The fact that central to automatism assessments is one’s 
involuntariness is hard to reconcile with the application of a standard of voluntariness. Such an 
approach would add conceptual confusion to the criminal law and affect certainty in respect of 
what types of cases should be judged under which category. Instead, the automatism rules should 
be abolished. The same approach is recommended in relation to the insanity rules, where this 
concerns a lack of voluntariness.60 Instances of involuntariness that are currently addressed under 
automatism and insanity, depending on the trigger, should be approached under the remit of the 
voluntariness requirement.  
• Any criminal assessment should begin by ascertaining whether the defendant had 
been voluntary. 
 
58 See also J J Child and Alan Reed, ‘Automatism Is Never a Defence’ (2014) 65 NILQ 167. 
59 R A Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 
287. 
60 As discussed above in section 2.c, this need not bar the application of disposal powers.  
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The requirement of voluntariness should be viewed as a gateway to criminal responsibility 
assessments. Conceptually, the definition may be regarded as a subset of the actus reus of an 
offence, but this should be clearly distinguished from analyses surrounding the circumstances or 
effects of certain movements. That is, the voluntariness of the defendant should be established 
applied first and it is only once this is identified established that the criminal law should look to 
wider concerns relevant to the actus reus of the specific and mens rea of the offence, the mens 
rea, as well as the potential application of a defence. However, for practical purposes, a 
presumption of voluntariness may apply, provided the defendant only bears an evidential, rather 
than a legal burden of proof.  
• The focus of the requirement of voluntariness should be on bodily movements.  
The requirement of voluntariness should focus on bodily movements (or the lack of movement, 
in the case of omissions) as the target of the definition. Understood as basic actions, that is, as an 
action that is not the effect of a previous one, bodily movements offer the backdrop against which 
the criminal law can impose descriptions and carry out criminal responsibility assessments. In 
other words, once an agent is found to have moved voluntarily, the law can subsequently carry 
out actus reus and mens rea assessments. These relate to the consequences or circumstances in 
which those movements were carried out, what they amounted to, whether any criminal intention, 
recklessness, etc. accompanied them, and so on.  
• Voluntariness should be identified in relation to bodily control. 
The definition of voluntariness should be adopted is that of: 
the exercise of sufficient bodily control to the effect that one can move otherwise 
This approach rests on the idea that control is essential for free action as the basis for moral 
responsibility. That is, free action rests on our agential control and the ability to follow a course 
of action out of many possible ones at any given moment. Therefore, as autonomy is enhanced 
through the exercise of control and the availability of alternate possibilities of action, this is the 
most suitable conceptualisation of voluntariness. Such approach is also supported though 
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empirical research in respect of our ability to regulate movements, including the inhibition of 
movement.   
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